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ABSTRACT
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Theories of herding behavior predict that people tend to follow the crowdfor a variety of reasons,
for instance, to appear as talented as others or to learn from others.1 One important yet under-
explored feature of these models is the idea that less skilled individuals may herd on the decisions
of their predecessors, while those with superior ability may be more likely to deviate from past
actions to the point of exhibiting antiherding behavior. Despite the rich implications of this
intuition, however, there is little empirical evidence on the relationship between skill and the
tendency to follow the crowd.
In this paper we investigate the link between herding behavior and skill in the context of the
mutual fund industry, which is an ideal setting to study the relation between herding and skill for
two reasons. First, ample evidence shows that mutual funds and other institutional investors tend
to herd in their buying and selling decisions.2 Second, an extensive empirical literature on mutual
fund performance analyzes the returns and investment decisions of mutual fund managers in an
attempt to measure unobservable skill.3
To address the question of whether investors can identify skilled and unskilled mutual fund
managers by observing their tendency to herd, we create a dynamic measure of fund-level herding
that captures the tendency of a fund manager to imitate the trading decisions of the institutional
crowd. We then test whether di¤erences in herding behavior across funds predict mutual fund
performance and whether skill drives the link between herding and future performance.
In line with the theoretical literature, our measure of fund herding is based on the intertemporal
correlation between the trades of a given fund and the collective trading decisions that institutional
investors have made in the past.4 Each quarter we estimate the relation between a funds trades
and past institutional trades. We then average this relation over previous periods in the life of the
fund to obtain a measure of herding tendency. We control for a stocks market capitalization, book-
to-market ratio, and past returns to account for potential correlated trading induced by common
investing styles. After ltering out these common information components, our measure of herding
captures a funds tendency to imitate the past trading decisions of the crowd.
Our estimates of fund herding reveal a large degree of heterogeneity in herding behavior, with
some funds exhibiting a tendency to follow the crowd while others show a propensity to trade
in the opposite direction. These di¤erences in fund herding have strong predictive power for the
cross-section of mutual fund returns. The top-decile portfolio of herding funds underperforms the
bottom-decile portfolio of antiherding funds by 2.28% on an annualized basis, both before and after
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expenses. We obtain similar results when we account for exposures to factors such as the market risk
premium, size, value, momentum, and liquidity: the alphas from di¤erent multi-factor models vary
between 1.68% and 2.52% on an annualized basis. Accounting for time-varying factor exposures
yields a predicted performance gap of 2.04% per year. In multivariate predictive regressions, fund
herding can predict four-factor alphas after controlling for fund size, age, turnover, expense ratios,
net ows, and past performance. Furthermore, fund herding remains a strong predictor of mutual
fund performance when we control for determinants of herding behavior that have been shown
to predict mutual fund performance.5 Taken together, our results strongly support the view that
herding behavior captures unobservable skill.
How do di¤erences in skill lead to di¤erences in herding behavior? Theoretical models of sequen-
tial decision-making suggest that di¤erences in ability or information quality can drive di¤erences
in herding tendencies. For example, reputational herding models predict that while managers tend
to follow their predecessors to enhance the markets perception of their ability, managers with supe-
rior ability might choose to antiherd, going against market trends(Avery and Chevalier (1999)).
Models of sequential information acquisition predict that earlier-informed investors anticipate the
actions of later-informed investors and hence can prot by reversing their positions, thus exhibiting
antiherding behavior (Hirshleifer, Subrahmanyam, and Titman (1994)). Models of informational
cascades predict that while agents tend to disregard their information signals to follow the crowd,
higher-precision individuals are more likely to use their information (Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer, and
Welch (1992)).6
We conduct a number of tests to deepen our understanding of the link between heterogeneity
in herding behavior and skill. First, we test whether antiherding funds consistently make better
investment decisions than herding funds, irrespective of the decisions of the institutional crowd.
Specically, we analyze the performance of mutual fundsinvestment choices for the subset of stocks
that are not heavily traded by institutions. The results show that stocks that constitute large bets
by antiherding funds outperform stocks held mostly by herding funds: the di¤erence in returns
is large and signicant, with an average Carhart alpha of 38 bps per month. Antiherding funds
therefore make better investment decisions than their herding peers, even on stocks that are not
subject to potential price pressure caused by institutional herds.
Second, we examine time-series variation in the performance gap between herding and antiherd-
ing funds. If di¤erences in skill drive di¤erences in herding behavior, we should observe a widening
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of the performance gap in times of greater investment opportunities in the mutual fund industry,
which skilled funds would be better able to exploit. Using stock return dispersion, average idio-
syncratic volatility, and investor sentiment to capture time-varying investment opportunities, we
nd that the performance gap between herding and antiherding funds is indeed signicantly larger
during and after periods in which opportunities for active managers are more valuable.
Third, we show that the performance gap between herding and antiherding funds is persistent,
with return di¤erentials that are large and signicant over horizons of up to two years after the
measurement of fund herding. This result suggests that the link between herding behavior and
future performance is not due to chance.
Fourth, we consider a sequential information acquisition framework in which earlier-informed
investors trade ahead of others and subsequently prot by unwinding their positions, thereby ex-
hibiting antiherding behavior (Froot, Scharfstein, and Stein (1992), Hirshleifer, Subrahmanyam,
and Titman (1994)). In this setting, earlier-informed investors are able to anticipate the trades
of later-informed investors. We show that the trades of antiherding funds can predict the trades
of the institutional crowd, suggesting that their outperformance is related to superior ability and
informational advantages.
Inspired by the theoretical literature on reputational herding, we next study how skill interacts
with career concerns to shape the response of mutual fund managers to reputational incentives.
We build on previous work on career concerns in the mutual fund industry (Chevalier and Ellison
(1999)) and argue that imitating the crowd can represent a rational response to career concerns.
We rst show that inexperienced managers face higher probabilities of termination and herding
can reduce inexperienced managersgreater likelihood of termination. When we introduce skill in
our analysis, we nd that, as predicted, the negative relation between herding behavior and future
performance is stronger for inexperienced managers. This result suggests that, among career-
concerned managers, a strong herding tendency reveals lack of skill, whereas antiherding might
signal superior ability in the absence of a su¢ ciently long performance record.
We conclude our empirical analysis by conducting a series of tests to assess the robustness of the
predictive ability of fund herding for mutual fund performance. We start by showing that our results
are not sensitive to the empirical methodology used to estimate fund herding; they continue to hold
if we estimate the trade regression after ltering out not only investment styles such as size, value,
and momentum, but also a large set of stock characteristics such as liquidity, idiosyncratic volatility,
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net issuance, industry membership, and revisions in analyst earnings forecasts. We also show that
the fund ows channel does not drive our ndings, as our predictive regressions of performance
include a control for fund ows,7 and we estimate fund herding after controlling for a funds own
past trades, which accounts for trade persistence induced by persistent capital ows. Finally, we
show that our results are not sensitive to how we measure fund performance: in particular, the
results continue to hold when we use performance measures based on fundsholdings or trades.
Our analysis brings together and extends two large bodies of empirical work that thus far have
evolved separately. First, we contribute to the literature on mutual fund performance, which seeks
to address the challenge of identifying skilled managers in the cross-section of mutual funds. Recent
studies in this literature construct new measures of skill based on fundsholdings and trades in an
attempt to nd reliable predictors of mutual fund returns. Our evidence on the predictability of
mutual fund performance uncovers the role of herding behavior as a powerful tool to capture the
distribution of skill among mutual fund managers.
Second, we contribute to the empirical literature on herding behavior. First, we introduce a
dynamic measure of fund-level herding behavior and relate it to managerial skill in the mutual
fund industry. Previous studies estimate institutional herding using stock-level measures of the
clustering of trades in a given period, with a focus on their impact on stock prices.8 In contrast,
our measure of fund herding enables us to investigate the dynamic link between imitative behavior
and skill while controlling for fund characteristics and ltering out common information signals,
common preferences, and common investment styles. Second, we shed new light on the dynamics
of herding behavior over a managers career cycle. Chevalier and Ellison (1999) show that younger
mutual fund managers are less likely to make investment decisions that deviate from their peers.
We extend this analysis by using our dynamic measure of imitation and analyzing its interaction
with managerial ability. We show that di¤erences in herding behavior reveal di¤erences in skill for
less experienced managers, who cannot rely on a long performance record to signal their ability.
Our results represent an important step toward understanding how incentives shape managerial
behavior in the presence of cross-sectional dispersion in skill.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section I describes the construction of our
measure of fund-level herding. Section II presents our main results on the ability of fund herding
to predict mutual fund performance. Section III presents tests that identify skill as the driver
of the link between fund herding and future performance. Section IV investigates the relation
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between skill and herding in the presence of reputational concerns. Section V provides results of
several robustness tests using alternative estimates of fund herding and fund performance. Section
VI presents evidence on whether investors respond to the information contained in fund herding.
Section VII concludes the paper.
I. Fund Herding
In this section we begin by describing the data. We then describe the estimation of our measure
of fund herding, namely the tendency of mutual funds to follow past institutional trades.
A. Data
Our sample consists of all actively managed U.S. equity funds from 1990 to 2009. Data on
monthly fund returns and other fund characteristics come from the CRSP Mutual Fund database,
and data on fund stock holdings come from the Thomson Reuters Mutual Fund Holdings data-
base. As we wish to capture active mutual funds that invest primarily in U.S. equities, we rst
exclude index funds from our sample. We then follow Kacperczyk, Sialm, and Zheng (2008) and
eliminate balanced, bond, money market, sector, and international funds, as well as funds that do
not primarily invest in US common equity.9 To address the incubation bias documented by Elton,
Gruber, and Blake (2001) and Evans (2010), we further exclude observations prior to the reported
fund inception date, and funds whose net assets fall below $5 million. We also require that funds
have at least 10 stock holdings to be eligible for consideration in our analysis. This process leaves
us with 2,255 distinct mutual funds.
To compute aggregate institutional trades, we use data from Thomson Reuters Institutional
Holdings database, which collects institutional investors13F lings.10 Finally, we obtain stock price
and return data from the CRSP monthly stock les and accounting information from Compustat.
Panel A of Table I reports descriptive statistics for our pooled sample of 56,116 fund-quarters.
The characteristics include fund size (total net assets under management, in millions of dollars),
fund age (in years), fund turnover, expense ratio, quarterly net ows (computed as the growth rate
of assets under management after adjusting for the appreciation of the funds assets), and quarterly
net fund returns. An average fund in our sample manages 1.6 billion dollars of assets, is 17 years
old, has an annual expense ratio of 1.27%, and has an annual turnover ratio of 85%. The average
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fund achieves an average net return of 1.55% per quarter and attracts 1.32% net money ow. These
numbers are in line with those typically reported in the mutual fund literature.
[Insert Table I about here]
B. Fund Herding Measure
We dene fund herding as the tendency of a mutual fund to imitate past actions of the institu-
tional crowd. Theoretical models of herding behavior analyze the incentives and choices of agents
who decide whether to follow the crowd after looking at the decisionspreviously made by other
agents (Scharfstein and Stein (1990), Banerjee (1992), Bikhchandani et al. (1992)). This dynamic
imitative behavior implies an intertemporal correlation between the action of an agent and the
previous actions of the crowd. In line with this idea of sequential decision-making, our measure of
herding captures dynamic imitation of past actions. The empirical literature on herding has not
su¢ ciently emphasized the inherently dynamic nature of imitative behavior. The most commonly
used measure of institutional herding, introduced by Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny (1992, LSV),
is based on the proportion of funds that buy the same stock in the same quarter. However, this
measure is not ideal for capturing a funds tendency to imitate the crowd, for two main reasons.
First, it is constructed at the stock level, and thus is a stock characteristic rather than a fund
characteristic. Second, it describes the clustering of mutual funds trades in a given stock at a
given point in time rather than a dynamic tendency to follow the decisions of the crowd.11
With our new approach, we focus on developing a measure that is more closely related to the
theoretical concept of herding. Our measure has two novel characteristics: (i) it is estimated at the
fund level, and (ii) it captures the dynamic link between the decisions of a fund and the decisions
made by the crowd in the past. To capture the actions of a fund, we use its trades, and to represent
the crowd in a comprehensive way, we use the set of all institutional investors. Specically, for
each fund j and quarter t, we run a cross-sectional regression of fund trades on past aggregate
institutional trades:
Tradei;j;t = j;t + j;tIOi;t 1 + 1j;tMomi;t 1 + 2j;tMCi;t 1 + 3j;tBMi;t 1 + "i;j;t: (1)
The dependent variable is the percentage change in the number of split-adjusted shares of stock
i in the portfolio of mutual fund j during quarter t: Tradei;j;t = (Ni;j;t   Ni;j;t 1)=Ni;j;t 1.12
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The main independent variable is the change in the aggregate institutional ownership of stock i
during quarter t  1, where institutional ownership is the fraction of shares outstanding of stock i
owned by institutional investors (13F institutions): IOi;t 1 = Ni;t 1=Nouti;t 1  Ni;t 2=Nouti;t 2. The
trade regressions control for three stock characteristics representing the main investment styles of
mutual funds: momentum, Momi;t 1, the return on stock i measured during quarter t  1; market
capitalization, MCi;t 1, the natural log of the market capitalization of stock i at the end of quarter
t   1; and book-to-market, BMi;t 1, the log book-to-market ratio of the stock at the end of the
previous quarter. To render the magnitude of the slope coe¢ cients comparable across funds and
over time, we standardize both the dependent and the independent variables such that they have
a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one for each fund-quarter.13
The slope coe¢ cient, j;t, captures the association between manager js trades in the current
quarter and institutional trades in the previous quarter, and forms the building block of our measure
of fund herding. The inclusion of stock characteristics in the trade regressions is a novel aspect
of our approach to estimating fund-level herding: it allows us to control for commonalities in
investment styles and institutional preferences, which could give rise to correlated trades across
money managers. We include a stocks past returns to control for the tendency of mutual funds to
engage in positive feedback trading (Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers (1995)). We also include a
stocks market capitalization and book-to-market ratio to control for the possibility that a common
investment style may induce correlated trading (Barberis and Shleifer (2003), Froot and Teo (2008)).
The slope j;t can therefore be interpreted as a partial correlation coe¢ cient between current fund
trades and past aggregate trades, which captures imitation and is not confounded by common
preferences or other determinants of comovement in trading decisions.
We next construct our measure of fund-level herding, FHj;t, which captures the average ten-
dency of a fund to follow past institutional trades. In particular, we adopt a rank inverse-weighting
scheme that assigns higher weights to more recent observations. For each fund j and quarter t, we
compute the weighted average of j;t during the funds history up to quarter t, with weights that
vary inversely with the distance of the coe¢ cients from quarter t:
FHj;t =
tP
h=1
1
hj;t h+1
tP
h=1
1
h
: (2)
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By attributing higher weights to more recent coe¢ cients, this measure reects more strongly the
funds most recent trading decisions. A mutual fund investor who observes the history of fund js
trades would plausibly want to use as much information as possible to estimate the funds average
tendency to herd, while updating his estimate with fresh information each quarter. Attributing
more weight to more recent information allows the investor to account for changes in the funds
trading behavior and for the decay of the information content of fund trades over time.14
Panel B of Table I presents descriptive statistics for the coe¢ cients j;t and the fund herding
measure FHj;t. The statistics include mean, standard deviation, and several quantiles computed
cross-sectionally each quarter and then averaged over the 80 quarters in our sample. The results
show that on average betas are equal to 2.30%, with a standard deviation of 18.73%. Fund herding
has a similar mean, at 2.42%, and considerably lower standard deviation, at 7.12%.15 Most impor-
tantly, these results show that fund herding exhibits substantial heterogeneity, varying from 8.81%
(5th percentile) to 13.86% (95th percentile). It is precisely this cross-sectional heterogeneity that
is the focus of our analysis on fund herding, performance, and skill.
II. Fund Herding and Future Performance
To investigate the link between herding behavior and skill, we start by testing whether fund
herding has predictive power for the cross-section of mutual fund performance. We examine both
net returns and gross returns, which add back fees and expenses. We start from univariate portfolio
tests. We then estimate predictive regressions that control for multiple fund characteristics.
A. Portfolios
In this subsection we use portfolio-based analysis to examine the link between fund herding
and future performance. At the end of each quarter, we sort mutual funds into 10 portfolios
based on our measure of fund herding, FHj;t. We then compute equally weighted returns for each
decile over the subsequent quarter, both net and before fees and expenses. We also estimate the
risk-adjusted returns of these portfolios as intercepts from time-series regressions using the capital
asset pricing model (CAPM), the three-factor model of Fama and French (1993), the four-factor
model of Carhart (1997), and the ve-factor model of Pástor and Stambaugh (2003). To allow
for time-variation in factor loadings, we follow Ferson and Schadt (1996) and assume a linear
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relation between factor loadings and ve conditioning variables: a January dummy and four lagged
macroeconomic variables, namely, the one-month Treasury bill yield, the aggregate dividend yield,
the term spread, and the default spread.
Table II presents the portfolio results. The top row reports the average value of fund herding
for each decile portfolio, measured at the end of quarter t. Funds in the top decile exhibit a
strong tendency to follow past institutional trades, with mean values of fund herding reaching
15.3%, whereas funds in the bottom decile exhibit antiherding behavior, with large and negative
values of fund herding reaching  10:4%. Fund returns are measured in each month of quarter
t+ 1. The panel for net returns shows that, in the quarter following portfolio formation, the funds
with the highest herding tendency in decile 10 underperform the funds with the highest antiherding
tendency in decile 1 by 19 bps per month, which implies a return di¤erential of 2.28% per year. The
performance di¤erential between herding and antiherding funds cannot be attributed to di¤erences
in risk loadings or investment styles, as the di¤erences in alphas from the CAPM, Fama and French,
Carhart, Pástor and Stambaugh, and Ferson and Schadt models are  21,  17,  16,  14, and  17
bps per month, all statistically signicant. If we consider gross fund returns, the results paint the
same picture: herding funds in decile 10 strongly underperform their antiherding peers in decile 1.
Overall, the performance di¤erential between herding and antiherding funds ranges between 1.68%
and 2.52% on an annualized basis.
The results above show that cross-sectional di¤erences in fund herding can signicantly predict
di¤erences in mutual fund performance, which suggests that fund herding is related to mutual
fund skill. The performance di¤erential between herding and antiherding funds is economically
important, especially when considered in light of existing evidence on cross-sectional dispersion in
mutual fund performance.
[Insert Table II about here]
B. Determinants of Fund Herding
In this subsection we investigate the relation between fund herding and several fund charac-
teristics previously shown to be associated with fund performance. Table III reports the results.
The rst column presents coe¢ cient estimates from a cross-sectional regression of fund herding on
fund size, age, expense ratio, turnover, net ows, and performance (measured by a funds Fama-
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French alpha estimated over the previous three years). The results show that funds with a stronger
propensity to herd tend to be older and less active, as indicated by the lower portfolio turnover.
Other fund characteristics such as expense ratios and past performance do not play a signicant
role in explaining cross-sectional di¤erences in mutual fund herding.
[Insert Table III about here]
We also consider recently developed measures of mutual fund skill that might be viewed as
naturally linked to our measure of fund herding; since these measures have been previously used to
predict fund returns, we include them as controls in our analysis of fund herding and performance.
First, herding funds might underperform their peers if they do not deviate from their benchmarks;
Cremers and Petajisto (2009) show that funds with lower active share, that is, whose portfolios
overlap more with their benchmark, tend to underperform. Second, they might underperform if
they rely more on public information, as shown by Kacperczyk and Seru (2007). Third, they might
underperform if their investment decisions di¤er from those of funds with good past performance,
as documented by Cohen, Coval, and Pástor (2005).16
The second column of Table III shows that fund herding is related to these three measures in
intuitive ways: funds with a higher tendency to herd exhibit lower active share, stronger reliance on
public information, and weaker similarity with the investment decisions of successful funds. As an
alternative measure of the degree to which a fund deviates from its benchmark, in the third column
of the table we use tracking error. The results show a negative relation between fund herding and
tracking error, which provides further evidence that antiherding funds exhibit a relatively higher
tendency to deviate from benchmarks. In summary, the evidence in this section suggests that less
skilled and less active funds appear to herd more.
C. Predictive Regressions
Given the association between fund herding and fund characteristics documented in the previous
subsection, we now use multivariate regressions to examine the robustness of the predictive power
of herding for mutual fund performance. Our measure of performance is the monthly four-factor
alpha of Carhart (1997), estimated over the months in quarter t+ 1 as the di¤erence between the
realized fund return in excess of the risk-free rate and the expected excess fund return from a four-
factor model that includes the market, size, value, and momentum factors. The factor loadings are
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estimated from rolling-window time-series regressions of fund returns over the previous three years.
Herding and fund characteristics are measured using information available at the end of quarter t.
Table IV presents the predictive panel regression results. We rst control for fund size, age,
portfolio turnover, expense ratio, net ows, and past alpha. We then include controls for the
measures described in the previous subsection that are related to fund herding: active share,
reliance on public information, similarity with past winners, and tracking error. We measure fund
performance using both net and gross fund returns. To control for aggregate movements in fund
returns over time, we include time xed e¤ects in the regressions. Furthermore, since the residuals
might correlate within funds, we cluster the standard errors by fund.17
We nd that fund herding reliably predicts mutual fund performance. The rst column of
Table IV shows that a univariate regression of four-factor net alphas on past herding yields a slope
coe¢ cient of  0:466, with a t-statistic of  5:16. To provide intuition on the economic magnitude
of this coe¢ cient, we note that a fund with a herding tendency of 1.65 standard deviations above
average underperforms a fund with a herding tendency of 1.65 standard deviations below average
by 11 bps per month, or 1.32% per year.18 Controlling for the inuence of fund characteristics
(second column) reduces the slope coe¢ cient only slightly to  0:438, with a t-statistic of  4:83.
Inclusion of other measures of skill or other measures of deviation from benchmarks, such as active
share, reliance on public information, similarity with successful funds, or tracking error, does not
reduce the ability of fund herding to predict mutual fund performance. Furthermore, the results
do not change if we measure alphas using gross returns.
[Insert Table IV about here]
In general, the fund characteristics relate to future fund performance in a way that is consistent
with previous ndings. For example, consistent with Chen et al. (2004), fund size is negatively
related to future performance. Consistent with Carhart (1997), fund turnover is negatively related
to future performance. Past ows have a positive relation with future performance, consistent with
the smart-money e¤ect documented by Gruber (1996) and Zheng (1999), although their signicance
is not robust to the introduction of further controls for skill. Expense ratios are unrelated to future
gross performance, but negatively predict future net alphas, which deduct fees and expenses. Past
alphas are not signicantly related to future performance. Finally, active share and similarity with
past winners signicantly predict mutual fund performance.
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We conclude that cross-sectional di¤erences in fund herding provide investors with valuable
information on the distribution of mutual fund skill. Even after controlling for characteristics
related to both fund herding and fund performance, fund herding retains its economic importance
and statistical signicance.
III. Does Herding Behavior Reveal Skill?
The predictive power of fund herding for mutual fund performance suggests that herding be-
havior reveals unobservable skill. In this section we deepen our analysis of the link between herding
behavior and managerial skill. We organize our investigation into four parts.
First, we test whether antiherding funds consistently make better investment decisions than
herding funds, even when considering stocks that are not heavily traded by the institutional crowd,
thus revealing that they are generally more skilled. Second, we test whether the performance
gap between herding and antiherding funds widens in times of greater investment opportunities in
the mutual fund industry, when managerial ability is more valuable. Third, we test whether this
performance gap is persistent over longer horizons, to further check that it is due to di¤erences
in skill rather than chance. Finally, we test whether antiherding funds might be able to acquire
information earlier than others and exploit their informational advantage by exhibiting antiherding
behavior and superior performance.
A. Revealing Skill through Investment Choices
Di¤erences in skill across funds should be reected in di¤erent investment choices. If the
performance gap between herding and antiherding funds is driven by skill, antiherding funds should
consistently make better investment decisions than those of their herding peers. We test this
hypothesis by analyzing the future returns of the stocks held in the portfolios of funds characterized
by di¤erent herding tendencies. We focus on the subset of stocks with small changes in institutional
ownership, as these stocks are least likely to drive our estimates of fund herding. This stock-level
analysis has the advantage of providing a clean identication of the link between herding and skill
by excluding potential alternative channels related to price pressure or chance.
This test is designed as follows. Each quarter t, we sort all stocks on the absolute value of
their prior-quarter change in institutional ownership and select those in the bottom tercile of the
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distribution. We then aggregate the positions of all funds that own these stocks, accounting for each
funds herding tendency. Specically, we scale the weight of stock i in the portfolio of fund j (wji;t)
using a simple transformation of our fund herding measure: we demean the herding decile rank of
each fund, rank(FHjt ), ip its sign, and divide by 10. This simple rescaling implies that stocks
in the portfolio of herding funds get a negative weight and stocks in the portfolio of antiherding
funds get a positive weight. Moreover, the weight of each stock reects the strength of the herding
tendency of the funds that own it. We thus obtain a stock-level measure of fund herding:
SFHi;t =
JX
j=1
wji;t
 
 rank(FH
j
t )  rank(FHjt )
10
!
: (3)
We test whether this stock-level measure of fund herding predicts stock returns. At the end of
each quarter we sort stocks into quintiles based on SFHi;t and compute their monthly returns in the
subsequent quarter. If heterogeneity in the propensity to herd captures di¤erences in stock-picking
ability across funds, SFHi;t should predict cross-sectional di¤erences in stock returns. In particular,
if antiherding funds are more skilled than their herding peers, then stocks with higher SFHi;t , which
are mostly held by antiherding funds, should outperform those with lower SFHi;t , which are mostly
held by herding funds.
Table V reports average monthly returns for the ve portfolios of stocks sorted on SFHi;t , as well
as alphas estimated using di¤erent performance evaluation models. The results strongly indicate
that stocks that represent large bets by antiherding funds outperform stocks that are mostly held
by herding funds. The di¤erences in returns are large and signicant, irrespective of the model
used to estimate alphas; focusing on Carhart alphas, for example, the return gap is on average
38 bps per month. Importantly, this analysis is restricted to stocks that, by construction, are not
likely to drive our fund herding estimates. This implies that the performance di¤erential between
herding and antiherding funds is not likely to be driven solely by herding and antiherding trades,
but rather by investment decisions related to unobservable skill. Moreover, this implies that the
return di¤erentials reported in Table V are attributable to di¤erences in the ability of managers to
pick stocks, rather than to potential price pressure induced by changes in institutional ownership.19
[Insert Table V about here]
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B. Time-Varying Opportunities and the Value of Skill
To the extent that the performance gap between herding and antiherding funds is driven by
di¤erences in skill, it should increase in times of greater investment opportunities in the mu-
tual fund industry, when investment skill is more valuable. We test this hypothesis using three
measures of investment opportunities in the mutual fund industry. First, we consider the cross-
sectional dispersion in stock returns used by Ankrim and Ding (2002), Petajisto (2013), and Pás-
tor, Stambaugh, and Taylor (2017). As in previous literature, we measure return dispersion us-
ing the Russell-Parametric Cross-Sectional Volatility Index for U.S. equities, which is given by
CrossV olt =
qPN
i=1wi;t 1(Ri;t  Rm;t)2, where Ri;t is the return on stock i in month t, Rm;t is
the return on the market portfolio in month t, and wi;t 1 is the beginning-of-period, oat-adjusted
capitalization weight of stock i.20 As the cross-sectional dispersion in stock returns around the mar-
ket increases, both the potential gain from outperforming the market and the potential loss from
underperforming it increase, and hence the spread in performance between skilled and unskilled
managers is likely to widen. The second measure of time-varying prot opportunities for mutual
funds is average idiosyncratic volatility (IV ), which is computed as the cross-sectional mean of
the residual standard deviation from daily Fama-French regressions estimated for each rm-month.
The third measure is the investor sentiment index (Sent), which is constructed as in Baker and
Wurgler (2006).
We present two sets of results. First, we estimate time-series regressions of the monthly return
di¤erential between herding and antiherding funds (decile portfolios 10 and 1, before and after
fees) on return dispersion, idiosyncratic volatility, and investor sentiment. The results are reported
in Panel A of Table VI. The negative and statistically signicant coe¢ cients indicate that the
di¤erence in performance between herding and antiherding funds widens both during and after
periods of high investment opportunities for active mutual funds, in line with our conjecture.
[Insert Table VI about here]
We next use our panel regression framework to test whether the cross-sectional di¤erences in
performance predicted by fund herding are linked to variation in prot opportunities. Our main
independent variables are fund herding and its interaction with return dispersion, idiosyncratic
volatility, and investor sentiment. We also control for fund size, age, expense ratio, turnover, ows,
and past alpha. The results are reported in Panel B of Table VI. The coe¢ cient estimates on
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fund herding are negative and signicant, and of similar magnitude to our baseline results. The
estimated coe¢ cients on the interaction terms are signicantly negative, particularly for return
dispersion and investor sentiment, which suggests that the performance gap between herding and
antiherding funds is greater during and after periods of high investment opportunities in the mutual
fund industry.
Our analysis of the time-varying performance of herding funds complements recent work by
Kacperczyk, Van Nieuwerburgh, and Velkamp (2014, 2016), who focus on fund managerscognitive
ability in processing information and propose a measure of managerial skill that emphasizes market
timing in recessions and stock picking in booms. Our results suggest that the tendency of mutual
funds to follow the crowd is particularly e¤ective at capturing managerial skill during and after
periods in which prot opportunities and rm-specic information are more valuable.
C. Performance Persistence
The literature on mutual fund performance has long recognized the challenge in separating
mutual fund skill from chance. One may thus wonder if herding funds underperform due to bad
luck, while antiherding funds are simply be lucky. To test this potential alternative explanation,
we examine the persistence in the performance di¤erential between herding and antiherding funds.
Each quarter we group funds into decile portfolios on the basis of their herding tendency and track
their performance over the subsequent two years. If the performance gap between herding and
antiherding funds were random, we would expect it to weaken and revert to zero as we extend
the holding horizon, while if performance is related to skill, we would expect a certain degree of
persistence.
The results of this analysis, presented in Table VII, reveal that the performance gap related to
herding is remarkably persistent. For example, net and gross return di¤erentials are 15 bps per
month in the subsequent six months and persist when we extend the holding period to nine months
and 12 months. Similarly, the di¤erence in four-factor alphas between herding and antiherding
funds is 11 bps and persists to a horizon of one year. At longer horizons the performance gap starts
to taper o¤, but remains economically important and statistically signicant. This high degree of
persistence lends further support to the hypothesis that the association between fund herding and
future performance is related to skill.
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[Insert Table VII about here]
D. Anticipating the Actions of the Crowd
In this subsection we consider a gradual information acquisition framework to study di¤erences
in skill between herding and antiherding funds. In this setting, investors who acquire information
earlier than others are more likely to display antiherding behavior. In particular, these earlier-
informed investors are likely to exploit their informational advantage by trading ahead of others, and
then unwinding their positions when the trades of the later-informed investors cause prices to more
fully reect information, thus realizing a prot (Froot, Scharfstein, and Stein (1992), Hirshleifer,
Subrahmanyam, and Titman (1994)). An immediate implication of this theoretical framework is
that the earlier-informed investors are able to anticipate the trades of the later-informed investors.
We use this implication to test whether the trades of antiherding funds can anticipate the trades
of other institutions, thus identifying antiherding funds as the skilled, earlier-informed investors in
this economic setting.
Using Fama-MacBeth (1973) cross-sectional regressions, we estimate the ability of herding and
antiherding funds to anticipate the trades of the crowd in the subsequent quarter (IOt+1) and
in the subsequent year (IOt+1:t+4). Table VIII presents the results. The estimates show that
antiherding funds can signicantly predict aggregate institutional trades; the coe¢ cients on the
current trades of antiherding funds are positive and statistically signicant in all regression speci-
cations. In contrast, the trades of herding funds are not related to subsequent institutional trades.
When we include several stock characteristics in the regression specication, we nd that past ag-
gregate trades, market capitalization, and stock turnover have negative predictability for aggregate
trades, while the trading decisions of antiherding funds retain their positive and signicant predic-
tive power. These results provide further evidence of a skill channel that might link di¤erences in
herding behavior to di¤erences in mutual fund performance.
[Insert Table VIII about here]
IV. Skill and Reputational Herding
Theoretical models of reputational herding generally predict that managers have an incentive
to imitate the actions of their predecessors to enhance the markets perception of their ability.
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Under some conditions, however, managers with superior ability have weaker incentives to herd,
choosing instead to deviate from past actions. For example, Scharfstein and Stein (1990) emphasize
that factors such as relative performance ranking or the reward for new investment ideas could
encourage skilled managers to anti-herd. Moreover, a number of reputational herding models focus
on the evolution of career concerns and herding incentives over a managers career cycle, and derive
implications for herding and antiherding behavior conditional on managerial experience.21 In this
line of research, Avery and Chevalier (1999) develop a model in which experienced managers who
are aware of their superior ability choose to anti-herd, demonstrating their self-condence by going
against market trends.In a di¤erent setting, Prendergast and Stole (1996) show that agents who
know their expertise may take bold actions to signal that they are talented.22
In this section we study how skill interacts with career concerns to shape herding and antiherding
incentives. We focus on three questions. First, building on Chevalier and Ellison (1999), we ask
whether there is evidence of career concerns among the mutual fund managers in our sample, and
whether herding might provide an incentive to attenuate such concerns. Second, we test whether
managers with stronger career concerns respond to these potential incentives to herd. Finally, we
study the degree to which herding and antiherding choices reveal skill for managers experiencing
di¤erent levels of career concerns.
Chevalier and Ellison (1999) examine a sample of mutual fund managers over the period 1992 to
1994. Measuring managersexperience with age, and measuring herding behavior using deviations
from their peersinvestment decisions in a given period, the authors nd that younger managers
are more likely to be red for deviating from their peers and are more likely to cluster with their
peersinvestment decisions. We extend this analysis using our dynamic measure of fund herding.
To translate our investigation at the manager level, we restrict our sample to the subset of mutual
funds that are managed by an individual manager, excluding team-managed funds. This lter leaves
us with about 40% of the original sample. We construct two measures of managerial experience: (i)
general experience, dened as the number of years during which a manager appears on the CRSP
database, and (ii) fund-specic tenure, dened as the number of years during which a manager is
employed in a given fund.
We start by estimating the determinants of the probability of termination for a fund manager.
We measure terminations by keeping track of all instances in which managers lose their position
with a fund and disappear from our sample.23 We estimate logit regressions in which the dependent
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variable is an indicator for whether the manager of a given fund in quarter t is no longer in our
sample from quarter t+ 1 onward. Table IX, Panel A, reports both the estimated logit coe¢ cients
and the marginal e¤ects associated with an innitesimal increase in the variable of interest when
all other variables are held at their mean values. The results show that less experienced managers
face a higher probability of termination: the coe¢ cient estimates on both general experience and
fund-specic tenure are signicantly negative. The coe¢ cient on fund herding is negative and
signicant, indicating that managers have incentives to follow the crowd in order to decrease the
probability of negative career outcomes. The results also show that high past performance decreases
the probability of termination, fund size and fund age are signicant, and tracking error has a
marginally signicant e¤ect. To gain a more intuitive understanding of the magnitude of the
impact of herding behavior, we compute the predicted probability of termination for two managers
who belong to the top and bottom deciles of the distribution of fund herding. We calculate that,
holding all other variables at their mean values, an antiherding manager faces a 5.5% probability
of termination, whereas a herding manager faces a lower probability of termination of 4.2%. To
the extent that following the crowd helps reduce the probability of termination, we can infer that
reputational incentives contribute to herding behavior.
In Panel B of Table IX we analyze the impact of herding on termination probabilities conditional
on experience (above and below cross-sectional median values). The results show that the impact
of herding is large among low-experience managers, whereas it is insignicant for high-experience
managers. We nd that, among low-experience managers, the probability of termination is 7.4%
for antiherding managers and 5.1% for herding managers; in contrast, these probabilities are very
similar (4.4% and 4%) among experienced managers. Similarly, the benet of herding translates
into a 2.1% lower probability of termination among managers with shorter fund-specic tenure,
but a 0.8% lower probability of termination for managers with longer tenure. Our evidence on
termination probabilities indicates that herding behavior might constitute a rational response to
reputational incentives that vary over a managers career.
[Insert Table IX about here]
Do mutual fund managers respond to such reputational incentives? We estimate cross-sectional
regressions of fund herding on managerial experience, controlling for fund characteristics. The
results in Table X show that less experienced managers are more likely to herd; the negative
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association between experience and herding holds both for general experience and for fund-specic
tenure. These results are consistent with Chevalier and Ellison (1999) and, like their study, support
models of reputational herding that predict stronger herding incentives for more career-concerned
managers. We contribute to their investigation by analyzing this question in a richer framework,
using a measure of herding that is dynamic and thus better able to capture the idea of intertemporal
imitation.
[Insert Table X about here]
Finally, we take our investigation further by analyzing di¤erences in performance across man-
agers that di¤er in the intensity of both their career concerns and their herding tendency. At the
end of each quarter, we sort all mutual fund managers into four groups based on fund herding; we
also sort them independently into managers with low, medium, and high levels of experience. For
each group we compute subsequent net returns and four-factor alphas. The results are presented
in Table XI. We nd that di¤erences in herding behavior predict large and signicant di¤erences in
performance for funds with less experienced managers. In particular, using our proxy for general
experience, the performance gap between herding and antiherding funds is 18bps per month for
inexperienced managers and becomes insignicant for the most experienced managers. Using our
measure of fund-specic tenure, the performance di¤erential associated with di¤erences in herding
behavior is 22bps for inexperienced managers, decreases to 16bps for managers with a medium
level of experience, and becomes zero for the most established managers.
These results show that di¤erences in herding behavior reveal skill more strongly for inexperi-
enced, career-concerned managers. Among these managers, a strong herding tendency reveals lack
of skill, whereas antiherding behavior o¤ers an opportunity to signal high ability in the absence of
a su¢ ciently long track record. Prior literature documents a link between herding behavior and
career concerns. Our investigation adds a new perspective by emphasizing the role of skill as a
driver of heterogeneity in herding behavior in the presence of reputational incentives.
[Insert Table XI about here]
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V. Robustness Tests
In this section we perform two sets of robustness tests on the ability of fund herding to predict
mutual fund performance. First, we estimate fund herding from trade regressions that control for a
large number of rm characteristics that may a¤ect the trading decisions of money managers. We
also control for potential serial dependence in a funds own trades. Second, we test the robustness
of the association between herding behavior and performance using two alternative measures of
mutual fund performance.24
A. Alternative Measures of Fund Herding
A.1. Controlling for Multiple Stock Characteristics
In the trade regressions used to estimate fund herding, we control for three main variables
that describe investment style: momentum, market capitalization, and book-to-market. Here we
consider additional stock characteristics that might inuence money managerstrading decisions:
stock turnover, idiosyncratic volatility, revisions in analyst earnings forecasts, rm share issuance,
bid-ask spread, Amihud illiquidity, and 10 industry dummies. We include stock turnover and other
liquidity measures because institutions exhibit a preference for liquid stocks, as documented in
Gompers and Metrick (2001), which would induce a mechanical correlation between a funds trades
and past institutional trades. Similarly, idiosyncratic volatility (Bennett, Sias, and Starks (2003)),
revisions in analyst earnings forecasts (Kacperczyk and Seru (2007)), and past share issuance (Jiang
(2010)) could play a role in generating a correlation between the trades of a given fund and past
institutional trades. Finally, we include industry controls because prior research presents evidence
of industry herding (Choi and Sias (2009)) and documents a link between mutual fund performance
and the industry concentration of mutual fund portfolios (Kacperczyk, Sialm, and Zheng (2005)).
Since these stock characteristics have been shown to predict returns, they may a¤ect future fund
performance.25 We orthogonalize aggregate institutional trades with respect to these characteristics
by estimating the following cross-sectional regression in each quarter t for all of the stocks in our
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sample:
IOi;t = 0t + 1tMomi;t + 2tMCi;t + 3tBMi;t + 4tTurni;t + 5tIV oli;t + 6tFRevi;t +
+7tIssuei;t + 8tSpreadi;t + 9tAmihudi;t +
9X
k=1
9+k;tIND
k
i;t + "i;t; (4)
where Turni;t is the number of shares traded for stock i in quarter t scaled by shares outstanding;
IV oli;t is the residual standard deviation from a regression of the daily excess returns of stock i on
the Fama and French three factors in quarter t; FRevi;t is the change in consensus analyst earnings
forecasts scaled by stock price at the end of the previous period; Issuei;t is the share issuance for
rm i in the previous year (the natural log of the split-adjusted shares outstanding at the end of
quarter t divided by the split-adjusted shares outstanding at the end of quarter t  4); Spreadi;t is
the end-of-day quoted bid-ask spread scaled by the midquote, averaged over a quarter; Amihudi;t
is the Amihud (2002) daily illiquidity measure, averaged over a quarter; and INDki;t is a dummy
variable indicating industry membership based on the Fama and French 10-industry classication.
We next estimate cross-sectional regressions of fund trades on past residual institutional trades,
by fund and by quarter, and average these quarterly coe¢ cients over the life of a fund to obtain a
new measure of fund herding. Based on this new measure, we rank funds into decile portfolios and
estimate their performance in the following quarter. The results, presented in Table XII, are very
similar to those of our baseline case. For example, the return gap between herding and antiherding
funds is now 16bps per month (19bps in the baseline case); when measured by Carhart alphas,
the performance gap is now 15bps per month (16bps in the baseline case). We conclude that the
predictive power of fund herding is robust to di¤erent ways of estimating the tendency of a mutual
fund to follow past institutional trades.
[Insert Table XII about here]
B.2. Controlling for Past Own Trades
Persistent fund ows and stealth trading could potentially a¤ect our fund herding measure by
generating autocorrelated fund trades, and could a¤ect performance through price pressure and
subsequent reversals.26 To control for this possibility, and to ensure that fund herding captures
imitation in sequential trading decisions, we reestimate our baseline fund trade regressions while
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controlling for fundsown past trades in a given stock, Tradei;j;t 1:
Tradei;j;t = j;t + j;tIOi;t 1 + 1j;tMomi;t 1 + 2j;tMCi;t 1 + 3j;tBMi;t 1 +
+4j;tTradei;j;t 1 + "i;j;t: (5)
As with our baseline regression, we use the estimates of j;t to compute fund herding, the average
tendency to herd for each fund in each quarter, and test whether it predicts performance. The
results, presented in Table XIII, conrm the strong negative relation between fund herding and
future performance. The return di¤erential between herding and antiherding funds is 17bps per
month (net or gross), and the four-factor alpha di¤erential is 14bps per month. We conclude that
our results are robust to controlling for the correlation in a funds own trades over time.
[Insert Table XIII about here]
B. Alternative Measures of Mutual Fund Performance
The measures of mutual fund performance used in our empirical analysis are based on fund
returns, both before and after fees and expenses. In this subsection we reestimate the baseline
predictive panel regressions of Table IV using three alternative measures of performance, which
are based on mutual fundsstock holdings and trades. We nd supportive evidence for a negative
and signicant relation between fund herding and future performance. The results are presented
in Table XIV.
Our rst alternative measure of performance is the holdings-based Characteristic-Selectivity
measure (CS) developed by Daniel et al. (1997):
CSt+1 =
NX
i=1
wi;t(Ri;t+1  Rbi;t+1); (6)
where wi;t is the weight of stock i in the portfolio of a fund at the end of quarter t; Ri;t+1 is the
monthly return of stock i during quarter t + 1; and Rbi;t+1 is the corresponding monthly return
on the characteristic-based benchmark portfolio for stock i. The benchmark portfolios are formed
on the basis of size, industry-adjusted book-to-market, and momentum. The rst two columns of
Table XIV present the estimated coe¢ cients from predictive panel regressions of fund performance
on fund herding and other fund characteristics measured in the previous quarter. The results show
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that herding funds exhibit inferior stock-picking ability than their antiherding peers, suggesting
that they are less skilled.
As a second alternative measure of performance, we use the trade-based measure of Grinblatt
and Titman (1993, GT):
GTt+1 =
NX
i=1
(wi;t   wi;t 4)Ri;t+1; (7)
where wi;t and wi;t 4 are the weights of stock i in the funds portfolio at the end of quarters t
and t   4; and Ri;t+1 is the monthly return of stock i during quarter t + 1. This measure reects
the covariance between the change in the portfolio weights of a stock and its subsequent return.
Following Grinblatt and Titman (1993), we compute the change in weights over the year that
precedes the measurement of returns. Columns (3) and (4) of Table XIV show that fund herding
negatively predicts performance as captured by the GT measure.
[Insert Table XIV about here]
Finally, we compute the GT measure with respect to the future trades of a fund. We ask
whether the trading decisions that mutual funds make after we measure their herding behavior
yield di¤erent returns for herding and antiherding funds. Specically, we consider a funds trades
over the year that follows the measurement of fund herding (quarters t+ 1 to t+ 4) and compute
the monthly returns to these trades in the subsequent quarter, t+ 5:
GTt+5 =
NX
i=1
(wi;t+4   wi;t)Ri;t+5; (8)
where wi;t+4 and wi;t are the weights of stock i in the funds portfolio at the end of quarters t+ 4
and t; and Ri;t+5 is the monthly return of stock i during quarter t + 5. The last two columns of
Table XIV show that fund herding predicts the returns derived from the trading decisions that
funds make over the subsequent year. In particular, herding funds tend to make trading decisions
that result in future inferior returns, whereas the trading decisions of antiherding funds tend to
yield superior performance. These results lend further support to the skill channel in explaining the
link between herding and future performance. Di¤erences in herding behavior identify di¤erences
in the subsequent trading decisions of mutual funds, which lead to di¤erences in performance.
Overall, these robustness tests corroborate our evidence on the predictive power of fund herding
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for mutual fund performance, and further reinforce the link between fund herding, future perfor-
mance, and managerial ability.
VI. Do Investors Respond to Fund Herding?
In this section we ask whether mutual fund investors are aware of the predictability of fund
performance associated with herding. In other words, we ask whether investors switch money out
of herding funds, which have lower expected future performance, and into antiherding funds, which
have higher expected future performance. To address this question we regress the percentage fund
ows in quarter t+ 1 on a funds herding tendency and a number of fund characteristics measured
in quarter t. The results, reported in Table XV, indicate a generally negative but statistically
insignicant relation between mutual fund herding and future fund ows. These ndings suggest
that, on average, mutual fund investors do not respond aggressively to the information about future
performance that is captured by our measure of fund herding.
[Insert Table XV about here]
From a practical point of view, these results highlight the investment value of our fund herding
measure for mutual fund investors: tilting their portfolio toward antiherding funds and away from
herding funds could substantially improve their investment returns. From a theoretical point of
view, these results may help explain the strong predictive ability of fund herding for mutual fund
performance. In the equilibrium model of Berk and Green (2004), mutual fund investors react
strongly to signals revealing managerial ability, such as past performance, actively switching money
across mutual funds. As a result, in equilibrium, these signals have no forecasting power for fund
performance. The results of our test suggest that the inability of investors to fully appreciate the
link between fund herding and managerial skill may help explain the signicant forecasting power
of fund herding documented in our paper.
VII. Conclusions
In this paper we investigate the link between herding behavior and managerial ability in the
mutual fund industry. We begin by creating a new, dynamic fund-level measure of herding to
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capture the intertemporal correlation between a managers trades and past institutional trades,
after accounting for the tendency of funds to invest in the same styles or engage in momentum
trading. We then test whether this measure of fund herding can predict cross-sectional di¤erences
in mutual fund performance.
We nd that herding behavior strongly and negatively predicts the cross-section of mutual fund
returns. The top decile portfolio of funds with the highest herding tendency underperforms the
bottom decile portfolio of antiherding funds by about 2.28% on an annualized basis, both before
and after expenses. We obtain similar results when we adjust the fund returns to account for their
risk exposures: the underperformance of herding funds is 1.92% based on Carhart (1997) four-factor
alphas. Our regression results show that the predictive ability of fund herding is distinct from the
e¤ect of past performance, other fund characteristics, and other measures of skill.
We next provide further evidence that the negative association between fund herding and future
performance is related to managerial skill. First, we nd a large and signicant return di¤erential
between the holdings of herding and antiherding funds, even after excluding stocks that are heav-
ily traded by the institutional crowd, suggesting that antiherding funds make consistently better
investment decisions than their herding peers. Second, we show that the performance gap between
herding and antiherding funds is stronger in periods of greater investment opportunities for mutual
fund managers, when skill is more valuable. Third, we show that this performance gap is persistent
over long horizons. Fourth, we show that the trades of antiherding funds can anticipate those of
the institutional crowd, suggesting that they might acquire information earlier than others.
To deepen our investigation of herding and skill, we study how the interaction between abil-
ity and career concerns shapes managers reaction to reputational incentives. We nd that the
performance gap between herding and antiherding funds is especially strong among inexperienced
managers, suggesting that herding and antiherding choices might be used to signal skill by managers
with stronger career concerns.
Our analysis is inspired by the theoretical literature on sequential decision-making, which,
under a range of di¤erent economic frameworks, points to a negative association between peoples
ability and their tendency to imitate past decisions. Consistent with the implications of these
theoretical models, our ndings establish a strong link between cross-sectional di¤erences in skill
and the dynamics of imitative behavior. The evidence presented in this paper calls for further
investigations, both empirical and theoretical, of the role played by managerial ability in shaping
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sequential decision-making processes.
Initial submission: 17 April 2013; Accepted: 3 November 2017
Editors: Bruno Biais, Michael R. Roberts, and Kenneth J. Singleton
26
Notes
1See, for example, Scharfstein and Stein (1990) for a model of reputational herding and Bikhchan-
dani, Hirshleifer, and Welch (1992) and Banerjee (1992) for models of informational cascades. The
relevant theoretical literature on herding behavior is reviewed in Section IV.
2Papers that document herding behavior among money managers and relate it to stock returns
include Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny (1992), Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers (1995), Nofsinger
and Sias (1999), Wermers (1999), Sias (2004), and Dasgupta, Prat, and Verardo (2011a).
3Fama and French (2010) nd evidence of inferior and superior performance in the extreme tails
of the cross-section of mutual fund alphas. Studies that develop measures of skill that identify
extreme performers include Kacperczyk, Sialm, and Zheng (2005, 2008), Cohen, Coval, and Pástor
(2005), Kacperczyk and Seru (2007), Cremers and Petajisto (2009), Cohen, Polk, and Silli (2010),
and Pástor, Stambaugh, and Taylor (2017), among others.
4Models of herding behavior are inherently dynamic and involve an agent making a decision after
observing the actions of other agents (e.g., Scharfstein and Stein (1990), Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer,
and Welch (1992)). In empirical studies, institutional herding is typically measured either as the
aggregate propensity of institutional investors to buy a given stock at the same time, or as the
correlation of aggregate institutional demand over adjacent quarters. With these measures, it is
di¢ cult to capture both the nature and the implications of sequential decision making for individual
funds.
5We consider active share (Cremers and Petajisto (2009)), reliance on public information (Kacper-
czyk and Seru (2007)), and similarity to funds with good past performance (Cohen, Coval, and
Pástor (2005)).
6More recently, Eyster and Rabin (2014) show that rational agents who observe the actions of
multiple predecessors become aware of the information redundancy conveyed by past herds and
form beliefs of the opposite sign, exhibiting anti-imitation behavior.
7Mutual fund ows have been linked to price pressure and subsequent reversals in stock returns
and fund performance. For empirical evidence, see Coval and Sta¤ord (2007) and Lou (2012); for
a theoretical analysis, see Vayanos and Woolley (2013).
8Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers (1995) explore the link between mutual fund herding and
performance. However, their analysis is based on the LSV stock-level measure of herding, that is,
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the fraction of funds buying and selling the same stock in the same quarter (Lakonishok, Shleifer,
and Vishny (1992)), averaged across stocks for a given fund. Using data on 274 mutual funds
during the period 1975 to 1985, they nd that the association between this measure of herding and
fund performance is subsumed by the tendency of mutual funds to buy past winners. In a similar
framework, Wei, Wermers, and Yao (2015) aggregate the LSV stock-level measure of herding across
stocks traded by a given fund and show that funds with a lower herding measure (higher contrarian
measure) outperform the rest of the funds.
9We exclude funds with any of the following investment objectives as provided by Thomson
Reuters: International, Municipal Bonds, Bond and Preferred, and Balanced. Furthermore, we use
the portfolio composition data provided by CRSP to exclude funds that on average invest less than
80% or more than 105% in common equity. Our sample starts in 1990 because of the small number
of funds in the earlier period of the sample. Specically, at the start of 1984, we have 102 distinct
mutual funds; the number grows to 174 at the start of 1990 and increases to 1,230 at the end of
2009.
10All institutions with more than $100 million under discretionary management are required to
report to the SEC all equity positions greater than either 10,000 shares or $200,000 in market value.
11In the empirical literature on institutional investors, Sias (2004) emphasizes the need to consider
the dynamic nature of herding. He measures institutional demand for a stock by the fraction
of institutional traders who are buyers (similar to LSV). He then denes aggregate institutional
herding as the slope coe¢ cient from a cross-sectional regression of institutional demand in quarter
t on institutional demand in quarter t 1. Dasgupta, Prat, and Verardo (2011a) construct a stock-
level measure of herding based on persistent institutional buying or selling activity for the same
stock over a number of consecutive quarters.
12We do not consider initiations of new positions or deletions of current ones, that is, we require
a fund to have nonzero holdings at the beginning and at the end of a quarter to compute a trade
in a given stock. However, our results do not change if we include these trades, as we show in the
Internet Appendix. The Internet Appendix is available in the online version of the article on The
Journal of Finance website.
13This choice is motivated by Sias (2004), who standardizes the dependent and independent
variables in cross-sectional regressions of institutional demand over adjacent quarters. We obtain
similar results if we do not standardize the variables in the trade regressions, as we show in the
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Internet Appendix.
14This type of inverse-weighting scheme is often used in the literature. For example, Chen and
Jiang (2006) apply it to compute a consensus measure from analyst forecasts that are issued up
to a given date, assigning higher weights to more recent forecasts as they contain more updated
information. In the Internet Appendix we show that the results of our analysis are qualitatively
similar if we dene fund herding as the simple quarterly beta or as the equally weighted average of
betas over the lifetime of a fund.
15Measured over the lifetime of the average fund in our sample, the standard deviation of betas
is 17.43%. After averaging the betas as in (2), the standard deviation of fund herding over the
lifetime of a fund is 5.72%.
16These three measures are constructed as follows. Active Share is computed as the fraction of
the funds portfolio holdings that di¤ers from its benchmark index holdings. Reliance on public
information, RPI, is the R2 of a regression of fund trades on changes in analyst stock recommenda-
tions, specied as in Kacperczyk and Seru (2007). For robustness we also compute an alternative
measure of reliance on public information using the R2 from our trade regressions (1). We obtain
similar results. Similarity is constructed as in Cohen, Coval, and Pástor (2005). Specically, each
quarter we rst construct a proxy for the quality of a given stock by averaging the prior three-year
Fama-French alpha of all funds trading the stock using the portfolio weights they place on the
stock. We then aggregate the quality of all stocks traded by a given fund, based on its portfolio
composition, to obtain a quarterly fund-level measure of quality. We obtain similar results if we
use the holdings-based measure of Cohen, Coval, and Pástor (2005) rather than their trades-based
measure (see also Pomorski (2009)).
17Following Petersen (2009) and Thompson (2011), we also consider two-way clustering by both
funds and time and obtain similar results.
18In the pooled sample, the standard deviation of FHj;t is 0:0698:
19In the Internet Appendix we show that changes in institutional ownership, IO, do not predict
stock returns in a way that can explain the performance gap between herding and antiherding funds.
In particular, IO does not predict price pressure or return reversals in the periods in which we
measure fund performance.
20We obtain the index from the Frank Russell Company.
21The empirical evidence generally supports the hypothesis that managerial experience attenuates
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the incentives to herd. For example, Chevalier and Ellison (1999) document that younger mutual
fund managers herd more than their older peers. Hong, Kubik, and Solomon (2000) nd that
younger security analysts deviate less from the consensus forecast of rmsearnings. Analyzing
a sample of macroeconomic forecasters, Lamont (2002) nds that younger forecasters herd more
than older ones.
22Other models of reputational herding in di¤erent settings include, for example, Trueman (1994),
Zwiebel (1995), Graham (1999), and Dasgupta, Prat and Verardo (2011b).
23Terminations occur in 1,482 manager-quarters, out of 19,387 manager-quarters in our sample
on average, the probability of termination is 7.64%. Chevalier and Ellison use a slightly broader
denition of termination that includes cases in which managers leave a fund to join a smaller and
possibly team-managed fund. However, when they dene terminations as we do, they report 98
manager-year occurrences, which represents 7.42% of their sample.
24In the Internet Appendix we report a more comprehensive set of robustness tests. For example,
we construct an alternative measure of fund herding starting from the LSV measure, that is, from
the fraction of funds that buy the same stock at the same time. We nd that this measure does
not predict mutual fund performance, conrming that the predictive ability of our measure of fund
herding relies on its fund-specic, dynamic character. Furthermore, we construct an alternative
measure of fund herding dened as the tendency to imitate the trades of a subset of successful
mutual funds. We nd that this measure does not predict fund performance, which highlights the
importance of using the tendency to follow the broad crowd of investors as a signal to separate
skilled and unskilled mutual funds.
25See, for example, Gervais, Kaniel, and Mingelgrin (2001) on trading volume, Ang et al. (2006)
on idiosyncratic volatility, Gleason and Lee (2003) on analyst earnings forecast revisions, Daniel
and Titman (2006) on share issuance, and Kacperczyk, Sialm, and Zheng (2005) on industry
concentration.
26For example, Sirri and Tufano (1998) and Chevalier and Ellison (1997) provide evidence of
persistent mutual fund ows. Mutual funds could also split their trades over time to reduce their
price impact. Coval and Sta¤ord (2007) and Lou (2012) investigate the impact of mutual fund ows
on stock returns and fund performance, and nd evidence of initial price pressure and subsequent
reversals.
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Table I 
Summary Statistics 
This table presents descriptive statistics for the sample of actively managed mutual funds analyzed in this paper. 
The sample consists of 2,255 distinct mutual funds over the period 1990 to 2009. Panel A presents summary 
statistics for fund characteristics. Fund Size is quarter-end total net fund assets in millions of dollars; Fund Age is 
the number of years a fund is present in the CRSP mutual fund database; Expense is the fund’s expense ratio; 
Turnover is the turnover ratio of the fund; Quarterly Flow is the quarterly growth rate of assets under management 
after adjusting for the appreciation of the fund's assets; and Quarterly Return is the quarterly net fund return. Panel 
B presents summary statistics for β and Fund Herding, FH. β is the slope coefficient from fund-specific quarterly 
regressions of mutual fund trades on past aggregate institutional trades measured in the previous quarter, 
controlling for past stock returns, firm size, and the book-to-market ratio. Both the dependent and the independent 
variables are cross-sectionally standardized to have means of zero and standard deviations of one for each fund in 
each quarter. To construct fund-level herding, FH, we average the quarterly coefficients β over the lifetime of 
each fund up to quarter t, using a rank inverse-weighting scheme that assigns higher weight to more recent 
quarters. All statistics are computed across funds in each quarter and then averaged over time. 
 
 
Panel A: Fund Characteristics 
 Mean Std Dev 5th Pctl 25th Pctl Median 75th Pctl 95th Pctl 
Fund Size (TNA) 1605.29 5602.45 18.07 94.80 322.60 1093.25 6380.60 
Fund Age 17.63 14.56 5.00 8.00 12.50 21.00 51.00 
Expense 0.013 0.005 0.007 0.010 0.012 0.015 0.020 
Turnover 0.851 0.858 0.110 0.340 0.646 1.100 2.230 
Quarterly Flow 0.013 1.583 -0.121 -0.044 -0.014 0.023 0.169 
Quarterly Return 0.016 0.105 -0.177 -0.036 0.021 0.074 0.176 
 
Panel B: Estimates of β and Fund Herding (%) 
Cross-Sectional Statistics (average over 80 quarters) 
 Mean Std Dev 5th Pctl 25th Pctl Median 75th Pctl 95th Pctl 
β 2.30 18.73 -27.84 -7.83 2.15 12.62 32.63 
Fund Herding 2.42 7.12 -8.81 -1.51 2.35 6.39 13.86
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Table II 
Fund Herding and Future Performance: Portfolios 
This table presents the performance of decile portfolios formed on the basis of Fund Herding (FH), the average tendency of mutual funds to follow past institutional 
trades. FH is constructed from the slope coefficient of cross-sectional regressions of mutual fund trades on aggregate institutional trades measured in the previous 
quarter, controlling for past stock returns, firm size, and the book-to-market ratio. We average these quarterly slope coefficients through a rank inverse-weighting 
scheme, assigning higher weights to more recent quarters. The decile portfolios are formed at the end of each quarter from 1989Q4 to 2009Q3 and held for one 
quarter. The resulting monthly return series span January 1990 to December 2009. Decile 10 is the portfolio of funds with the highest average herding measure. 
We compute equally weighted net and gross (net plus expense ratio) returns on the portfolios, as well as risk-adjusted returns based on the CAPM, the Fama and 
French (1993, FF) three-factor model, the Carhart (1997) four-factor model, the Pastor and Stambaugh (2003, PS) five-factor model, and the Ferson and Schadt 
(1996, FS) conditional model. We report average returns and alphas in monthly percentages. Newey-West (1987) t-statistics are shown in parentheses. ***, **, 
and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively, for the return differentials between deciles 10 and 1. 
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FH rank 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 D10-D1 
            
FH -0.104 -0.041 -0.016 0.002 0.017 0.031 0.046 0.064 0.089 0.152 0.256 
            
Net Return 
Average 0.84 0.80 0.80 0.79 0.78 0.74 0.75 0.77 0.69 0.65 -0.19*** 
 (2.91) (2.76) (2.78) (2.76) (2.69) (2.55) (2.55) (2.60) (2.30) (2.18) (-3.37) 
CAPM α 0.07 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.01 -0.04 -0.03 -0.01 -0.10 -0.14 -0.21*** 
 (1.07) (0.48) (0.52) (0.37) (0.10) (-0.69) (-0.65) (-0.27) (-1.76) (-2.58) (-3.71) 
FF α 0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.03 -0.04 -0.08 -0.06 -0.04 -0.11 -0.15 -0.17*** 
 (0.31) (-0.40) (-0.46) (-0.67) (-0.96) (-1.85) (-1.46) (-0.81) (-2.21) (-3.06) (-3.26) 
Carhart α 0.01 -0.03 -0.02 -0.05 -0.05 -0.07 -0.06 -0.03 -0.12 -0.14 -0.16*** 
 (0.20) (-0.50) (-0.42) (-0.92) (-1.20) (-1.55) (-1.33) (-0.57) (-2.34) (-2.59) (-2.93) 
PS α 0.00 -0.04 -0.03 -0.06 -0.05 -0.07 -0.06 -0.02 -0.12 -0.14 -0.14*** 
 (0.02) (-0.73) (-0.56) (-1.12) (-1.18) (-1.48) (-1.22) (-0.41) (-2.23) (-2.58) (-2.67) 
FS α -0.02 -0.09 -0.05 -0.08 -0.07 -0.11 -0.09 -0.07 -0.14 -0.19 -0.17*** 
 (-0.34) (-1.88) (-1.24) (-1.64) (-2.02) (-3.03) (-2.12) (-1.63) (-3.20) (-4.18) (-3.18) 
Gross Return 
Average 0.95 0.91 0.90 0.89 0.88 0.84 0.85 0.87 0.79 0.76 -0.19*** 
 (3.31) (3.12) (3.14) (3.10) (3.02) (2.89) (2.90) (2.94) (2.65) (2.56) (-3.38) 
CAPM α 0.19 0.13 0.13 0.12 0.10 0.06 0.07 0.09 0.00 -0.02 -0.21*** 
 (2.74) (2.10) (2.24) (1.93) (2.02) (1.24) (1.36) (1.65) (0.07) (-0.47) (-3.72) 
FF α 0.13 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.06 0.02 0.04 0.06 -0.01 -0.04 -0.17*** 
 (2.37) (1.59) (1.60) (1.37) (1.63) (0.50) (0.83) (1.29) (-0.19) (-0.79) (-3.27) 
Carhart α 0.12 0.08 0.08 0.05 0.05 0.03 0.04 0.07 -0.02 -0.03 -0.16*** 
 (2.08) (1.41) (1.52) (1.03) (1.25) (0.77) (0.82) (1.44) (-0.37) (-0.59) (-2.95) 
PS α 0.11 0.06 0.07 0.04 0.05 0.03 0.04 0.08 -0.02 -0.03 -0.14*** 
 (1.93) (1.16) (1.32) (0.83) (1.18) (0.75) (0.89) (1.52) (-0.33) (-0.55) (-2.69) 
FS α 0.10 0.01 0.05 0.02 0.03 -0.01 0.01 0.03 -0.04 -0.08 -0.17*** 
 (2.02) (0.31) (1.12) (0.32) (0.71) (-0.20) (0.21) (0.70) (-0.81) (-1.71) (-3.23) 
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Table III 
Determinants of Fund Herding 
This table shows the estimated coefficients from Fama-MacBeth (1973) regressions of Fund Herding on fund 
characteristics. Fund Herding is constructed from cross-sectional regressions of mutual fund trades on past aggregate 
institutional trades, as described in Table I. Size is the natural log of the quarter-end total net fund assets; Age is the 
natural log of fund age in years; Expense is the fund expense ratio; Turnover is the turnover ratio of the fund; Flow 
is the fund flow in the previous quarter; Alpha is the fund’s three-factor alpha estimated over the previous three 
years; Active Share (AS) is the share of a fund’s holdings that differ from the benchmark index holdings, as in 
Cremers and Petajisto (2009); RPI is the responsiveness of funds’ trades to public information, as in Kacperczyk 
and Seru (2007); Similarity is the degree to which a fund’s investment decisions resemble those of successful funds, 
as in Cohen Coval and Pastor (2005); and Tracking Error (TE) is the standard deviation of the residuals from 
regressions of monthly excess fund returns on monthly excess stock market returns over the previous year. The 
regressors are standardized to have a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one in each quarter. Newey-West 
(1987) t-statistics are shown in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
level, respectively. 
 
 
Dependent Variable: Fund Herding 
Size  -0.081 -0.079 -0.081   (-1.08) (-1.10) (1.09) 
Age  0.250*** 0.274*** 0.235***   (3.21) (2.98) (2.95) 
Expense  -0.051 0.063 0.004   (-1.02) (1.31) (0.08) 
Turnover  -0.256** -0.229* -0.221**   (-2.51) (-1.69) (2.28) 
Flow  -0.008 -0.083 -0.011   (-0.10) (-0.65) (0.13) 
Alpha  0.133 0.176 0.144   (1.11) (1.16) (1.14) 
AS -0.548***    (-4.51)  
RPI  0.412***    (3.87)  
Similarity  -0.202*    (-1.74)  
TE -0.230*   (1.68)     
Adj R2 0.010 0.026 0.015 
N 56116 27310 53348 
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Table IV 
Fund Herding and Future Performance: Predictive Regressions 
This table presents coefficient estimates from predictive panel regressions estimating the association between Fund 
Herding and future fund performance. Fund Herding (FH) is constructed from cross-sectional regressions of mutual fund 
trades on past aggregate institutional trades, as described in Table I. Future mutual fund performance is measured using 
the Carhart (1997) four-factor alpha (both net and gross, in monthly percentages); factor loadings are estimated from 
rolling-window regressions over the previous three years. The panel regressions control for fund size, fund age, expense 
ratio (in percent), fund turnover, fund percentage flows in the previous quarter, fund alpha (in percent) estimated over 
the previous three years, active share, reliance on public information, similarity with the investment decisions of 
successful funds, and tracking error; the control variables are described in Table III. The regressions include time fixed 
effects and the standard errors are clustered by fund. t-statistics are shown in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
  Four-Factor Net α (t+1)   Four-Factor Gross α (t+1) 
FH -0.466*** -0.438*** -0.543*** -0.439*** -0.469*** -0.437*** -0.541*** -0.438***  (-5.16) (-4.83) (-4.36) (-4.84) (-5.18) (-4.82) (-4.35) (-4.82) 
Size  -0.007** -0.011** -0.006* -0.008** -0.012*** -0.007**   (-2.01) (-2.37) (-1.78) (-2.41) (-2.63) (-2.17) 
Age  0.015* 0.005 0.016* 0.016* 0.006 0.016*   (1.79) (0.49) (1.84) (1.87) (0.59) (1.92)  
Expense  -0.075*** -0.101*** -0.079*** -0.005 -0.028 -0.009   (-4.65) (-4.53) (-4.91) (-0.28) (-1.25) (-0.55) 
Turnover  -0.026*** -0.035*** -0.028*** -0.025*** -0.034*** -0.028***   (-3.49) (-3.21) (-3.69) (-3.40) (-3.13) (-3.63) 
Flow  0.002*** 0.011 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.008 0.002***   (2.59) (1.08) (2.70) (2.73) (0.79) (2.81) 
Alpha  0.014 0.048** 0.006 0.011 0.045* 0.002 
  (0.63) (2.09) (0.25) (0.46) (1.94) (0.08) 
AS   0.177*** 0.180***    (3.89) (3.97) 
RPI   0.061 0.063    (0.49) (0.51) 
Similarity   0.087*** 0.087*** 
   (2.74) (2.74) 
TE    1.577  1.646* 
    (1.60)  (1.68) 
     
Adj R2 0.060 0.062 0.092 0.062 0.060 0.061 0.092 0.061 
N 167854 160067 81759 159588   167854 160067 81759 159588 
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Table V 
Revealing Skill through Investment Choices 
This table presents average monthly returns to quintile portfolios of stocks sorted on a stock-level measure of fund 
herding, SFH. The sample is restricted to stocks with small past institutional trades, that is, stocks in the bottom tercile of 
the absolute value of the change in institutional ownership (|ΔIO|) experienced in quarter t-1. We aggregate the positions 
of each stock across mutual fund portfolios using weights that account for the Fund Herding (FH) of each fund, measured 
in quarter t. The portfolio weight of a given stock in a given fund is scaled by a transformation of FH whereby the decile 
rank of FH is demeaned, multiplied by -1, and divided by 10. This weighting scheme implies that large positions in the 
portfolio of herding funds get a large negative weight, and large positions in the portfolio of antiherding funds get a large 
positive weight. Based on this stock-level measure of fund herding, SFH, we sort stocks into quintiles and measure their 
equally weighted portfolio returns in the subsequent quarter, t+1. The monthly return series span January 1990 to 
December 2009. We report average returns as well as risk-adjusted returns in monthly percentages based on the CAPM, 
the Fama and French (1993, FF) three-factor model, the Carhart (1997) four-factor model, and the Pastor and Stambaugh 
(2003, PS) five-factor model. Newey-West (1987) t-statistics are shown in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
 SFH Low 2 3 4 High High-Low 
Average 0.93** 1.07*** 0.92*** 1.21*** 1.42*** 0.49*** 
 (2.48) (3.30) (2.80) (3.56) (3.95) (3.03) 
CAPM α 0.08 0.29** 0.15 0.42** 0.62*** 0.54*** 
 (0.49) (2.09) (0.91) (2.52) (3.11) (3.36) 
FF α -0.06 0.14 -0.01 0.20 0.39** 0.45*** 
 (-0.40) (1.25) (-0.05) (1.53) (2.36) (2.83) 
Carhart α 0.11 0.24** 0.10 0.31** 0.49*** 0.38** 
 (0.71) (2.19) (0.65) (2.38) (3.07) (2.36) 
PS α -0.17 0.20 -0.05 0.16 0.30 0.47** 
  (-0.98) (1.43) (-0.32) (1.11) (1.56) (2.43) 
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Table VI 
Fund Herding and Future Performance: Time-Varying Investment Opportunities  
This table presents results from time-series and panel regressions that estimate the relation between fund herding (FH) 
and future performance conditional on the level of investment opportunities in the mutual fund industry. We consider 
three proxies for investment opportunities: the dispersion in stock returns, measured by the Russell-Parametric Cross-
Sectional Volatility Index for U.S. equities from July 1996 to December 2009 (CrossVol); idiosyncratic volatility, 
measured by the average standard deviation of the residuals from daily Fama-French (1993) regressions of stock returns 
(IV); investor sentiment, from Baker and Wurgler (2006). We use both contemporaneous and lagged measures of the 
proxies for investment opportunities. Panel A shows time-series regressions. At the end of each quarter from 1989Q4 to 
2009Q3, we sort mutual funds into 10 portfolios on the basis of Fund Herding (FH) and compute their monthly 
equallyweighted net returns (in percent). The return series span January 1990 to December 2009. We compute the 
difference in returns between Decile 10, with the highest FH, and Decile 1, with the lowest FH. We then run time-series 
regressions of this return differential on the proxies for investment opportunities, which are standardized to have a mean 
of zero and a standard deviation of one. Panel B presents results from predictive panel regressions of mutual fund 
performance as measured by the Carhart (1997) four-factor net fund alpha (in percent) on FH, fund characteristics, and 
interaction terms between FH and the proxies for investment opportunities, both contemporaneous and lagged. The panel 
regressions control for fund size, fund age, expense ratio (in percent), fund turnover, fund percentage flows over the past 
quarter, and fund alpha (in percent) over the past three years. The regressions include time fixed effects and the standard 
errors are clustered by fund. t-statistics are shown in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 
5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
 
Panel A: Time-Series Regressions 
Dependent Variable: Net Return Differential between Herding and Antiherding Funds  
CrossVolt -0.206***  
 (-2.97)  
CrossVolt-1  -0.221***  
  (-3.19)  
IVt  -0.114**  
  (-2.04)  
IVt-1  -0.121**  
  (-2.18)  
Sentt  -0.256***  
  (-4.78)  
Sentt-1  -0.243*** 
  (-4.50) 
       
Intercept -0.263*** -0.261*** -0.190*** -0.184*** -0.190*** -0.190*** 
 (-3.80) (-3.77) (-3.42) (-3.32) (-3.55) (-3.53) 
   
Adj R2 0.046 0.054 0.013 0.015 0.084 0.075 
N 162 161 240 239 240 240 
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Panel B: Predictive Panel Regressions 
Dependent Variable: Four-Factor Net α  
Fund Herding -0.529*** -0.535*** -0.480*** -0.459*** -0.416*** -0.419*** 
 (-4.76) (-4.92) (-4.67) (-4.41) (-4.70) (-4.73) 
FH × CrossVolt -0.322**  
 (-2.14)  
FH × CrossVolt-1  -0.324**  
  (-2.51)  
FH × IVt  -0.165*  
  (-1.88)  
FH × IVt-1  -0.102  
  (-1.10)  
FH × Sentt  -0.358*** 
  (-2.64) 
FH × Sentt-1   -0.276** 
   (-2.15) 
   
Size -0.010*** -0.010*** -0.007** -0.007** -0.007** -0.007**  (-2.76) (-2.80) (-2.03) (-2.05) (-1.97) (-1.98) 
Age 0.030*** 0.030*** 0.015* 0.016* 0.015* 0.015*  (3.39) (3.38) (1.81) (1.85) (1.80) (1.79) 
Expense -0.067*** -0.067*** -0.076*** -0.076*** -0.076*** -0.076***  (-3.78) (-3.82) (-4.69) (-4.68) (-4.68) (-4.68) 
Turnover -0.023*** -0.023*** -0.025*** -0.025*** -0.025*** -0.025***  (-3.01) (-3.02) (-3.44) (-3.45) (-3.44) (-3.45) 
Flow 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002***  (3.41) (3.44) (2.61) (2.60) (2.59) (2.59) 
Alpha 0.025 0.024 0.015 0.016 0.017 0.016 
 (1.12) (1.09) (0.67) (0.69) (0.74) (0.71) 
   
Adj R2 0.064 0.064 0.060 0.060 0.060 0.060 
N 140041 139837 160067 159841 160067 160067 
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Table VII 
Fund Herding and Persistence in Performance 
This table presents long-term differences in performance between herding and antiherding funds. Mutual funds are sorted into 10 portfolios based on Fund Herding, 
as described in Table I. The return series span January 1990 to December 2009. The holding period for each portfolio, indicated by K, varies from six months to 
24 months. The table reports differences in returns between Decile 10 (highest herding) and Decile 1 (lowest herding). We compute monthly equally-weighted net 
and gross (net plus expense ratio) returns on the portfolios, as well as risk-adjusted returns based on the CAPM, the Fama and French (1993, FF) three-factor model, 
the Carhart (1997) four-factor model, and the Pastor and Stambaugh (2003, PS) five-factor model. Returns and alphas are in monthly percentages. Newey-West 
(1987) t-statistics are shown in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
  K=6 K=9 K=12 K=15 K=18 K=21 K=24 
 Net Return 
Average  -0.15*** -0.15*** -0.15*** -0.13** -0.13** -0.12* -0.10* 
  (-2.83) (-3.04) (-2.62) (-2.14) (-1.98) (-1.88) (-1.71) 
CAPM α  -0.17*** -0.17*** -0.17*** -0.15** -0.15** -0.13** -0.11** 
  (-3.15) (-3.42) (-2.99) (-2.46) (-2.29) (-2.24) (-2.14) 
FF α  -0.13*** -0.14*** -0.13*** -0.12*** -0.12** -0.10** -0.09** 
  (-3.07) (-3.59) (-3.21) (-2.60) (-2.53) (-2.56) (-2.50) 
Carhart α  -0.11*** -0.12*** -0.11*** -0.09** -0.09** -0.08** -0.06** 
  (-2.67) (-3.41) (-3.00) (-2.38) (-2.35) (-2.43) (-2.36) 
PS α  -0.10** -0.11*** -0.10*** -0.08** -0.08** -0.06** -0.05* 
   (-2.38) (-2.98) (-2.63) (-2.04) (-2.01) (-2.02) (-1.88) 
Gross Return
Average  -0.15*** -0.15*** -0.15*** -0.13** -0.13** -0.12* -0.10* 
  (-2.84) (-3.04) (-2.61) (-2.13) (-1.98) (-1.88) (-1.71) 
CAPM α  -0.17*** -0.17*** -0.17*** -0.15** -0.15** -0.13** -0.12** 
  (-3.17) (-3.42) (-2.98) (-2.46) (-2.29) (-2.24) (-2.14) 
FF α  -0.13*** -0.14*** -0.14*** -0.12** -0.12** -0.10** -0.09** 
  (-3.10) (-3.60) (-3.21) (-2.59) (-2.53) (-2.56) (-2.49) 
Carhart α  -0.11*** -0.12*** -0.11*** -0.09** -0.09** -0.08** -0.07** 
  (-2.69) (-3.41) (-3.00) (-2.38) (-2.36) (-2.44) (-2.37) 
PS α  -0.10** -0.11*** -0.10*** -0.08** -0.08** -0.06** -0.05* 
    (-2.40) (-2.99) (-2.63) (-2.04) (-2.01) (-2.02) (-1.88) 
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Table VIII 
Anticipating the Actions of the Crowd 
This table presents coefficients from cross-sectional predictive regressions that use the trades of herding and antiherding funds in quarter t to forecast aggregate 
institutional trades in the subsequent quarter (quarter t+1) and in the subsequent year (quarters t+1 to  t+4). Herding and antiherding funds are defined as the top 
and bottom 10% of funds based on Fund Herding measured in quarter t-1; Fund Herding is constructed from cross-sectional regressions of mutual fund trades on 
past aggregate institutional trades, as described in Table I. For each stock, we compute the change in the fraction of shares owned by herding and antiherding funds 
in quarter t as the predictive variables, and the change in the fraction of shares owned by institutions in quarter t+1 (or in quarters t+1 to  t+4) as the dependent 
variable. The control variables are past aggregate institutional trades (lagged ΔIO), size, book-to-market, momentum (past quarterly return) and turnover, measured 
in quarter t. The estimates are time-series averages of coefficients from Fama-MacBeth (1973) cross-sectional regressions. Newey-West (1987) t-statistics are 
shown in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
  Dependent Variable: ΔIO (t+1)   Dependent Variable: ΔIO (t+1 : t+4) 
Trades of Antiherding Funds  1.120** 1.297** 1.140**   1.747*  2.257** 2.420** 
  (2.07) (2.38) (2.15)   (1.83)  (2.54) (2.38) 
Trades of Herding Funds  0.177 0.033 0.068    -0.565 -0.899 -0.655 
  (0.39) (0.07) (0.17)    (-0.71) (-1.12) (-0.83) 
Lagged ΔIO  -0.300***      -0.289*** 
  (-11.95)      (-9.13) 
Size  -0.001**      0.002* 
  (-1.97)      (1.66) 
BM  -0.001      -0.002 
  (-0.56)      (-1.04) 
Momentum  0.008      -0.019 
  (1.07)      (-1.56) 
Turnover  -0.044***      -0.102*** 
  (-5.56)      (-7.71) 
Adj R2  0.003 0.007 0.009 0.143   0.005 0.01 0.014 0.077 
N  19095 19095 19095 19095   18814 18814 18814 18814 
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Table IX 
Termination Probabilities 
This table presents estimated coefficients and marginal effects from logit regressions of the probability of termination for a 
mutual fund manager on a set of characteristics. The sample includes only funds managed by an individual manager and 
spans January 1990 to December 2009. Termination is an indicator for whether the manager of a given fund in quarter t is 
no longer in our sample from quarter t+1 onward. The regressors are described in Table III. All variables are standardized 
to have a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one in each quarter. Marginal effects, shown in brackets, are calculated 
for an infinitesimal increase in a given variable holding all other variables at their mean values. z-statistics are shown in 
parentheses. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Whole Sample 
Fund Herding  -0.075** -0.080*** -0.074** -0.079*** 
  (-2.49) (-2.61) (-2.46) (-2.58) 
  [-0.0035] [-0.0037] [-0.0034] [-0.0037] 
Experience  -0.183*** -0.187***  
  (-5.51) (-5.57)  
  [-0.0081] [-0.0086]  
Tenure  -0.144*** -0.145*** 
  (-4.41) (-4.41) 
  [-0.0066] [-0.0067] 
TNA  -0.209*** -0.203*** -0.225*** -0.219***   (-5.67) (-5.50) (-6.18) (-6.01)   [-0.0090] [-0.0094] [-0.0104] [-0.0102] 
Age  0.110*** 0.113*** 0.109*** 0.111***   (3.16) (3.22) (3.08) (3.14)   [0.0037] [0.0052] [0.0050] [0.0051] 
Expense  0.009 0.020 0.011 0.021   (0.30) (0.65) (0.38) (0.71)   [0.0003] [0.0009] [0.0005] [0.0010] 
Turnover  0.020 0.033 0.016 0.029   (0.68) (1.12) (0.56) (0.99)   [0.0008] [0.0015] [0.0008] [0.0014] 
Flow  -0.077 -0.075 -0.076 -0.075 
  (-1.20) (-1.18) (-1.20) (-1.18) 
  [-0.0037] [-0.0035] [-0.0035] [-0.0035] 
Alpha  -0.161*** -0.163*** -0.156*** -0.159*** 
  (-5.56) (-5.58) (-5.39) (-5.42) 
  [-0.0075] [-0.0075] [-0.0072] [-0.0074] 
TE  -0.054*  -0.052* 
  (-1.78)  (-1.70) 
  [-0.0025]  [-0.0024] 
       
Adj R2  0.129 0.128 0.127 0.126 
N  17593 17417 17593 17387 
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Panel B: Sample Split by Experience or Tenure 
  Experience  Tenure 
  Low High  Low High 
FH  -0.106*** -0.106*** -0.028 -0.041 -0.105*** -0.104*** -0.049 -0.061 
  (-2.92) (-2.89) (-0.56) (-0.78) (-2.65) (-2.61) (-1.03) (-1.25) 
  [-0.0062] [-0.0061] [-0.0011] [-0.0017] [-0.0057] [-0.0056] [-0.0022] [-0.0028] 
Experience  -0.230** -0.239** -0.122** -0.119**  
  (-2.08) (-2.14) (-2.07) (-1.99)  
  [-0.0133] [-0.0138] [-0.0049] [-0.0048]  
Tenure     0.130 0.127 -0.159*** -0.147** 
     (0.93) (0.90) (-2.78) (-2.54)
     [0.0071] [0.0069] [-0.0071] [-0.0067] 
TNA  -0.177*** -0.173*** -0.241*** -0.235*** -0.303*** -0.305*** -0.170*** -0.156***   (-3.57) (-3.47) (-4.29) (-4.20) (-5.98) (-6.03) (-3.35) (-3.09)   [-0.0102] [-0.0100] [-0.0097] [-0.0096] [-0.0164] [-0.0165] [-0.0076] [-0.0071] 
Age  0.125*** 0.129*** 0.077 0.071 0.164*** 0.166*** 0.090 0.085   (2.87) (2.94) (1.33) (1.21) (3.49) (3.54) (1.52) (1.43)   [0.0072] [0.0074] [0.0031] [0.0029] [0.0089] [0.0090] [0.0040] [0.0039] 
Expense  0.064 0.062 -0.054 -0.021 0.056 0.051 -0.034 -0.006  (1.59) (1.50) (-1.23) (-0.47) (1.32) (1.17) (-0.83) (-0.14)   [0.0037] [0.0036] [-0.0022] [-0.0008] [0.0030] [0.0028] [-0.0015] [-0.0003] 
Turnover  -0.012 -0.011 0.080* 0.118** -0.037 -0.036 0.118** 0.153***   (-0.34) (-0.31) (1.67) (2.42) (-0.97) (-0.94) (2.33) (2.96)   [-0.0007] [-0.0007] [0.0032] [0.0048] [-0.0020] [-0.0020] [0.0053] [0.0070] 
Flow  -0.014 -0.013 -0.302*** -0.307*** -0.034 -0.034 -0.181* -0.179* 
  (-0.23) (-0.23) (-2.76) (-2.75) (-0.47) (-0.47) (-1.92) (-1.87) 
  [-0.0008] [-0.0008] [-0.0121] [-0.0125] [-0.0019] [-0.0019] [-0.0081] [-0.0081]
Alpha  -0.192*** -0.194*** -0.094* -0.092* -0.167*** -0.168*** -0.137*** -0.139*** 
  (-5.53) (-5.56) (-1.86) (-1.74) (-4.42) (-4.43) (-2.90) (-2.82) 
  [-0.0111] [-0.0112] [-0.0038] [-0.0038] [-0.0090] [-0.0091] [-0.0061] [-0.0063] 
TE   -0.006  -0.141*** 0.000  -0.109** 
   (-0.15)  (-2.94) (-0.01)  (-2.43) 
   [-0.0004]  [-0.0058] [0.0000]  [-0.0050] 
           
Adj R2  0.125 0.124 0.128 0.128 0.132 0.132 0.117 0.117
N  8583 8543 8251 8095 7927 7897 8887 8719 
 
 
48 
 
Table X 
Fund Herding and Managerial Experience 
This table shows the estimated coefficients from Fama-MacBeth (1973) quarterly regressions of Fund Herding on 
fund characteristics and two measures of managerial experience. The sample includes only funds managed by an 
individual manager. Fund Herding is constructed from cross-sectional regressions of mutual fund trades on past 
aggregate institutional trades, as described in Table I. Experience is the number of years in which a manager appears 
in the CRSP mutual fund data set; Tenure is fund-specific experience, measured as the number of years a manager is 
with a given fund. The control variables are described in Table III.  The regressors are standardized to have a mean 
of zero and a standard deviation of one in each quarter. Newey-West (1987) t-statistics are shown in parentheses. ***, 
**, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
  Dependent variable: Fund Herding 
 Experience   Tenure 
Experience -0.144** -0.160** -0.148**     (-2.29) (-2.23) (-2.21)    
Tenure    -0.158** -0.135* -0.163**
    (-2.43) (-1.78) (-2.22) 
Size -0.188*** -0.15 -0.172***   -0.200*** -0.152 -0.186***  (-2.94) (-1.47) (-2.70)   (-2.98) (-1.52) (-2.84) 
Age 0.223** 0.259*** 0.204**   0.232** 0.270*** 0.214**  (2.36) (3.42) (2.26)   (2.54) (3.85) (2.43) 
Expense -0.115 -0.152 -0.072   -0.127 -0.159 -0.084  (-1.42) (-1.37) (-1.01)   (-1.50) (-1.41) (-1.15) 
Turnover -0.172 -0.222 -0.140   -0.179* -0.217 -0.149 (-1.61) (-1.57) (-1.40)   (-1.66) (-1.56) (-1.46) 
Flow 0.084 -0.030 0.035   0.080 -0.040 0.030  (0.99) (-0.21) (0.42)   (0.97) (-0.28) (0.37) 
Alpha 0.159 0.143 0.177   0.162 0.145 0.180  (1.01) (0.73) (1.12)   (1.04) (0.77) (1.14) 
AS  -0.411***   -0.405*** 
  (-4.11)   (-3.72) 
RPI  0.546***   0.559***   (7.67)   (7.51) 
Similarity  -0.137   -0.136 
  (-1.42)   (-1.46) 
TE  -0.199    -0.193 
  (-1.59)    (-1.49) 
     
Adj R2 0.009 0.026 0.013   0.009 0.026 0.013 
N 22389 12227 22325   22343 12227 22279
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Table XI 
Fund Herding, Managerial Experience, and Future Performance 
This table presents the monthly performance of portfolios of mutual funds double-sorted on the basis of fund herding (FH) and managerial experience. Fund 
Herding is constructed from cross-sectional regressions of mutual fund trades on past aggregate institutional trades, as described in Table I. We sort funds 
independently into four groups based on fund herding and into three groups based on one of two proxies for managerial experience: general experience or fund-
specific tenure. The sample includes only funds managed by an individual manager. We compute the average monthly net return and the Carhart (1997) four-factor 
α for each of the 16 portfolios. Newey-West (1987) t-statistics are shown in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
level, respectively, for the return differentials between portfolios of high and low FH. 
 
Panel A: General Experience 
   Net Return  Four-Factor Net α 
FH  Low 2 3 High High-Low  Low 2 3 High High-Low 
Experience             
   Low  0.80 0.75 0.77 0.64 -0.16**  0.02 -0.06 -0.02 -0.16 -0.18** 
  (2.46) (2.27) (2.35) (1.92) (-2.41)  (0.21) (-0.89) (-0.23) (-2.29) (-2.60) 
   Med  0.79 0.73 0.71 0.65 -0.14**  0.00 -0.07 -0.05 -0.11 -0.11* 
  (2.50) (2.28) (2.16) (1.96) (-2.27)  (-0.02) (-1.02) (-0.70) (-1.31) (-1.90) 
   High  0.78 0.73 0.68 0.66 -0.12  -0.01 -0.06 -0.08 -0.12 -0.10 
  (2.53) (2.42) (2.12) (2.03) (-1.47)  (-0.15) (-0.90) (-1.00) (-1.50) (-1.37) 
   High-Low  -0.02 -0.02 -0.10 0.02 0.05  -0.03 0.00 -0.06 0.05 0.08 
   (-0.36) (-0.32) (-1.31) (0.37) (0.53)  (-0.47) (-0.02) (-0.86) (0.72) (0.83) 
   Gross Return  Four-Factor Gross α 
FH  Low 2 3 High High-Low  Low 2 3 High High-Low 
Experience             
   Low  0.91 0.85 0.88 0.75 -0.17**  0.13 0.05 0.09 -0.05 -0.18*** 
  (2.79) (2.58) (2.68) (2.25) (-2.43)  (1.63) (0.76) (1.27) (-0.76) (-2.62) 
   Med  0.91 0.84 0.82 0.76 -0.15**  0.11 0.03 0.06 0.00 -0.11** 
  (2.85) (2.62) (2.48) (2.29) (-2.32)  (1.45) (0.46) (0.86) (-0.02) (-1.96) 
   High  0.88 0.83 0.77 0.77 -0.11  0.09 0.04 0.02 -0.01 -0.10 
  (2.86) (2.75) (2.43) (2.35) (-1.45)  (1.12) (0.67) (0.26) (-0.13) (-1.35) 
   High-Low  -0.03 -0.03 -0.10 0.02 0.05  -0.03 -0.01 -0.07 0.04 0.08 
   (-0.46) (-0.38) (-1.43) (0.33) (0.56)  (-0.57) (-0.09) (-0.98) (0.68) (0.87) 
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Panel B: Fund-Specific Tenure 
   Net Return  Four-Factor Net α 
FH  Low 2 3 High High-Low  Low 2 3 High High-Low 
Tenure             
   Low  0.81 0.73 0.70 0.58 -0.23***  0.02 -0.09 -0.07 -0.20 -0.22*** 
  (2.46) (2.18) (2.13) (1.71) (-3.00)  (0.19) (-1.31) (-0.95) (-2.49) (-2.93) 
   Med  0.79 0.78 0.74 0.67 -0.12**  0.01 -0.01 -0.04 -0.11 -0.12** 
  (2.52) (2.48) (2.28) (2.06) (-2.07)  (0.08) (-0.17) (-0.60) (-1.50) (-2.03) 
   High  0.78 0.70 0.72 0.71 -0.07  -0.02 -0.08 -0.03 -0.06 -0.04 
  (2.50) (2.32) (2.26) (2.19) (-0.95)  (-0.20) (-1.29) (-0.41) (-0.77) (-0.62) 
   High-Low  -0.03 -0.03 0.02 0.13* 0.16*  -0.03 0.01 0.04 0.14** 0.17** 
   (-0.44) (-0.40) (0.26) (1.88) (1.73)  (-0.53) (0.16) (0.58) (2.34) (2.02) 
   Gross Return  Four-Factor Gross α 
FH  Low 2 3 High High-Low  Low 2 3 High High-Low 
Tenure             
   Low  0.91 0.84 0.81 0.69 -0.23***  0.12 0.01 0.04 -0.09 -0.22*** 
  (2.79) (2.48) (2.45) (2.03) (-3.00)  (1.47) (0.16) (0.54) (-1.15) (-2.94) 
   Med  0.91 0.88 0.84 0.78 -0.12**  0.12 0.10 0.07 -0.01 -0.12** 
  (2.88) (2.82) (2.60) (2.39) (-2.15)  (1.64) (1.50) (0.96) (-0.07) (-2.10) 
   High  0.88 0.80 0.82 0.81 -0.07  0.09 0.02 0.07 0.05 -0.04 
  (2.84) (2.65) (2.56) (2.52) (-0.93)  (1.14) (0.31) (0.95) (0.66) (-0.60) 
   High-Low  -0.03 -0.04 0.01 0.13* 0.16*  -0.04 0.01 0.03 0.14** 0.18** 
   (-0.51) (-0.43) (0.17) (1.85) (1.76)  (-0.59) (0.12) (0.49) (2.31) (2.05) 
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Table XII 
Alternative Measures of Fund Herding: Controlling for Multiple Stock Characteristics 
This table presents the monthly performance of decile portfolios of funds sorted on an alternative measure of Fund Herding (FH). FH is constructed from the slope 
coefficients of cross-sectional regressions of mutual fund trades on past orthogonalized institutional trades measured in the previous quarter; institutional trades 
are orthogonalized in cross-sectional regressions with respect to past stock returns, firm size, book-to-market, turnover, idiosyncratic volatility, analyst earnings 
forecast revisions, firm share issuance, bid-ask spread, Amihud illiquidity, and 10 industry dummies. The construction of the portfolios and the estimation of returns 
are described in Table II. Newey-West (1987) t-statistics are shown in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, 
respectively, for the return differentials between deciles 10 and 1. 
FH rank 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 D10-D1 
Net Return 
Average 0.83 0.79 0.79 0.78 0.77 0.76 0.78 0.73 0.75 0.68 -0.16*** 
 (2.89) (2.78) (2.74) (2.73) (2.64) (2.61) (2.61) (2.45) (2.48) (2.25) (-2.69) 
CAPM α 0.07 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.00 -0.01 0.00 -0.05 -0.04 -0.11 -0.18*** 
 (1.03) (0.53) (0.43) (0.32) (-0.03) (-0.16) (-0.04) (-0.85) (-0.60) (-1.63) (-2.99) 
FF α 0.01 -0.03 -0.03 -0.05 -0.05 -0.06 -0.05 -0.09 -0.05 -0.13 -0.14** 
 (0.15) (-0.66) (-0.64) (-0.93) (-1.11) (-1.3) (-0.98) (-1.72) (-0.95) (-2.19) (-2.42) 
Carhart α 0.02 -0.02 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.06 -0.06 -0.08 -0.06 -0.13 -0.15** 
 (0.26) (-0.39) (-0.74) (-0.71) (-0.77) (-1.18) (-1.19) (-1.5) (-1.11) (-1.99) (-2.44) 
PS α -0.01 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 -0.06 -0.08 -0.09 -0.06 -0.13 -0.12** 
 (-0.24) (-0.86) (-1.10) (-1.05) (-1.06) (-1.15) (-1.49) (-1.74) (-1.11) (-1.93) (-2.01) 
Gross Return 
Average 0.94 0.89 0.89 0.88 0.86 0.86 0.87 0.83 0.86 0.78 -0.16*** 
 (3.26) (3.15) (3.09) (3.08) (2.98) (2.94) (2.95) (2.79) (2.82) (2.60) (-2.73) 
CAPM α 0.18 0.14 0.12 0.12 0.10 0.09 0.10 0.05 0.07 0.00 -0.18*** 
 (2.61) (2.22) (2.10) (1.94) (1.62) (1.45) (1.56) (0.84) (1.14) (0.01) (-3.04) 
FF α 0.12 0.07 0.07 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.05 0.01 0.05 -0.02 -0.14** 
 (2.07) (1.32) (1.51) (1.02) (0.86) (0.72) (1.06) (0.29) (0.91) (-0.4) (-2.47) 
Carhart α 0.12 0.08 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.04 0.04 0.02 0.04 -0.02 -0.15** 
 (2.06) (1.52) (1.29) (1.18) (1.13) (0.74) (0.76) (0.37) (0.74) (-0.37) (-2.48) 
PS α 0.10 0.06 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.02 0.01 0.04 -0.02 -0.12** 
  (1.70) (1.07) (0.94) (0.87) (0.81) (0.69) (0.41) (0.13) (0.71) (-0.34) (-2.05) 
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Table XIII 
Alternative Measures of Fund Herding: Controlling for Past Own Trades 
This table presents the monthly performance of decile portfolios of funds sorted on an alternative measure of Fund Herding (FH). FH is constructed from the slope 
coefficients of cross-sectional regressions of mutual fund trades on past institutional trades measured in the previous quarter; the regressions control for past stock 
returns, firm size, book-to-market, and the fund’s own trades in the previous quarter. The construction of the portfolios and the estimation of returns are described 
in Table II. Newey-West (1987) t-statistics are shown in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively, for 
the return differentials between deciles 10 and 1. 
FH rank 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 D10-D1 
Net Return 
Average 0.82 0.82 0.79 0.83 0.76 0.80 0.74 0.74 0.69 0.64 -0.17*** 
 (2.81) (2.77) (2.72) (2.85) (2.66) (2.73) (2.54) (2.53) (2.30) (2.17) (-3.07) 
CAPM α 0.05 0.04 0.02 0.06 0.00 0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.09 -0.13 -0.19*** 
 (0.70) (0.65) (0.34) (0.92) (0.04) (0.49) (-0.55) (-0.59) (-1.71) (-2.39) (-3.18) 
FF α -0.01 -0.01 -0.04 0.00 -0.06 -0.02 -0.07 -0.07 -0.12 -0.16 -0.15*** 
 (-0.13) (-0.27) (-0.89) (0.03) (-1.22) (-0.46) (-1.36) (-1.53) (-2.47) (-2.93) (-2.8) 
Carhart α -0.01 -0.03 -0.04 -0.01 -0.06 -0.01 -0.05 -0.06 -0.12 -0.14 -0.14** 
 (-0.09) (-0.46) (-0.73) (-0.12) (-1.19) (-0.26) (-1.02) (-1.27) (-2.3) (-2.42) (-2.57) 
PS α -0.03 -0.05 -0.05 -0.02 -0.07 -0.02 -0.07 -0.07 -0.13 -0.16 -0.12** 
 (-0.53) (-0.91) (-0.91) (-0.41) (-1.51) (-0.41) (-1.3) (-1.3) (-2.43) (-2.71) (-2.28) 
Gross Return 
Average 0.93 0.92 0.89 0.92 0.86 0.90 0.84 0.84 0.79 0.76 -0.17*** 
 (3.19) (3.12) (3.06) (3.19) (3.00) (3.07) (2.88) (2.87) (2.66) (2.55) (-3.07) 
CAPM α 0.16 0.15 0.12 0.16 0.10 0.13 0.07 0.07 0.01 -0.02 -0.19*** 
 (2.17) (2.19) (1.94) (2.41) (1.70) (2.30) (1.25) (1.32) (0.19) (-0.39) (-3.17) 
FF α 0.10 0.09 0.06 0.10 0.04 0.08 0.03 0.03 -0.02 -0.04 -0.15*** 
 (1.64) (1.72) (1.18) (1.98) (0.94) (1.79) (0.64) (0.61) (-0.36) (-0.82) (-2.80) 
Carhart α 0.11 0.08 0.06 0.09 0.04 0.09 0.05 0.04 -0.02 -0.03 -0.14** 
 (1.54) (1.43) (1.14) (1.74) (0.82) (1.93) (0.92) (0.77) (-0.31) (-0.53) (-2.57) 
PS α 0.08 0.06 0.05 0.08 0.02 0.08 0.03 0.03 -0.03 -0.05 -0.12** 
  (1.17) (1.04) (0.95) (1.43) (0.52) (1.69) (0.63) (0.66) (-0.48) (-0.79) (-2.28) 
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Table XIV 
Alternative Measures of Mutual Fund Performance 
This table presents coefficient estimates from predictive panel regressions testing the association between fund 
herding and future mutual fund performance. Performance is computed from fund stock holdings using two 
measures: the Daniel et al. (1997, DGTW) Characteristic Selectivity (CS) measure (columns (1) and (2)) and the 
Grinblatt and Titman (1993, GT) measure. The monthly GT measure is computed over quarter t+1 and over 
quarter t+5. The regressions control for fund size, age, expense ratio (percent), turnover, flows (percent) over the 
previous quarter, and alpha (percent) over the previous three years. Performance is measured in monthly 
percentages. The regressions include time fixed effects and the standard errors are clustered by fund. t-statistics 
are shown in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
 DGTW Measure (CS)  Grinblatt-Titman Measure (GT) 
  t+1  t+1  t+5 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6) 
Fund Herding -0.251** -0.276***  -0.208** -0.244**  -0.173** -0.197** 
  (-2.39) (-2.63)  (-2.10) (-2.54)  (-2.10) (-2.30) 
Size  -0.006*   -0.007*   -0.004 
   (-1.64)   (-1.88)   (-1.17) 
Age  0.015   -0.002   -0.003 
   (1.56)   (-0.25)   (-0.40) 
Expense  -0.018   0.011   0.010 
   (-1.14)   (0.82)   (0.82) 
Turnover  -0.008   -0.007   0.007 
   (-0.92)   (-1.01)   (0.95) 
Flow  0.005   0.005***   -0.023 
   (0.32)   (13.12)   (-1.38) 
Alpha  0.022   0.049***   -0.013 
   (0.96)   (2.63)   (-0.84) 
         
Adj R2 0.054 0.056  0.209 0.206  0.241 0.237 
N 136742 129596  155083 147358  132347 125104 
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Table XV 
Fund Herding and Future Fund Flows 
This table presents coefficient estimates from predictive regressions testing the association between fund herding 
and future fund flows. The dependent variable is the net flow of a given fund during quarter t+1. Net flow is the 
growth rate of assets under management after adjusting for the appreciation of the fund's assets. The regressions 
control for fund size, age, expense ratio (percent), turnover, flows over the previous quarter, and alpha (percent) 
over the previous three years. All independent variables are measured at the end of quarter t. The regressions 
include fixed time effects and the standard errors are clustered by fund. t-statistics are shown in parentheses. ***, 
**, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
Dependent Variable: Fund Flows 
Fund Herding -0.033** -0.019 
  (-2.34) (-1.58) 
Size  -0.003*** 
   (-5.85) 
Age  -0.009*** 
   (-7.58) 
Expense 0.131
   (0.60) 
Turnover  0.002 
   (0.99) 
Flow  0.192*** 
   (11.13) 
Alpha  5.758*** 
  (19.67) 
   
Adj R2 0.010 0.084 
N 55595 53002 
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I. Introduction
In this Internet Appendix we provide supplementary material and robustness tests on the re-
lation between herding behavior and mutual fund skill. This document is organized as follows.
Section II examines the link between herding and performance using the LSV measure; the results
of this analysis highlight the value of developing a dynamic measure to capture the tendency of
individual funds to follow past institutional trading decisions. Section III presents results on the
herding-performance relation when we use a narrower denition for the crowd that mutual funds
imitate; in particular, we restrict the crowd to include: (i) only mutual funds, (ii) the subset of
mutual funds with relatively high past performance, and (iii) the subset of peer mutual funds based
on investment style. Section IV contains a set of robustness tests that use alternative approaches
to measuring fund herding. For example, we consider: fund trades that include initiations and
deletions; trades dened as changes in portfolio weights; estimating a funds herding tendency with
no controls, controlling for industry momentum, and controlling for contemporaneous institutional
trades; dening herding as a funds tendency to follow longer-horizon institutional trades. Section
V presents results on buy herding and sell herding. Section VI presents a number of further tests
on the robustness of the relation between fund herding and future performance.
II. Comparison with the LSV Measure
The popular stock-level measure of herding proposed by Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny (1992,
LSV) captures the tendency of investors to buy and sell the same stocks at the same time. Our
measure of fund herding di¤ers from this measure in that it captures the intertemporal correlation
between a funds trades and past aggregate institutional trades. To better understand the impor-
tance of this intertemporal focus, we follow Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers (1995) and create a
fund-level measure of herding by aggregating the stock-level LSV measure of each stock i traded
by each fund j:
FHLSVj;t =
Ni;tX
i=1
h
wji;t HMi;t  I(pi;t > pi;t)
i
;
where wji;t is the weight of stock i in fund j at the end of quarter t; pi;t is the fraction of mutual funds
trading stock i in quarter t that are buyers; HMi;t is the LSV herding measure for stock i in quarter
t: HMi;t = jpi;t   pi;tj  E(jpi;t   pi;tj); and I(pi;t > pi;t) = 1 if pi;t 1 > pi;t 1, I(pi;t > pi;t) =  1 if
2
pi;t 1 < pi;t 1:
We next test the ability of FHLSVj;t to predict mutual fund performance by sorting funds into
decile portfolios based on this new measure of herding and estimating their subsequent returns.
The results, reported in Table IA.I, show that this measure of herding is not signicantly related to
future performance. This evidence suggests that our intertemporal measure of fund herding reveals
a dimension of mutual fund skill that is not detectable with a traditional, more static measure
of trade clustering, and this highlights the importance of focusing on the dynamic tendency of
individual funds to follow past institutional trading decisions.
III. Following a Smaller Crowd
In our baseline analysis we measure herding as the tendency of a mutual fund to follow the
trades of the institutional crowd, dened as the aggregate trades of all institutional investors. In
this section we consider a number of narrower denitions for the crowd that mutual funds imitate.
In particular, we restrict the crowd to include: (i) only mutual funds, (ii) the subset of mutual
funds with relatively high past performance (past winners), and (iii) the subset of peer mutual
funds, that is, mutual funds that follow the same investment style or have the same investment
objective as the fund that we are analyzing. We estimate regressions of fund trades on the past
trades of the crowd, as in our baseline analysis, to construct new measures of fund herding and
assess their ability to predict performance.
Overall, our investigation of herding as imitation of a selected group of institutions suggests
that the predictability of herding for mutual fund performance is clear and strong when we measure
herding as imitation of the broad crowd of investors. When we use a narrower denition of the set
of institutions that mutual funds might imitate, the link between herding and future performance
is not as important in magnitude or statistical signicance. Taken together, our results suggest
that our measure of imitation, based on following the crowd,is better able to detect skill in the
cross-section of mutual funds.
A. Following Mutual Funds
We rst consider a funds tendency to follow the past trading decisions of mutual funds as a
group. We replace aggregate institutional trades with aggregate mutual fund trades in our trade
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regression:
Tradei;j;t = j;t + j;tMFi;t 1 + 1j;tMomi;t 1 + 2j;tMCi;t 1 + 3j;tBMi;t 1 + "i;j;t:
We then use these quarterly coe¢ cients to construct a new measure of herding, as in our baseline
case, and relate it to future fund performance. The results, reported in Table IA.II, indicate that
the tendency to follow aggregate mutual fund trades is a useful measure to forecast future fund
performance, although it is less powerful than a measure based on the tendency to follow the crowd.
B. Following Successful Mutual Funds
We next consider a funds tendency to follow the past trading decisions of successful mutual
funds only. Each quarter, we dene successful mutual funds as those funds with prior-year three-
factor alphas in the top 20% of the cross-fund distribution. We then estimate the trade regressions
after replacing aggregate institutional trades with the trades of these successful funds and, as before,
we use the estimated quarterly coe¢ cients to construct a new measure of herding and predict fund
performance.
Table IA.III shows that the performance gap between herding and antiherding funds is not
signicant. Compared to our baseline case scenario, these results indicate that di¤erences in the
tendency to follow past winners, which we can loosely term as copycatting star mutual funds, might
not be a highly e¤ective signal to identify skill. This result is consistent with the copycat literature,
which nds little evidence that imitating successful managers can systematically lead to superior
performance (Frank et al. (2004), Verbeek and Wang (2013), Phillips, Pukthuanthong, and Rau
(2014)). Our ndings highlight the importance of using the tendency to follow the crowd as a signal
to separate skilled and unskilled mutual funds.
C. Following Style Peers
To measure herding on style peers, we modify the denition of crowd to include only those
mutual funds that can be viewed as peers based on their investment style or investment objective.
We dene style peers in three ways:
i. Using the 12 styles as dened in the Equity Fund Classication Matrix of Lipper: Large-Cap
Value, Large-Cap Core, Large-Cap Growth, Multi-Cap Value, Multi-Cap Core, Multi-Cap
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Growth, Mid-Cap Value, Mid-Cap Core, Mid-Cap Growth, Small-Cap Value, Small-Cap Core,
and Small-Cap Growth;
ii. Focusing on the four non-overlapping extreme styles: Large-Cap Value, Large-Cap Growth,
Small-Cap Value, and Small-Cap Growth;
iii. Using the Thomson-Reuters mutual fund investment objective code to group funds into three
styles: Aggressive Growth, Growth, and Growth and Income.
We reestimate fund herding based on these new proxies for the trades of the crowd, and mea-
sure subsequent fund performance. We present the results in Table IA.IV (Panels A, B, and C).
The average spread in returns (gross and net) between herding and antiherding funds is negative,
ranging from 10bps to 13bps, and is signicant at the 10% level. However, the spread in Carhart
alphas, although similar in magnitude, is not statistically signicant. The results from these tests
suggest that the tendency of mutual funds to imitate their style peers does not reliably capture the
heterogeneity in skill across mutual funds.
IV. Robustness of the Fund Herding Measure
In this section we check the robustness of our fund herding measure with a number of di¤erent
empirical tests. First, we consider di¤erent approaches to measuring mutual fund trades. Second,
we consider di¤erent control variables in the baseline regressions of fund trades on past aggregate
institutional trades. Third, we estimate mutual fund herding with respect to past long-horizon
institutional trades. Finally, we examine di¤erent ways of averaging the quarterly coe¢ cients used
to construct a funds average tendency to herd.
A. Trades with Initiations and Deletions
Our baseline measure of trade is the percentage change in holdings of stock i in the portfolio of
mutual fund j during quarter t, where holdings are measured as the number of split-adjusted shares.
This measure of trade captures all purchases and sales by a mutual fund, excluding initiations and
deletions of positions in a given stock. In this subsection we test the link between fund herding
and performance when herding is computed from trades that also include initiations and deletions.
Table IA.V shows that the performance of funds sorted on fund herding is very similar to our
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baseline results. For example, the Carhart alpha di¤erential between herding and antiherding
funds is 14bps, similar to the baseline case of 16bps. We conclude that initiations and deletions
do not a¤ect our results signicantly.
B. Trades as Changes in Portfolio Weights
We next recompute fund herding after measuring a funds trades as the change in portfolio
weight in a given stock in a given quarter. Table IA.VI reports the performance of portfolios
of funds that are sorted by this measure of fund herding. The results are very similar, and if
anything slightly stronger, than our baseline results. For example, the di¤erence in raw returns
between herding and antiherding funds is 20bps (compared to 19bps in our baseline case), and
the di¤erence in Carhart alphas is now 21bps (compared to 16bps in our baseline case). We
conclude that our results are robust to the method of fund trade measurement.
C. Controlling for Industry Momentum
Prior work presents evidence of gradual di¤usion of industry-level information into stock prices,
which could have implications for the tendency of mutual funds to herd (Hou (2007)). To assess the
importance of industry momentum in prices, we reestimate fund herding using a trade regression
that includes MomIndi;t 1; the industry-level return measured in the previous quarter. We use the
Fama and French (1997) 10-industry classication. The trade regressions are modied as follows:
Tradei;j;t = j;t+j;tIOi;t 1+1j;tMomi;t 1+2j;tMCi;t 1+3j;tBMi;t 1+4j;tMomIndi;t 1+"i;j;t:
As with our baseline analysis, we average the quarterly coe¢ cients on IO to construct a
new measure of fund herding. We then assess its ability to predict performance for the cross-
section of mutual funds. The results, reported in Table IA.VII, conrm that the return spread
between herding and antiherding funds remains large and statistically signicant after controlling
for industry momentum.
D. Controlling for Contemporaneous Institutional Trades
If aggregate institutional trades are persistent over time, they might play a role in driving the
correlation between the current trades of a mutual fund and past institutional trades. To control
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for this possibility, we reconstruct our measure of herding from a trade regression that includes the
current change in institutional ownership for stock i, IOi;t:
Tradei;j;t = j;t + j;tIOi;t 1 + 1j;tMomi;t 1 + 2j;tMCi;t 1 + 3j;tBMi;t 1 + 4j;tIOi;t + "i;j;t:
The results are reported in Table IA.VIII. We nd that even after controlling for the inuence of
contemporaneous institutional trades, fund herding is negatively and signicantly associated with
future performance.
E. No Controls
We next investigate the link between fund herding and future fund performance when herding
is estimated without controlling for investment styles (size, value, momentum). The main rationale
for our style controls is to capture a funds tendency to imitate the crowd for reasons other than
following the same investment style as the crowd. For example, if we didnt control for value,
we might attribute herding behavior to a manager who appears to follow the crowd but is really
implementing value strategies, possibly together with a fraction of institutional investors. With the
controls we hope to separate deliberate imitating behavior from apparent imitation that might be
due to commonalities in investing styles.
In this subsection we rerun our portfolio analysis by sorting funds on a measure of herding that
is obtained from our baseline regression of fund trades on IO without including any controls. The
results are presented in Table IA.IX. They are similar to our baseline results, albeit less strong. For
example, the di¤erence in Carhart alphas between herding and antiherding funds is now 12bps for
net returns and 13bps for gross returns, signicant at the 10% level (compared to 16bps in the
baseline case). These results suggest that the measure of herding obtained without style controls is
a less clean measure of imitation; as with measures previously used in the literature (e.g., Grinblatt,
Titman, and Wermers (1995)), this measure may not capture pure imitating behavior, since the
estimated correlation between fund trades and institutional trades is potentially confounded by
trading decisions that are based on common preferences for investing styles and feedback trading.
This evidence emphasizes the importance of ltering out information on stock characteristics to
obtain a cleaner estimate of herding behavior, which can reveal cross-sectional di¤erences in mutual
fund skill.
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F. Following Longer-Horizon Institutional Trades
In our baseline analysis we dene fund herding as the average correlation between a funds trades
and past aggregate institutional trades, measured over two adjacent quarters. We now modify our
measure of fund herding to capture the behavior of mutual funds following institutional herds
that have developed over longer periods of time. Specically, for any given stock, we construct
three measures of long-horizon institutional trades: aggregate institutional trades over the past
two quarters, IOi;t 2:t 1; aggregate institutional trades over the past four quarters, IOi;t 4:t 1;
and a measure of persistence in past institutional trades, which counts the number of consecutive
quarters in which the stock is bought or sold by institutional investors and attributes positive values
to buy decisions and negative values to sell decisions, Persi;t 1.1
At the end of each quarter t, we reestimate our basic trade regression using each of the longer-
horizon measures of past institutional trades measured up to the end of quarter t 1, with the usual
stock characteristics to control for style. For example, with Persi;t 1 we estimate the following
regression:
Tradei;j;t = j;t + j;tPersi;t 1 + 1j;tMomi;t 1 + 2j;tMCi;t 1 + 3j;tBMi;t 1 + "i;j;t:
The coe¢ cient j;t now represents the responsiveness of the trades of mutual fund j to di¤erent
degrees of persistence in buying or selling by institutional investors, measured over horizons of
several quarters in the past. We then use these quarterly coe¢ cients to construct a new measure
of herding, as in our baseline case.
Table IA.X (Panels A, B, and C) presents results from panel regressions of fund performance
on these new measures of herding. The ndings indicate that the tendency of mutual funds to
follow past institutional trades negatively predicts their future performance, especially when past
aggregate trades are persistent or are measured in the more recent past.
1A stock is bought (sold) if the change in institutional ownership in a given quarter is above (below) the cross-
sectional median. For example, for a stock bought in quarter t and sold in quarter t   1 trade persistence equals
+1, while for a stock bought in quarters t and t   1 and sold in t   2; trade persistence equals +2. Stocks that
are bought or sold for at least four consecutive quarters have a trade persistence value of +4 and -4, respectively.
Dasgupta, Prat, and Verardo (2011) document empirically that stocks persistently bought or sold by institutional
investors experience return reversals in the long run.
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G. Alternative Approaches to Constructing Fund Herding
In this subsection we further consider alternative approaches to constructing our measure of
fund herding. First, we compute a funds average tendency to herd using the equally weighted
time-series average of the quarterly herding coe¢ cients from the trade regressions (Table IA.XI).
Second, we simply use the quarterly coe¢ cients from the trade regressions as proxies for mutual
fund herding (Table IA.XII). Third, we estimate the fund trade regressions without standardizing
the dependent and independent variables (Table IA.XIII). The results indicate that the relation
between fund herding and future performance is robust to these alternative estimates of fund
herding. In particular, this investigation highlights the importance of measuring fund herding using
all information available on a funds trading behavior up to quarter t, rather than truncating the
information set to the most recent past. At the same time, our ndings emphasize the importance
of allowing for time-varying changes in fundstrading behavior, rather than attributing the same
weight to both recent and past actions.
V. Buy Herding and Sell Herding
In our baseline analysis, we construct fund herding using all available information on funds
behavior with respect to the past decisions of the institutional crowd. In this section, we separate
out buys and sells to check for asymmetries in the strength of the performance signal coming from
imitating aggregate buys and aggregate sells. Specically, we sort past aggregate trades (IO)
into buys and sells based on their sign and estimate regressions of fundstrades on these measures.
Using the beta coe¢ cients from these regressions, we construct each funds average tendency to
follow past buys (FH/buys) and past sells (FH/sells). We then form decile portfolios of funds
based on buy herding and sell herding and estimate their future performance. The results from
these univariate sorts are reported in Table IA.XIV (Panels A and B). The evidence indicates that
there is no clear di¤erence in the ability of fund herding and sell herding to predict mutual fund
performance. The di¤erence in raw returns between herding and antiherding funds (deciles 10 and
1) is slightly larger for buy herding (17bps versus 13bps), but the di¤erence in Carhart alphas
varies between 9bps and 10bps. Overall, these return di¤erentials are somewhat weaker than those
reported for our pooled sample of trades. However, this test does not account for the degree to
which any given fund might engage in both buy herding behavior and sell herding behavior.
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For a more powerful test of potential asymmetries between buy herding and sell herding, we
consider funds that are double-sorted based on their propensity to imitate past aggregate buys
or sells. This test allows us to analyze the incremental value of buy herding and sell herding for
predicting fund performance. We sort all funds independently into quartiles based on FH/buys
and FH/sells, and we estimate their future performance. Table IA.XV reports the raw returns
and the four-factor alphas of the portfolios. The table shows that, conditional on sell herding, the
di¤erence in future performance between funds that herd and funds that antiherd on past buys
(HighLow/buys) is both large and signicant for low and medium sell herding. In particular, the
performance di¤erentials are 13bps and 12bps when measured in raw returns (signicant at the
5% level), and 10bps when measured using the four-factor alphas (with t-statistics around 1.80).
This evidence suggests that, controlling for a funds tendency to imitate past institutional selling
activity, the tendency to follow aggregate buys contains incremental information for a funds future
performance. In contrast, we do not observe signicant return di¤erentials between herding and
antiherding funds following aggregate sells. These results are consistent with the intuition that
herding behavior can reveal di¤erences in skill more clearly when considering buy herding than
when considering sell herding.
VI. Other Robustness Tests
A. Price Pressure from Institutional Trades
One possible driver of the link between herding and future performance might be the price
impact of aggregate institutional trades. If institutional trades exert destabilizing pressure on
prices, then fund managers who follow these trades may buy high and sell low, thus achieving
on average inferior performance. This hypothesis relies crucially on the premise that aggregate
institutional trades predict reversals in stock returns, and that such return reversals occur in the
period in which we evaluate mutual fund performance.
To examine this conjecture, we investigate the relation between aggregate institutional trades
and future stock returns. In particular, for each month from January 1990 to December 2009, we
estimate the ability of changes in aggregate institutional ownership to predict monthly stock returns
measured in the subsequent four quarters, after controlling for a variety of stock characteristics.
Table IA.XVI presents the results. In the rst specication we include rm size, book-to-market,
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stock returns in the previous quarter, and stock returns in the previous year. In the second
specication we add stock turnover, idiosyncratic volatility, share issuance, and analyst earnings
forecast revisions. We use the Fama and MacBeth (1973) procedure to conduct statistical inference.
Aggregate institutional trades are measured in quarter t. The results from the predictive re-
gressions show that the slope coe¢ cients on institutional trades are statistically indistinguishable
from zero for all forecasting horizons t+ 1 to t+ 4 and for both regression specications. To map
the forecasting horizon of this regression to our investigation of mutual fund herding and perfor-
mance, we note that if quarter t is the period in which we measure aggregate institutional trades,
then individual mutual fund trades are measured in quarter t+ 1 and mutual fund performance is
measured over quarter t+ 2. The results suggest that, at least for the sample period we consider,
aggregate institutional trades have no predictive power for the cross-section of stock returns. Based
on this evidence, we can rule out the possibility that the underperformance of herding funds arises
mainly from price pressure caused by aggregate institutional trades.
B. Excluding Funds with Highest and Lowest Fund Herding
We examine the robustness of the predictive power of herding for mutual fund performance by
estimating multivariate regressions that exclude funds in the top and bottom deciles of fund herding.
Our measure of performance is the monthly four-factor alpha of Carhart (1997), estimated in the
months of quarter t+ 1 as the di¤erence between the realized fund return in excess of the risk-free
rate and the expected excess fund return from a four-factor model that includes the market, size,
value, and momentum factors. The factor loadings are estimated from rolling-window time-series
regressions of fund returns over the previous three years. Herding and fund characteristics are
measured using information available at the end of quarter t.
Table IA.XVII presents the results from the predictive panel regressions. The results provide
further evidence of a signicant link between fund herding and future performance, even after we
remove the funds in the extreme deciles of fund herding.
C. Value-Weighted Fund Portfolios
We next reestimate the herding-performance relation using value-weighted deciles of funds
rather than equally weighted portfolios. The weights for individual funds are based on the funds
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total net assets. We measure the future returns of these portfolios and estimate their risk-adjusted
returns from time-series regressions using the capital asset pricing model (CAPM), the three-factor
model of Fama and French (1993), the four-factor model of Carhart (1997), and the ve-factor
model of Pástor and Stambaugh (2003). Table IA.XVIII presents the results. Herding funds in
decile 10 strongly underperform their antiherding peers in decile 1. The magnitude of the return
di¤erentials is larger than that based on equally weighted fund portfolio returns, suggesting that
the performance implications of mutual fund herding are not conned to small funds.
D. Fund Herding and Stock Characteristics
In our main analysis, as a robustness check, we estimate fund herding from trade regressions
that control for a large number of stock characteristics: size, book-to-market, momentum, stock
turnover, idiosyncratic volatility, revisions in analyst earnings forecasts, past share issuance, bid-ask
spread, Amihud illiquidity, and 10 industry dummies. When we estimate the future performance
of mutual funds sorted on this new measure of herding, we nd that the performance di¤erential
between herding and antiherding funds is remarkably similar to our baseline case (Carhart alphas
are 15bps per month when using all controls, indistinguishable from the benchmark value of
16bps).
In this subsection, we perform another test to investigate whether funds with di¤erent propen-
sity to herd might hold stocks with di¤erent characteristics, thus driving the return di¤erential
across funds. In particular, we compute the average decile rank of the distribution of a given stock
characteristic for each decile of fund herding. We consider stock size, book-to-market, momentum,
and institutional ownership. Table IA.XIX reports the results. There is clearly no discernible vari-
ation in stock characteristics across fund herding deciles, which conrms that stock characteristics
are not important drivers of the herding-performance relation that we uncover in our study.
E. Reliance on Information from Past Institutional Trades
In this subsection we estimate the herding-performance relation while controlling for the degree
to which mutual fund managers rely on information contained in past institutional trades. We use
the R2 from the regressions of individual fundstrades on past changes in institutional ownership
(IO) as a proxy for funds reliance on past institutional trades. If skilled funds disregard the
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information contained in IO and unskilled funds heavily rely on this information, we would
expect this proxy to have a negative and signicant impact on future performance; at the same
time, our fund herding measure would become redundant in the performance regressions. Table
IA.XX presents the results. The estimates show that R2 does not have signicant power to predict
mutual fund performance, whereas fund herding retains its economic and statistical signicance.
These results conrm that the tendency of a fund to imitate or anti-imitate past aggregate trading
decisions contains information that is useful to detect skill.
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Table IA.I 
Fund Herding Measured from LSV Stock Herding 
This table presents the performance of decile portfolios of funds formed on the basis of their herding measure. A fund’s herding measure is computed by aggregating the 
stock-level LSV herding measure of its holdings using its portfolio weights. The decile portfolios are formed at the end of each quarter from 1989Q4 to 2009Q3 and held 
for one quarter. The return series span January 1990 to December 2009. Decile 10 is the portfolio of funds with the highest fund herding measure. We compute monthly 
equally weighted net and gross (net plus expense ratio) returns on the portfolios, as well as risk-adjusted returns based on the CAPM, the Fama and French (1993, FF) 
three-factor model, the Carhart (1997) four-factor model, and the Pastor and Stambaugh (2003, PS) five-factor model. Average returns and alphas are in monthly 
percentages. Newey-West (1987) t-statistics are shown in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively, for the 
return differentials between deciles 10 and 1. 
FH rank 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 D10-D1 
Net Return 
Average 0.75 0.73 0.75 0.71 0.71 0.73 0.74 0.76 0.83 0.87 0.12 
 (2.73) (2.74) (2.82) (2.60) (2.54) (2.59) (2.54) (2.42) (2.41) (2.17) (0.52) 
CAPM α 0.01 0.00 0.02 -0.03 -0.05 -0.03 -0.03 -0.04 0.00 -0.01 -0.02 
 (0.15) (0.05) (0.38) (-0.54) (-0.9) (-0.47) (-0.52) (-0.49) (0.02) (-0.03) (-0.08) 
FF α -0.07 -0.08 -0.06 -0.10 -0.11 -0.08 -0.07 -0.06 0.00 0.02 0.10 
 (-1.21) (-1.57) (-1.08) (-1.99) (-2.53) (-1.64) (-1.53) (-1.08) (0.05) (0.25) (0.89) 
Carhart α -0.04 -0.04 -0.01 -0.07 -0.09 -0.07 -0.07 -0.09 -0.06 -0.09 -0.05 
 (-0.63) (-0.68) (-0.13) (-1.32) (-1.96) (-1.35) (-1.45) (-1.55) (-0.91) (-0.95) (-0.47) 
PS α -0.06 -0.06 -0.03 -0.10 -0.10 -0.09 -0.08 -0.10 -0.05 -0.08 -0.02 
 (-1) (-1.06) (-0.53) (-1.92) (-2.36) (-1.77) (-1.77) (-1.78) (-0.81) (-0.87) (-0.17) 
Gross Return 
Average 0.87 0.83 0.85 0.81 0.81 0.83 0.85 0.86 0.94 1.00 0.13 
 (3.16) (3.14) (3.20) (2.97) (2.90) (2.94) (2.89) (2.76) (2.75) (2.51) (0.58) 
CAPM α 0.13 0.11 0.12 0.07 0.05 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.12 0.13 0.00 
 (1.81) (1.60) (1.88) (1.19) (1.07) (1.36) (1.25) (0.83) (0.97) (0.68) (-0.02) 
FF α 0.08 0.07 0.09 0.03 0.01 0.03 0.04 0.02 0.05 0.05 -0.03 
 (1.27) (1.27) (1.71) (0.65) (0.25) (0.63) (0.75) (0.29) (0.82) (0.52) (-0.34) 
Carhart α 0.05 0.02 0.04 0.00 -0.01 0.02 0.03 0.05 0.12 0.16 0.11 
 (0.73) (0.38) (0.75) 0.00  (-0.22) (0.48) (0.76) (0.85) (1.78) (1.65) (1.01) 
PS α 0.06 0.05 0.07 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.06 0.05 0.00 
  (0.90) (0.91) (1.32) (0.12) (-0.1) (0.21) (0.42) (0.05) (0.89) (0.58) (-0.04) 
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Table IA.II 
Fund Herding Following a Smaller Crowd: Mutual Funds 
This table presents the performance of decile portfolios formed on the basis of FH, the average tendency of mutual funds to follow past mutual fund trades. FH is 
constructed from the slope coefficient of cross-sectional regressions of mutual fund trades on aggregate mutual fund trades measured in the previous quarter, controlling 
for past stock returns, firm size, and the book-to-market ratio. The return series span January 1990 to December 2009. Decile 10 is the portfolio of funds with the highest 
fund herding measure. We compute monthly equally weighted net and gross (net plus expense ratio) returns on the portfolios, as well as risk-adjusted returns based on the 
CAPM, the Fama and French (1993, FF) three-factor model, the Carhart (1997) four-factor model, and the Pastor and Stambaugh (2003, PS) five-factor model. Average 
returns and alphas are in monthly percentages. Newey-West (1987) t-statistics are shown in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 
10% level, respectively, for the return differentials between deciles 10 and 1. 
FH rank 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 D10-D1 
Net Return 
Average 0.79 0.8 0.75 0.77 0.77 0.76 0.77 0.69 0.71 0.68 -0.11** 
 (3.04) (3.11) (2.94) (2.92) (2.93) (2.90) (2.91) (2.59) (2.58) (2.57) (-2.42) 
CAPM α -0.02 -0.01 -0.05 -0.05 -0.04 -0.05 -0.05 -0.13 -0.13 -0.14 -0.12*** 
 (-0.33) (-0.1) (-0.93) (-0.9) (-0.86) (-0.99) (-0.98) (-2.73) (-2.45) (-2.75) (-2.66) 
FF α -0.03 -0.04 -0.09 -0.07 -0.06 -0.06 -0.06 -0.13 -0.11 -0.12 -0.09** 
 (-0.68) (-0.74) (-1.87) (-1.66) (-1.56) (-1.42) (-1.47) (-2.94) (-2.58) (-2.71) (-2.06) 
Carhart α -0.04 -0.02 -0.07 -0.06 -0.07 -0.08 -0.07 -0.12 -0.12 -0.12 -0.08* 
 (-0.87) (-0.44) (-1.46) (-1.41) (-1.58) (-1.85) (-1.49) (-2.7) (-2.65) (-2.52) (-1.91) 
PS α -0.05 -0.03 -0.07 -0.06 -0.07 -0.09 -0.07 -0.12 -0.11 -0.12 -0.07* 
 (-0.99) (-0.51) (-1.5) (-1.43) (-1.68) (-1.84) (-1.48) (-2.48) (-2.33) (-2.53) (-1.82) 
Gross Return 
Average 0.90 0.90 0.85 0.86 0.86 0.86 0.86 0.78 0.81 0.79 -0.11** 
 (3.45) (3.50) (3.33) (3.28) (3.29) (3.25) (3.27) (2.95) (2.93) (2.96) (-2.51) 
CAPM α 0.09 0.10 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.05 -0.04 -0.03 -0.03 -0.12*** 
 (1.56) (1.73) (0.90) (0.91) (0.96) (0.78) (0.93) (-0.77) (-0.56) (-0.66) (-2.75) 
FF α 0.08 0.07 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.04 -0.03 -0.02 -0.02 -0.09** 
 (1.61) (1.34) (0.23) (0.60) (0.73) (0.71) (0.91) (-0.79) (-0.37) (-0.35) (-2.16) 
Carhart α 0.06 0.08 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.02 -0.08** 
 (1.27) (1.47) (0.53) (0.78) (0.57) (0.19) (0.59) (-0.61) (-0.56) (-0.37) (-2.01) 
PS α 0.06 0.07 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.08* 
  (1.12) (1.35) (0.47) (0.71) (0.44) (0.11) (0.51) (-0.48) (-0.36) (-0.43) (-1.91) 
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Table IA.III 
Fund Herding Following a Smaller Crowd: Successful Mutual Funds 
This table presents the performance of decile portfolios formed on the basis of FH, the average tendency of mutual funds to follow successful mutual fund trades. FH is 
constructed from the slope coefficient of cross-sectional regressions of mutual fund trades on past trades by successful mutual funds (funds with prior-year alpha in the 
top 20% of all active funds) measured in the previous quarter, controlling for past stock returns, firm size, and the book-to-market ratio. The return series span January 
1990 to December 2009. Decile 10 is the portfolio of funds with the highest fund herding measure. We compute monthly equally weighted net and gross (net plus expense 
ratio) returns on the portfolios, as well as risk-adjusted returns based on the CAPM, the Fama and French (1993, FF) three-factor model, the Carhart (1997) four-factor 
model, and the Pastor and Stambaugh (2003, PS) five-factor model. Average returns and alphas are in monthly percentages. Newey-West (1987) t-statistics are shown in 
parentheses. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively, for the return differentials between deciles 10 and 1. 
FH rank 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 D10-D1 
Net Return 
Average 0.80 0.77 0.77 0.76 0.78 0.76 0.75 0.75 0.73 0.77 -0.03 
 (2.79) (2.68) (2.68) (2.60) (2.69) (2.61) (2.53) (2.52) (2.43) (2.53) (-0.54) 
CAPM α 0.04 0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.01 -0.01 -0.03 -0.03 -0.06 -0.02 -0.06 
 (0.56) (0.10) (0.10) (-0.17) (0.24) (-0.21) (-0.41) (-0.57) (-0.98) (-0.37) (-1.08) 
FF α -0.03 -0.05 -0.06 -0.07 -0.05 -0.06 -0.07 -0.06 -0.08 -0.03 0.00 
 (-0.48) (-0.94) (-1.17) (-1.4) (-0.97) (-1.19) (-1.35) (-1.4) (-1.68) (-0.64) (-0.07) 
Carhart α -0.02 -0.03 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 -0.08 -0.07 -0.08 -0.05 -0.03 
 (-0.33) (-0.58) (-0.95) (-1.02) (-0.85) (-0.95) (-1.48) (-1.46) (-1.64) (-0.99) (-0.65) 
PS α -0.03 -0.05 -0.07 -0.07 -0.07 -0.07 -0.09 -0.08 -0.09 -0.05 -0.02 
 (-0.57) (-0.88) (-1.37) (-1.22) (-1.21) (-1.28) (-1.68) (-1.74) (-1.71) (-1.00) (-0.37) 
Gross Return 
Average 0.91 0.87 0.87 0.86 0.88 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.83 0.88 -0.03 
 (3.16) (3.04) (3.02) (2.94) (3.03) (2.95) (2.87) (2.86) (2.77) (2.89) (-0.54) 
CAPM α 0.15 0.11 0.10 0.09 0.11 0.09 0.07 0.07 0.05 0.09 -0.06 
 (2.18) (1.77) (1.68) (1.39) (1.81) (1.50) (1.20) (1.26) (0.83) (1.49) (-1.08) 
FF α 0.08 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.08 0.00 
 (1.37) (0.93) (0.79) (0.55) (0.98) (0.77) (0.67) (0.80) (0.55) (1.57) (-0.06) 
Carhart α 0.09 0.07 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.06 -0.03 
 (1.43) (1.22) (0.88) (0.84) (0.91) (0.91) (0.40) (0.63) (0.42) (1.10) (-0.65) 
PS α 0.07 0.05 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.06 -0.02 
  (1.23) (0.91) (0.50) (0.59) (0.56) (0.51) (0.19) (0.34) (0.33) (1.07) (-0.37) 
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Table IA.IV (A) 
Fund Herding Following a Smaller Crowd: Style Peers (I) 
This table presents the performance of decile portfolios formed on the basis of FH, the average tendency of mutual funds to follow past institutional trades. FH is constructed 
from the slope coefficient of cross-sectional regressions of mutual fund trades on past aggregate trades by their peer funds measured in the previous quarter, controlling 
for past stock returns, firm size, and the book-to-market ratio. Peer funds are defined following the 12-style Lipper mutual fund classification. The return series span 
January 1990 to December 2009. Decile 10 is the portfolio of funds with the highest average herding measure. We compute monthly equally weighted net and gross (net 
plus expense ratio) returns on the portfolios, as well as risk-adjusted returns based on the CAPM, the Fama and French (1993, FF) three-factor model, the Carhart (1997) 
four-factor model, and the Pastor and Stambaugh (2003, PS) five-factor model. Average returns and alphas are in monthly percentages. Newey-West (1987) t-statistics are 
shown in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively, for the return differentials between deciles 10 and 1. 
FH rank 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 D10-D1 
Net Return 
Average 0.77 0.69 0.62 0.73 0.65 0.7 0.68 0.66 0.67 0.65 -0.11* 
 (2.46) (2.21) (2.00) (2.30) (2.10) (2.28) (2.19) (2.10) (2.02) (1.96) (-1.74) 
CAPM α 0.05 -0.03 -0.10 0.00 -0.07 -0.02 -0.04 -0.06 -0.08 -0.10 -0.15** 
 (0.74) (-0.52) (-1.83) (0.04) (-1.4) (-0.32) (-0.72) (-1.14) (-1.4) (-1.49) (-2.22) 
FF α 0.01 -0.05 -0.12 -0.02 -0.08 -0.04 -0.06 -0.07 -0.07 -0.07 -0.08 
 (0.20) (-0.95) (-2.08) (-0.35) (-1.66) (-0.74) (-1.07) (-1.41) (-1.15) (-1.29) (-1.54) 
Carhart α 0.02 -0.06 -0.11 -0.04 -0.08 -0.04 -0.06 -0.09 -0.08 -0.07 -0.08 
 (0.25) (-1.04) (-1.94) (-0.67) (-1.43) (-0.69) (-1.07) (-1.6) (-1.28) (-1.16) (-1.53) 
PS α -0.01 -0.08 -0.15 -0.05 -0.09 -0.06 -0.09 -0.10 -0.08 -0.07 -0.06 
 (-0.09) (-1.31) (-2.78) (-0.93) (-1.77) (-1.06) (-1.58) (-1.81) (-1.31) (-1.2) (-1.16) 
Gross Return 
Average 0.87 0.79 0.72 0.83 0.75 0.79 0.78 0.76 0.76 0.76 -0.11* 
 (2.78) (2.51) (2.30) (2.60) (2.41) (2.60) (2.50) (2.41) (2.32) (2.27) (-1.70) 
CAPM α 0.15 0.07 0.00 0.10 0.03 0.08 0.06 0.03 0.02 0.01 -0.14** 
 (2.27) (1.09) (-0.08) (1.69) (0.53) (1.63) (1.06) (0.60) (0.33) (0.11) (-2.18) 
FF α 0.11 0.04 -0.02 0.08 0.01 0.06 0.04 0.02 0.03 0.03 -0.08 
 (1.82) (0.77) (-0.36) (1.46) (0.25) (1.18) (0.77) (0.43) (0.57) (0.59) (-1.48) 
Carhart α 0.12 0.04 -0.02 0.06 0.02 0.06 0.04 0.01 0.02 0.04 -0.08 
 (1.87) (0.61) (-0.28) (1.10) (0.37) (1.11) (0.73) (0.12) (0.40) (0.67) (-1.48) 
PS α 0.09 0.02 -0.05 0.04 0.00 0.04 0.01 -0.01 0.02 0.03 -0.06 
  (1.45) (0.35) (-1) (0.83) (0.03) (0.74) (0.18) (-0.13) (0.32) (0.56) (-1.11) 
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Table IA.IV (B) 
Fund Herding Following a Smaller Crowd: Style Peers (II) 
This table presents the performance of decile portfolios formed on the basis of FH, the average tendency of mutual funds to follow past institutional trades. FH is constructed 
from the slope coefficient of cross-sectional regressions of mutual fund trades on past aggregate trades by their peer funds measured in the previous quarter, controlling 
for past stock returns, firm size, and the book-to-market ratio. Peer funds are identified by four styles from the Lipper mutual fund classification: Large-Cap Value, Large-
Cap growth, Small-Cap Value, and Small-Cap Growth. The return series span January 1990 to December 2009. Decile 10 is the portfolio of funds with the highest average 
herding measure. We compute monthly equally weighted net and gross (net plus expense ratio) returns on the portfolios, as well as risk-adjusted returns based on the 
CAPM, the Fama and French (1993, FF) three-factor model, the Carhart (1997) four-factor model, and the Pastor and Stambaugh (2003, PS) five-factor model. Average 
returns and alphas are in monthly percentages. Newey-West (1987) t-statistics are shown in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 
10% level, respectively, for the return differentials between deciles 10 and 1. 
FH rank 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 D10-D1 
Net Return 
Average 0.79 0.69 0.63 0.78 0.66 0.72 0.7 0.69 0.64 0.66 -0.13* 
 (2.43) (2.12) (1.95) (2.38) (2.03) (2.29) (2.15) (2.10) (1.88) (1.87) (-1.68) 
CAPM α 0.06 -0.05 -0.10 0.04 -0.08 -0.01 -0.04 -0.05 -0.12 -0.12 -0.17** 
 (0.74) (-0.66) (-1.61) (0.64) (-1.4) (-0.11) (-0.64) (-0.79) (-1.77) (-1.45) (-2.15) 
FF α 0.02 -0.06 -0.11 0.02 -0.09 -0.02 -0.05 -0.05 -0.1 -0.08 -0.09 
 (0.28) (-0.93) (-1.77) (0.39) (-1.57) (-0.35) (-0.85) (-0.88) (-1.5) (-1.15) (-1.47) 
Carhart α 0.03 -0.07 -0.11 0.00 -0.10 -0.02 -0.05 -0.08 -0.11 -0.06 -0.09 
 (0.38) (-0.96) (-1.64) (0.07) (-1.63) (-0.32) (-0.78) (-1.2) (-1.57) (-0.91) (-1.41) 
PS α 0.01 -0.09 -0.15 -0.01 -0.12 -0.06 -0.08 -0.10 -0.11 -0.06 -0.07 
 (0.13) (-1.35) (-2.35) (-0.21) (-2.12) (-0.98) (-1.25) (-1.44) (-1.68) (-0.88) (-1.09) 
Gross Return 
Average 0.89 0.79 0.73 0.87 0.76 0.81 0.79 0.79 0.74 0.76 -0.13* 
 (2.75) (2.42) (2.25) (2.67) (2.33) (2.59) (2.45) (2.40) (2.17) (2.16) (-1.65) 
CAPM α 0.16 0.05 -0.01 0.13 0.02 0.09 0.06 0.05 -0.02 -0.01 -0.17** 
 (2.10) (0.69) (-0.12) (2.22) (0.29) (1.55) (0.89) (0.70) (-0.29) (-0.15) (-2.12) 
FF α 0.12 0.03 -0.01 0.12 0.01 0.08 0.04 0.04 0 0.03 -0.09 
 (1.75) (0.51) (-0.23) (2.14) (0.09) (1.25) (0.72) (0.74) (0.01) (0.43) (-1.44) 
Carhart α 0.13 0.03 -0.01 0.10 0.00 0.08 0.05 0.02 -0.01 0.04 -0.09 
 (1.83) (0.43) (-0.18) (1.79) (-0.07) (1.18) (0.71) (0.32) (-0.11) (0.63) (-1.38) 
PS α 0.11 0.00 -0.05 0.08 -0.03 0.04 0.02 0.00 -0.01 0.04 -0.07 
  (1.52) (0.05) (-0.81) (1.49) (-0.49) (0.63) (0.27) (0.04) (-0.22) (0.62) (-1.06) 
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Table IA.IV (C) 
Fund Herding Following a Smaller Crowd: Style Peers (III) 
This table presents the performance of decile portfolios formed on the basis of FH, the average tendency of mutual funds to follow past institutional trades. FH is constructed 
from the slope coefficient of cross-sectional regressions of mutual fund trades on past aggregate trades by their peer funds measured in the previous quarter, controlling 
for past stock returns, firm size, and the book-to-market ratio. Peer funds are defined by three styles following the Thomson Reuters mutual fund investment objective 
code: Aggressive Growth, Growth, and Growth and Income. The return series span January 1990 to December 2009. Decile 10 is the portfolio of funds with the highest 
average herding measure. We compute monthly equally weighted net and gross (net plus expense ratio) returns on the portfolios, as well as risk-adjusted returns based on 
the CAPM, the Fama and French (1993, FF) three-factor model, the Carhart (1997) four-factor model, and the Pastor and Stambaugh (2003, PS) five-factor model. Average 
returns and alphas are in monthly percentages. Newey-West (1987) t-statistics are shown in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 
10% level, respectively, for the return differentials between deciles 10 and 1. 
FH rank 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 D10-D1 
Net Return 
Average 0.82 0.77 0.82 0.8 0.73 0.75 0.79 0.71 0.73 0.72 -0.10 
 (2.83) (2.65) (2.90) (2.82) (2.53) (2.62) (2.69) (2.43) (2.42) (2.39) (-1.61) 
CAPM α 0.06 0.00 0.07 0.05 -0.03 -0.01 0.02 -0.06 -0.06 -0.06 -0.12* 
 (0.83) (0.05) (1.02) (0.72) (-0.52) (-0.2) (0.31) (-1.14) (-1.06) (-1.09) (-1.89) 
FF α 0.00 -0.05 0.01 -0.01 -0.09 -0.06 -0.02 -0.09 -0.07 -0.07 -0.06 
 (-0.06) (-0.96) (0.11) (-0.28) (-1.74) (-1.28) (-0.37) (-1.69) (-1.47) (-1.27) (-1.12) 
Carhart α 0.01 -0.05 0.01 -0.01 -0.08 -0.06 -0.02 -0.09 -0.09 -0.08 -0.09 
 (0.18) (-0.87) (0.16) (-0.1) (-1.41) (-1.11) (-0.36) (-1.64) (-1.71) (-1.41) (-1.60) 
PS α -0.01 -0.08 -0.01 -0.02 -0.10 -0.08 -0.03 -0.11 -0.1 -0.08 -0.07 
 (-0.24) (-1.36) (-0.22) (-0.37) (-1.78) (-1.48) (-0.63) (-1.98) (-1.85) (-1.42) (-1.21) 
Gross Return 
Average 0.93 0.87 0.93 0.9 0.83 0.85 0.89 0.81 0.83 0.83 -0.10* 
 (3.20) (3.01) (3.25) (3.17) (2.87) (2.96) (3.02) (2.76) (2.76) (2.74) (-1.67) 
CAPM α 0.17 0.11 0.17 0.14 0.06 0.09 0.11 0.04 0.04 0.04 -0.13* 
 (2.39) (1.70) (2.53) (2.29) (0.99) (1.48) (2.03) (0.68) (0.78) (0.68) (-1.95) 
FF α 0.10 0.05 0.11 0.09 0.01 0.03 0.08 0.01 0.03 0.04 -0.07 
 (1.82) (1.01) (2.13) (1.70) (0.12) (0.68) (1.58) (0.24) (0.52) (0.69) (-1.19) 
Carhart α 0.12 0.05 0.11 0.09 0.02 0.04 0.08 0.01 0.01 0.03 -0.09* 
 (2.00) (1.00) (2.09) (1.79) (0.29) (0.76) (1.41) (0.16) (0.17) (0.47) (-1.66) 
PS α 0.09 0.03 0.09 0.08 0.00 0.02 0.06 -0.01 0.00 0.02 -0.07 
  (1.65) (0.50) (1.69) (1.50) (-0.04) (0.35) (1.14) (-0.17) (0.07) (0.40) (-1.27) 
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Table IA.V 
Fund Herding from Trades Including Initiations and Deletions 
This table presents the performance of decile portfolios formed on the basis of FH, the average tendency of mutual funds to follow past institutional trades. FH is constructed 
from the slope coefficient of cross-sectional regressions of mutual fund trades on past aggregate institutional trades measured in the previous quarter, controlling for past 
stock returns, firm size, and the book-to-market ratio. All trades, including deletions and initiations, are used in the calculation of a fund’s herding tendency. The return 
series span January 1990 to December 2009. Decile 10 is the portfolio of funds with the highest fund herding measure. We compute monthly equally weighted net and 
gross (net plus expense ratio) returns on the portfolios, as well as risk-adjusted returns based on the CAPM, the Fama and French (1993, FF) three-factor model, the Carhart 
(1997) four-factor model, and the Pastor and Stambaugh (2003, PS) five-factor model. Average returns and alphas are in monthly percentages. Newey-West (1987) t-
statistics are in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively, for the return differentials between deciles 10 and 1. 
FH rank 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 D10-D1 
Net Return 
Average 0.91 0.87 0.89 0.91 0.88 0.81 0.83 0.86 0.81 0.76 -0.15*** 
 (3.59) (3.37) (3.37) (3.55) (3.39) (3.11) (3.23) (3.25) (3.03) (2.89) (-3.18) 
CAPM α 0.02 -0.03 -0.03 0.01 -0.03 -0.10 -0.07 -0.06 -0.11 -0.15 -0.17*** 
 (0.33) (-0.55) (-0.45) (0.22) (-0.65) (-2.05) (-1.58) (-1.12) (-2.11) (-2.97) (-3.73) 
FF α 0.00 -0.05 -0.05 -0.02 -0.05 -0.12 -0.09 -0.06 -0.10 -0.15 -0.15*** 
 (-0.09) (-1.13) (-1.2) (-0.43) (-1.46) (-2.98) (-2.24) (-1.43) (-2.09) (-3.1) (-3.34) 
Carhart α 0.00 -0.05 -0.06 -0.02 -0.06 -0.10 -0.08 -0.06 -0.10 -0.14 -0.14*** 
 (0.02) (-1.02) (-1.3) (-0.5) (-1.51) (-2.59) (-1.72) (-1.16) (-1.92) (-2.46) (-3.02) 
PS α -0.01 -0.06 -0.07 -0.03 -0.06 -0.10 -0.08 -0.05 -0.10 -0.14 -0.13*** 
 (-0.23) (-1.19) (-1.35) (-0.63) (-1.41) (-2.48) (-1.71) (-1.09) (-1.89) (-2.51) (-2.73) 
Gross Return 
Average 1.02 0.97 0.98 1.01 0.97 0.91 0.93 0.96 0.91 0.87 -0.15*** 
 (4.02) (3.76) (3.74) (3.91) (3.74) (3.47) (3.59) (3.62) (3.40) (3.28) (-3.26) 
CAPM α 0.13 0.07 0.07 0.11 0.06 -0.01 0.02 0.04 -0.01 -0.05 -0.18*** 
 (2.13) (1.18) (1.25) (1.88) (1.30) (-0.11) (0.43) (0.78) (-0.22) (-0.95) (-3.82) 
FF α 0.10 0.05 0.04 0.07 0.04 -0.02 0.00 0.03 0.00 -0.05 -0.15*** 
 (2.02) (0.94) (0.92) (1.68) (1.00) (-0.59) (-0.02) (0.74) (-0.01) (-0.95) (-3.43) 
Carhart α 0.11 0.05 0.03 0.07 0.03 -0.01 0.02 0.04 0.00 -0.03 -0.14*** 
 (1.97) (0.99) (0.69) (1.51) (0.84) (-0.27) (0.38) (0.86) (0.08) (-0.58) (-3.11) 
PS α 0.10 0.04 0.03 0.06 0.03 -0.01 0.02 0.04 0.00 -0.03 -0.13*** 
  (1.72) (0.78) (0.63) (1.36) (0.83) (-0.25) (0.36) (0.89) (0.03) (-0.62) (-2.81) 
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Table IA.VI 
Fund Herding from Trades Measured as Changes in Portfolio Weights 
This table presents the performance of decile portfolios formed on the basis of FH, the average tendency of mutual funds to follow past institutional trades. FH is constructed 
from the slope coefficient of cross-sectional regressions of mutual fund trades (measured as changes in portfolio weights) on past aggregate institutional trades measured 
in the previous quarter, controlling for past stock returns, firm size, and the book-to-market ratio. The return series span January 1990 to December 2009. Decile 10 is the 
portfolio of funds with the highest average herding measure. We compute monthly equally weighted net and gross (net plus expense ratio) returns, as well as risk-adjusted 
returns based on the CAPM, the Fama and French (1993, FF) three-factor model, the Carhart (1997) four-factor model, and the Pastor and Stambaugh (2003, PS) five-
factor model. Average returns and alphas are in monthly percentages. Newey-West (1987) t-statistics are shown in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance 
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively, for the return differentials between deciles 10 and 1. 
FH rank 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 D10–D1 
Net Return 
Average 0.88 0.81 0.79 0.75 0.79 0.75 0.73 0.76 0.70 0.68 -0.20*** 
 (3.01) (2.83) (2.73) (2.61) (2.72) (2.56) (2.50) (2.55) (2.34) (2.28) (-4.65) 
CAPM α 0.11 0.05 0.03 -0.01 0.02 -0.02 -0.04 -0.02 -0.08 -0.10 -0.21*** 
 (1.69) (0.88) (0.44) (-0.23) (0.38) (-0.39) (-0.8) (-0.34) (-1.32) (-1.41) (-4.82) 
FF α 0.06 0.00 -0.03 -0.07 -0.02 -0.06 -0.09 -0.07 -0.12 -0.15 -0.21*** 
 (1.16) (0.08) (-0.52) (-1.44) (-0.4) (-1.33) (-2.08) (-1.43) (-2.39) (-2.56) (-4.65) 
Carhart α 0.06 0.02 -0.02 -0.06 -0.02 -0.06 -0.10 -0.07 -0.12 -0.14 -0.21*** 
 (1.11) (0.29) (-0.37) (-1.09) (-0.4) (-1.19) (-2.21) (-1.46) (-2.27) (-2.36) (-4.42) 
PS α 0.04 -0.01 -0.04 -0.08 -0.03 -0.07 -0.11 -0.09 -0.12 -0.15 -0.19*** 
 (0.70) (-0.11) (-0.78) (-1.5) (-0.67) (-1.38) (-2.39) (-1.72) (-2.3) (-2.47) (-4.08) 
Gross Return 
Average 0.99 0.91 0.89 0.85 0.88 0.85 0.83 0.85 0.80 0.79 -0.20*** 
 (3.39) (3.20) (3.08) (2.95) (3.06) (2.89) (2.83) (2.89) (2.67) (2.65) (-4.69) 
CAPM α 0.22 0.15 0.13 0.09 0.12 0.07 0.06 0.08 0.02 0.01 -0.21*** 
 (3.43) (2.71) (2.01) (1.42) (2.18) (1.30) (1.06) (1.30) (0.33) (0.19) (-4.85) 
FF α 0.17 0.11 0.07 0.03 0.08 0.03 0.01 0.03 -0.02 -0.04 -0.21*** 
 (3.33) (2.12) (1.36) (0.54) (1.65) (0.70) (0.16) (0.62) (-0.41) (-0.62) (-4.68) 
Carhart α 0.17 0.12 0.08 0.04 0.08 0.04 0.00 0.02 -0.02 -0.03 -0.21*** 
 (3.17) (2.24) (1.44) (0.76) (1.49) (0.71) (-0.09) (0.49) (-0.37) (-0.56) (-4.45) 
PS α 0.15 0.10 0.06 0.02 0.06 0.02 -0.02 0.01 -0.02 -0.04 -0.19*** 
  (2.81) (1.87) (1.01) (0.37) (1.19) (0.46) (-0.33) (0.18) (-0.42) (-0.68) (-4.10) 
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Table IA.VII 
Fund Herding Controlling for Industry Momentum 
This table presents the performance of decile portfolios formed on the basis of FH, the average tendency of mutual funds to follow past institutional trades. FH is constructed 
from cross-sectional regressions of mutual fund trades on past aggregate institutional trades, controlling for past stock returns, firm size, book-to-market, and industry 
momentum. The portfolios are formed at the end of each quarter from 1989Q4 to 2009Q3 and held for one quarter. The return series span January 1990 to December 2009. 
Decile 10 is the portfolio of funds with the highest fund herding measure. We compute monthly equally-weighted net and gross (net plus expense ratio) returns on the 
portfolios, as well as risk-adjusted returns based on the CAPM, the Fama and French (1993, FF) three-factor model, the Carhart (1997) four-factor model, and the Pastor 
and Stambaugh (2003, PS) five-factor model. Average returns and alphas are in monthly percentages. Newey-West (1987) t-statistics are shown in parentheses. ***, **, 
and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively, for the return differentials between deciles 10 and 1. 
FH rank 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 D10-D1 
Net Return 
Average 0.83 0.82 0.80 0.77 0.80 0.74 0.76 0.76 0.71 0.64 -0.19*** 
 (2.88) (2.84) (2.77) (2.67) (2.80) (2.53) (2.61) (2.53) (2.34) (2.13) (-3.41) 
CAPM α 0.07 0.06 0.04 0.01 0.04 -0.03 -0.01 -0.03 -0.08 -0.15 -0.22*** 
 (0.98) (0.84) (0.59) (0.08) (0.68) (-0.62) (-0.22) (-0.46) (-1.33) (-2.54) (-3.78) 
FF α 0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.05 -0.02 -0.08 -0.05 -0.06 -0.11 -0.17 -0.17*** 
 (0.12) (-0.12) (-0.35) (-1.06) (-0.41) (-1.81) (-1.19) (-1.29) (-1.97) (-3.13) (-3.27) 
Carhart α 0.01 -0.01 -0.03 -0.05 -0.02 -0.08 -0.05 -0.05 -0.11 -0.16 -0.17*** 
 (0.15) (-0.1) (-0.66) (-0.92) (-0.4) (-1.65) (-0.97) (-0.97) (-1.88) (-2.74) (-3.04) 
PS α -0.01 -0.03 -0.05 -0.07 -0.03 -0.08 -0.05 -0.06 -0.12 -0.17 -0.15*** 
 (-0.2) (-0.47) (-1.11) (-1.34) (-0.62) (-1.8) (-1.05) (-1.03) (-1.99) (-2.89) (-2.71) 
Gross Return 
Average 0.94 0.92 0.91 0.87 0.90 0.83 0.85 0.86 0.81 0.75 -0.19*** 
 (3.26) (3.19) (3.12) (3.01) (3.14) (2.87) (2.95) (2.87) (2.68) (2.49) (-3.44) 
CAPM α 0.18 0.16 0.14 0.10 0.14 0.06 0.09 0.07 0.02 -0.04 -0.22*** 
 (2.54) (2.36) (2.13) (1.68) (2.34) (1.15) (1.58) (1.34) (0.39) (-0.65) (-3.81) 
FF α 0.12 0.10 0.08 0.05 0.08 0.01 0.04 0.04 0.00 -0.06 -0.17*** 
 (2.01) (1.71) (1.70) (0.93) (1.69) (0.32) (0.96) (0.71) (-0.07) (-1.08) (-3.30) 
Carhart α 0.12 0.10 0.07 0.05 0.08 0.02 0.05 0.05 -0.01 -0.05 -0.17*** 
 (1.89) (1.62) (1.32) (0.95) (1.57) (0.43) (1.07) (0.96) (-0.11) (-0.87) (-3.06) 
PS α 0.10 0.07 0.05 0.03 0.07 0.01 0.05 0.04 -0.01 -0.06 -0.16*** 
  (1.60) (1.25) (0.92) (0.56) (1.28) (0.25) (0.93) (0.83) (-0.24) (-1.02) (-2.73) 
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 Table IA.VIII 
Fund Herding Controlling for Contemporaneous Institutional Trades 
This table presents the performance of decile portfolios formed on the basis of FH, the average tendency of mutual funds to follow past institutional trades. FH is constructed 
from the slope coefficient of cross-sectional regressions of mutual fund trades on aggregate institutional trades measured in the previous quarter, controlling for past stock 
returns, firm size, the book-to-market ratio, and contemporaneous aggregate institutional trades. The return series span January 1990 to December 2009. Decile 10 is the 
portfolio of funds with the highest fund herding measure. We compute monthly equally-weighted net and gross (net plus expense ratio) returns on the portfolios, as well 
as risk-adjusted returns based on the CAPM, the Fama and French (1993, FF) three-factor model, the Carhart (1997) four-factor model, and the Pastor and Stambaugh 
(2003, PS) five-factor model. Average returns and alphas are in monthly percentages. Newey-West (1987) t-statistics are shown in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively, for the return differentials between deciles 10 and 1. 
FH rank 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 D10-D1 
Net Return 
Average 0.81 0.75 0.77 0.76 0.78 0.76 0.81 0.73 0.75 0.66 -0.16** 
 (2.88) (2.60) (2.68) (2.66) (2.71) (2.58) (2.70) (2.41) (2.46) (2.18) (-2.39) 
CAPM α 0.06 -0.01 0.01 0.00 0.02 -0.01 0.03 -0.05 -0.04 -0.13 -0.19*** 
 (0.91) (-0.22) (0.17) (0.06) (0.27) (-0.24) (0.45) (-0.74) (-0.65) (-2.08) (-2.98) 
FF α 0.00 -0.07 -0.04 -0.05 -0.04 -0.06 -0.01 -0.09 -0.07 -0.15 -0.15** 
 (-0.02) (-1.27) (-0.74) (-0.97) (-0.91) (-1.24) (-0.27) (-1.63) (-1.15) (-2.52) (-2.43) 
Carhart α 0.01 -0.06 -0.05 -0.05 -0.04 -0.08 -0.03 -0.10 -0.05 -0.15 -0.16*** 
 (0.17) (-1.05) (-0.80) (-0.87) (-0.86) (-1.52) (-0.50) (-1.70) (-0.80) (-2.36) (-2.70) 
PS α -0.01 -0.09 -0.07 -0.06 -0.06 -0.10 -0.03 -0.11 -0.05 -0.15 -0.14** 
 (-0.17) (-1.61) (-1.21) (-1.11) (-1.12) (-1.94) (-0.66) (-1.85) (-0.85) (-2.39) (-2.31) 
Gross Return 
Average 0.92 0.85 0.87 0.86 0.88 0.85 0.91 0.83 0.85 0.76 -0.16** 
 (3.25) (2.95) (3.03) (3.00) (3.05) (2.91) (3.02) (2.73) (2.80) (2.53) (-2.37) 
CAPM α 0.17 0.09 0.11 0.10 0.11 0.08 0.12 0.05 0.06 -0.02 -0.19*** 
 (2.47) (1.37) (1.58) (1.59) (1.85) (1.34) (2.02) (0.66) (0.98) (-0.35) (-2.97) 
FF α 0.10 0.03 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.08 0.01 0.04 -0.04 -0.14** 
 (1.70) (0.54) (1.00) (0.91) (1.06) (0.75) (1.67) (0.12) (0.62) (-0.7) (-2.41) 
Carhart α 0.12 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.02 0.07 0.00 0.05 -0.04 -0.16*** 
 (1.82) (0.75) (0.88) (0.98) (1.03) (0.44) (1.39) (-0.02) (0.80) (-0.66) (-2.68) 
PS α 0.09 0.01 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.00 0.06 -0.01 0.05 -0.04 -0.14** 
  (1.50) (0.27) (0.45) (0.68) (0.78) (-0.01) (1.18) (-0.22) (0.73) (-0.68) (-2.30) 
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Table IA.IX 
Fund Herding from Trade Regressions without Control Variables 
This table presents the performance of decile portfolios formed on the basis of Fund Herding (FH), the average tendency of mutual funds to follow past institutional trades. 
FH is constructed from the slope coefficient of cross-sectional regressions of mutual fund trades on past aggregate institutional trades measured in the previous quarter, 
without controlling for stock characteristics. The return series span January 1990 to December 2009. Decile 10 is the portfolio of funds with the highest average herding 
measure. We compute monthly equally weighted net and gross (net plus expense ratio) returns, as well as risk-adjusted returns based on the CAPM, the Fama and French 
(1993, FF) three-factor model, the Carhart (1997) four-factor model, and the Pastor and Stambaugh (2003, PS) five-factor model. Average returns and alphas are in monthly 
percentages. Newey-West (1987) t-statistics are shown in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively, for the 
return differentials between deciles 10 and 1. 
FH rank 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 D10-D1 
Net Return 
Average 0.79 0.81 0.78 0.78 0.78 0.72 0.80 0.69 0.73 0.64 -0.14** 
 (2.82) (2.87) (2.74) (2.75) (2.72) (2.48) (2.71) (2.31) (2.37) (2.18) (-1.98) 
CAPM α 0.05 0.06 0.02 0.02 0.02 -0.05 0.02 -0.09 -0.06 -0.13 -0.17** 
 (0.55) (0.85) (0.36) (0.35) (0.30) (-0.8) (0.37) (-1.49) (-0.92) (-1.69) (-2.39) 
FF α -0.04 -0.03 -0.05 -0.05 -0.04 -0.10 -0.02 -0.11 -0.06 -0.14 -0.10 
 (-0.57) (-0.52) (-0.82) (-0.97) (-0.85) (-2.14) (-0.33) (-2.24) (-1.09) (-2.04) (-1.61) 
Carhart α -0.03 -0.02 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.10 -0.01 -0.12 -0.07 -0.15 -0.12* 
 (-0.37) (-0.35) (-0.6) (-0.81) (-0.81) (-2.09) (-0.13) (-2.22) (-1.18) (-1.92) (-1.80) 
PS α -0.06 -0.04 -0.05 -0.07 -0.06 -0.12 -0.02 -0.13 -0.07 -0.17 -0.11* 
 (-0.89) (-0.8) (-0.86) (-1.29) (-1.1) (-2.4) (-0.35) (-2.44) (-1.19) (-2.22) (-1.66) 
Gross Return 
Average 0.91 0.92 0.88 0.88 0.88 0.82 0.90 0.79 0.84 0.76 -0.15** 
 (3.25) (3.25) (3.11) (3.11) (3.08) (2.83) (3.05) (2.66) (2.72) (2.56) (-2.06) 
CAPM α 0.17 0.17 0.13 0.13 0.12 0.05 0.12 0.01 0.04 -0.01 -0.18** 
 (1.97) (2.42) (1.95) (1.98) (1.95) (0.85) (1.97) (0.20) (0.63) (-0.17) (-2.47) 
FF α 0.08 0.08 0.06 0.05 0.06 0.00 0.08 -0.01 0.04 -0.03 -0.11* 
 (1.11) (1.57) (1.02) (1.01) (1.20) (-0.03) (1.53) (-0.22) (0.77) (-0.43) (-1.71) 
Carhart α 0.09 0.09 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.00 0.09 -0.02 0.04 -0.03 -0.13* 
 (1.26) (1.65) (1.17) (1.07) (1.15) (-0.06) (1.63) (-0.3) (0.59) (-0.43) (-1.89) 
PS α 0.06 0.07 0.05 0.03 0.04 -0.02 0.08 -0.03 0.03 -0.06 -0.11* 
  (0.79) (1.25) (0.86) (0.66) (0.84) (-0.38) (1.36) (-0.54) (0.55) (-0.75) (-1.75) 
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Table IA.X 
Fund Herding as the Tendency to Follow Longer-Horizon Institutional Trades 
This table presents the performance of decile portfolios formed on the basis of FH, the average tendency of mutual funds to follow past institutional trades. FH is constructed 
from the slope coefficient of cross-sectional regressions of mutual fund trades on past aggregate institutional trades measured over various horizons, controlling for past 
stock returns, firm size, and book-to-market. Panels A and B use aggregate institutional trades measured in the past two and four quarters, respectively. Panel C uses the 
persistence in past institutional trades as defined in Dasgupta, Prat, and Verardo (2011). The return series span January 1990 to December 2009. Decile 10 is the portfolio 
of funds with the highest fund herding measure. We compute monthly equally-weighted net and gross (net plus expense ratio) returns on the portfolios, as well as risk-
adjusted returns based on the CAPM, the Fama and French (1993, FF) three-factor model, the Carhart (1997) four-factor model, and the Pastor and Stambaugh (2003, PS) 
five-factor model. Average returns and alphas are in monthly percentages. Newey-West (1987) t-statistics are shown in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively, for the return differentials between deciles 10 and 1. 
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Panel A: Following Institutional Trades from the Previous Two Quarters 
FH rank 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 D10-D1 
Net Return 
Average 0.85 0.78 0.83 0.72 0.77 0.81 0.73 0.69 0.74 0.69 -0.16*** 
 (2.94) (2.74) (2.90) (2.48) (2.68) (2.76) (2.48) (2.35) (2.47) (2.29) (-2.64) 
CAPM α 0.09 0.02 0.07 -0.05 0.01 0.04 -0.04 -0.08 -0.04 -0.09 -0.18*** 
 (1.20) (0.34) (1.06) (-0.71) (0.15) (0.64) (-0.8) (-1.49) (-0.74) (-1.57) (-3.02) 
FF α 0.02 -0.05 0.00 -0.11 -0.05 0.00 -0.08 -0.11 -0.05 -0.11 -0.13** 
 (0.30) (-0.94) (-0.09) (-2.15) (-1.08) (-0.01) (-1.72) (-2.41) (-1.09) (-1.96) (-2.35) 
Carhart α 0.03 -0.03 0.00 -0.10 -0.05 0.00 -0.08 -0.11 -0.06 -0.12 -0.15*** 
 (0.43) (-0.53) (0.03) (-1.92) (-1.01) (0.10) (-1.64) (-2.07) (-1.2) (-2.00) (-2.64) 
PS α 0.00 -0.05 -0.02 -0.12 -0.07 -0.01 -0.09 -0.12 -0.07 -0.13 -0.13** 
 (-0.04) (-0.89) (-0.31) (-2.32) (-1.39) (-0.1) (-1.78) (-2.27) (-1.31) (-2.14) (-2.29) 
Gross Return 
Average 0.96 0.88 0.93 0.82 0.87 0.91 0.83 0.79 0.84 0.80 -0.16*** 
 (3.33) (3.12) (3.26) (2.82) (3.02) (3.10) (2.82) (2.69) (2.81) (2.65) (-2.70) 
CAPM α 0.20 0.13 0.17 0.05 0.11 0.14 0.06 0.02 0.06 0.02 -0.19*** 
 (2.73) (1.88) (2.61) (0.82) (1.88) (2.38) (0.99) (0.32) (1.07) (0.26) (-3.08) 
FF α 0.13 0.05 0.10 -0.01 0.05 0.10 0.02 -0.01 0.05 0.00 -0.13** 
 (2.26) (0.99) (1.82) (-0.24) (1.03) (2.08) (0.43) (-0.29) (1.00) (0.01) (-2.42) 
Carhart α 0.14 0.08 0.10 0.00 0.05 0.10 0.02 -0.01 0.04 -0.01 -0.15*** 
 (2.31) (1.32) (1.82) (-0.06) (1.01) (2.07) (0.35) (-0.13) (0.76) (-0.23) (-2.70) 
PS α 0.11 0.05 0.08 -0.02 0.03 0.09 0.01 -0.02 0.03 -0.02 -0.13** 
  (1.92) (0.94) (1.50) (-0.43) (0.69) (1.81) (0.10) (-0.34) (0.62) (-0.37) (-2.36) 
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Panel B: Following Institutional Trades from the Previous Year 
FH rank 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 D10-D1 
Net Return 
Average 0.79 0.78 0.85 0.75 0.74 0.81 0.75 0.73 0.73 0.66 -0.13** 
 (2.66) (2.71) (2.97) (2.61) (2.54) (2.84) (2.60) (2.47) (2.46) (2.20) (-2.26) 
CAPM α 0.02 0.02 0.09 -0.01 -0.03 0.05 -0.01 -0.05 -0.05 -0.12 -0.14** 
 (0.24) (0.30) (1.49) (-0.23) (-0.52) (0.92) (-0.25) (-0.9) (-0.85) (-2.02) (-2.44) 
FF α -0.05 -0.04 0.03 -0.07 -0.08 0.01 -0.06 -0.08 -0.08 -0.14 -0.09* 
 (-0.78) (-0.83) (0.70) (-1.6) (-1.71) (0.13) (-1.20) (-1.68) (-1.56) (-2.51) (-1.77) 
Carhart α -0.05 -0.03 0.02 -0.08 -0.07 0.00 -0.05 -0.07 -0.06 -0.14 -0.09 
 (-0.75) (-0.63) (0.47) (-1.52) (-1.44) (-0.03) (-0.99) (-1.48) (-1.24) (-2.23) (-1.63) 
PS α -0.06 -0.05 0.00 -0.09 -0.08 -0.02 -0.07 -0.09 -0.07 -0.16 -0.10* 
 (-0.86) (-0.93) (-0.06) (-1.85) (-1.67) (-0.38) (-1.41) (-1.73) (-1.39) (-2.58) (-1.77) 
Gross Return 
Average 0.90 0.88 0.95 0.84 0.84 0.91 0.85 0.83 0.84 0.77 -0.13** 
 (3.03) (3.08) (3.31) (2.96) (2.88) (3.18) (2.95) (2.80) (2.80) (2.55) (-2.34) 
CAPM α 0.13 0.12 0.19 0.08 0.07 0.15 0.09 0.05 0.05 -0.02 -0.15** 
 (1.63) (1.94) (3.12) (1.42) (1.19) (2.69) (1.58) (0.92) (0.97) (-0.25) (-2.52) 
FF α 0.06 0.06 0.13 0.02 0.02 0.10 0.04 0.02 0.03 -0.03 -0.09* 
 (0.93) (1.21) (2.71) (0.54) (0.40) (2.27) (0.81) (0.43) (0.55) (-0.6) (-1.86) 
Carhart α 0.06 0.07 0.12 0.02 0.03 0.10 0.04 0.03 0.04 -0.03 -0.09* 
 (0.87) (1.29) (2.37) (0.43) (0.67) (1.96) (0.82) (0.53) (0.74) (-0.52) (-1.72) 
PS α 0.05 0.05 0.10 0.00 0.02 0.08 0.02 0.01 0.03 -0.05 -0.10* 
  (0.74) (1.00) (1.94) (0.07) (0.36) (1.57) (0.45) (0.23) (0.59) (-0.82) (-1.86) 
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Panel C: Following Persistent Past Institutional Trades 
FH rank 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 D10-D1 
Net Return 
Average 0.82 0.75 0.74 0.75 0.78 0.79 0.81 0.76 0.72 0.68 -0.14*** 
 (2.85) (2.61) (2.59) (2.65) (2.70) (2.70) (2.76) (2.56) (2.41) (2.25) (-2.81) 
CAPM α 0.06 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 0.01 0.02 0.04 -0.02 -0.06 -0.11 -0.17*** 
 (0.92) (-0.16) (-0.29) (-0.1) (0.27) (0.31) (0.58) (-0.33) (-1.01) (-1.7) (-3.36) 
FF α 0.01 -0.07 -0.08 -0.06 -0.03 -0.04 0.00 -0.06 -0.08 -0.13 -0.14*** 
 (0.12) (-1.44) (-1.52) (-1.21) (-0.73) (-0.78) (-0.09) (-1.26) (-1.61) (-2.32) (-2.88) 
Carhart α 0.01 -0.07 -0.07 -0.05 -0.04 -0.03 -0.01 -0.06 -0.08 -0.13 -0.14*** 
 (0.14) (-1.32) (-1.17) (-0.92) (-0.73) (-0.67) (-0.14) (-1.25) (-1.52) (-2.23) (-3.02) 
PS α -0.01 -0.10 -0.09 -0.07 -0.05 -0.05 -0.01 -0.07 -0.09 -0.15 -0.13*** 
 (-0.23) (-1.99) (-1.63) (-1.23) (-1.11) (-0.95) (-0.25) (-1.35) (-1.7) (-2.49) (-2.78) 
Gross Return 
Average 0.93 0.86 0.84 0.85 0.88 0.89 0.90 0.86 0.83 0.79 -0.15*** 
 (3.23) (2.97) (2.93) (2.99) (3.04) (3.04) (3.09) (2.90) (2.76) (2.61) (-2.86) 
CAPM α 0.17 0.09 0.08 0.09 0.11 0.12 0.13 0.08 0.04 0.00 -0.17*** 
 (2.63) (1.50) (1.31) (1.58) (2.05) (1.98) (2.19) (1.38) (0.74) (0.05) (-3.41) 
FF α 0.12 0.03 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.06 0.09 0.04 0.02 -0.02 -0.14*** 
 (2.13) (0.66) (0.33) (0.78) (1.39) (1.36) (1.81) (0.86) (0.37) (-0.37) (-2.92) 
Carhart α 0.12 0.03 0.03 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.09 0.04 0.02 -0.03 -0.14*** 
 (2.02) (0.63) (0.63) (0.95) (1.24) (1.35) (1.64) (0.73) (0.40) (-0.42) (-3.07) 
PS α 0.10 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.08 0.03 0.01 -0.04 -0.14*** 
  (1.67) (0.06) (0.24) (0.61) (0.89) (1.02) (1.47) (0.55) (0.19) (-0.65) (-2.82) 
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Table IA.XI 
Fund Herding Measured by the Equally Weighted Average of Quarterly Betas  
This table presents the performance of decile portfolios formed on the basis of FH, the average tendency of mutual funds to follow past institutional trades. FH is constructed 
from the slope coefficient of cross-sectional regressions of mutual fund trades on past aggregate institutional trades measured in the previous quarter, controlling for past 
stock returns, firm size, and the book-to-market ratio. The quarterly slope coefficients are equally weighted over the lifetime of a fund. The return series span January 1990 
to December 2009. Decile 10 is the portfolio of funds with the highest fund herding measure. We compute monthly equally weighted net and gross (net plus expense ratio) 
returns on the portfolios, as well as risk-adjusted returns based on the CAPM, the Fama and French (1993, FF) three-factor model, the Carhart (1997) four-factor model, 
and the Pastor and Stambaugh (2003, PS) five-factor model. Average returns and alphas are in monthly percentages. Newey-West (1987) t-statistics are shown in 
parentheses. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively, for the return differentials between deciles 10 and 1. 
FH rank 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 D10-D1 
Net Return 
Average 0.88 0.89 0.90 0.84 0.84 0.89 0.88 0.83 0.84 0.76 -0.12*** 
 (3.46) (3.49) (3.53) (3.21) (3.17) (3.4) (3.37) (3.17) (3.15) (2.86) (-2.67) 
CAPM α -0.01 -0.00 0.01 -0.07 -0.08 -0.02 -0.03 -0.08 -0.08 -0.16 -0.15*** 
 (-0.19) (-0.09) (0.12) (-1.37) (-1.51) (-0.44) (-0.63) (-1.85) (-1.71) (-3.42) (-3.29) 
FF α -0.05 -0.05 -0.04 -0.09 -0.09 -0.01 -0.01 -0.06 -0.06 -0.15 -0.10** 
 (-1.09) (-1.17) (-0.94) (-2.27) (-2.27) (-0.31) (-0.24) (-1.62) (-1.45) (-3.64) (-2.57) 
Carhart α -0.04 -0.05 -0.03 -0.10 -0.10 -0.03 -0.01 -0.06 -0.05 -0.15 -0.11** 
 (-0.77) (-1.05) (-0.69) (-2.42) (-2.5) (-0.62) (-0.34) (-1.56) (-1.23) (-3.28) (-2.53) 
PS α -0.05 -0.05 -0.03 -0.10 -0.09 -0.02 -0.01 -0.06 -0.04 -0.13 -0.09** 
 (-0.93) (-1.09) (-0.72) (-2.27) (-2.16) (-0.39) (-0.18) (-1.33) (-0.97) (-2.88) (-2.00) 
Gross Return 
Average 0.99 0.99 1.00 0.93 0.93 0.98 0.98 0.92 0.94 0.86 -0.13*** 
 (3.89) (3.88) (3.92) (3.57) (3.52) (3.76) (3.73) (3.53) (3.51) (3.25) (-2.77) 
CAPM α 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.03 0.02 0.07 0.07 0.01 0.02 -0.06 -0.15*** 
 (1.7) (1.8) (2.14) (0.5) (0.35) (1.55) (1.49) (0.28) (0.35) (-1.2) (-3.39) 
FF α 0.06 0.05 0.06 0.00 0.01 0.08 0.08 0.03 0.04 -0.05 -0.11*** 
 (1.3) (1.25) (1.55) (0.06) (0.19) (1.95) (2.22) (0.78) (0.88) (-1.16) (-2.67) 
Carhart α 0.07 0.05 0.07 -0.01 -0.01 0.07 0.08 0.03 0.04 -0.04 -0.11*** 
 (1.46) (1.23) (1.63) (-0.16) (-0.18) (1.49) (1.85) (0.75) (0.98) (-0.98) (-2.63) 
PS α 0.06 0.05 0.07 -0.00 0.00 0.08 0.08 0.04 0.05 -0.03 -0.09** 
  (1.28) (1.19) (1.55) (-0.08) (0.1) (1.64) (1.96) (0.94) (1.22) (-0.6) (-2.10) 
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Table IA.XII 
Fund Herding Measured by Quarterly Betas  
This table presents the performance of decile portfolios formed on the basis of FH, the average tendency of mutual funds to follow past institutional trades. FH is constructed 
as the slope coefficient of cross-sectional regressions of mutual fund trades on past aggregate institutional trades measured in the previous quarter, controlling for past 
stock returns, firm size, and the book-to-market ratio. The return series span January 1990 to December 2009. Decile 10 is the portfolio of funds with the highest fund 
herding measure. We compute monthly equally weighted net and gross (net plus expense ratio) returns on the portfolios, as well as risk-adjusted returns based on the 
CAPM, the Fama and French (1993, FF) three-factor model, the Carhart (1997) four-factor model, and the Pastor and Stambaugh (2003, PS) five-factor model. Average 
returns and alphas are in monthly percentages. Newey-West (1987) t-statistics are shown in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 
10% level, respectively, for the return differentials between deciles 10 and 1. 
FH rank 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 D10-D1 
Net Return 
Average 0.64 0.63 0.64 0.64 0.61 0.61 0.63 0.60 0.63 0.55 -0.08** 
 (2.16) (2.11) (2.15) (2.18) (2.09) (2.07) (2.10) (1.98) (2.06) (1.84) (-2.30) 
CAPM α 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.03 -0.03 -0.02 -0.05 -0.02 -0.10 -0.09** 
 (-0.06) (-0.19) (-0.02) (-0.01) (-0.38) (-0.45) (-0.24) (-0.86) (-0.39) (-1.78) (-2.55) 
FF α -0.03 -0.06 -0.06 -0.05 -0.08 -0.08 -0.07 -0.08 -0.04 -0.11 -0.07** 
 (-0.71) (-1.25) (-1.04) (-1.06) (-1.59) (-1.75) (-1.35) (-1.84) (-0.8) (-2.19) (-2.14) 
Carhart α -0.05 -0.07 -0.05 -0.05 -0.07 -0.08 -0.06 -0.10 -0.06 -0.12 -0.07** 
 (-1.01) (-1.31) (-0.85) (-0.92) (-1.2) (-1.5) (-1.12) (-2.01) (-1.32) (-2.41) (-2.13) 
PS α -0.06 -0.08 -0.06 -0.07 -0.08 -0.09 -0.07 -0.11 -0.07 -0.14 -0.07** 
  (-1.26) (-1.51) (-1.14) (-1.17) (-1.41) (-1.7) (-1.25) (-2.07) (-1.36) (-2.54) (-2.09) 
Gross Return 
Average 0.75 0.74 0.75 0.74 0.72 0.72 0.73 0.70 0.73 0.66 -0.09** 
 (2.54) (2.48) (2.50) (2.53) (2.44) (2.42) (2.45) (2.32) (2.41) (2.21) (-2.32) 
CAPM α 0.11 0.09 0.10 0.10 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.05 0.08 0.01 -0.09** 
 (1.79) (1.38) (1.47) (1.58) (1.19) (1.20) (1.40) (0.86) (1.37) (0.26) (-2.56) 
FF α 0.08 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.02 0.07 0.00 -0.07** 
 (1.62) (0.96) (0.93) (0.92) (0.38) (0.42) (0.79) (0.47) (1.53) (0.10) (-2.16) 
Carhart α 0.06 0.04 0.06 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.05 0.00 0.04 -0.02 -0.08** 
 (1.19) (0.73) (1.00) (0.94) (0.63) (0.52) (0.87) (0.07) (0.87) (-0.29) (-2.14) 
PS α 0.05 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.02 0.01 0.04 0.00 0.04 -0.03 -0.07** 
  (0.90) (0.49) (0.71) (0.66) (0.37) (0.27) (0.73) (-0.04) (0.75) (-0.5) (-2.11) 
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Table IA.XIII 
Fund Herding from Trade Regressions with Nonstandardized Variables 
This table presents the performance of decile portfolios formed on the basis of FH, the average tendency of mutual funds to follow past institutional trades. FH is constructed 
from the slope coefficient of cross-sectional regressions of mutual fund trades on past aggregate institutional trades measured in the previous quarter, controlling for past 
stock returns, firm size, and the book-to-market ratio. The dependent and independent variables are not standardized. The return series span January 1990 to December 
2009. Decile 10 is the portfolio of funds with the highest fund herding measure. We compute monthly equally weighted net and gross (net plus expense ratio) returns on 
the portfolios, as well as risk-adjusted returns based on the CAPM, the Fama and French (1993, FF) three-factor model, the Carhart (1997) four-factor model, and the 
Pastor and Stambaugh (2003, PS) five-factor model. Average returns and alphas are in monthly percentages. Newey-West (1987) t-statistics are shown in parentheses. 
***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively, for the return differentials between deciles 10 and 1. 
FH rank 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 D10-D1 
Net Return 
Average 0.65 0.66 0.69 0.61 0.67 0.60 0.60 0.61 0.56 0.54 -0.11** 
 (2.27) (2.26) (2.33) (2.11) (2.24) (2.03) (2) (2.05) (1.88) (1.84) (-2.22) 
CAPM α 0.02 0.03 0.05 -0.02 0.03 -0.04 -0.04 -0.03 -0.08 -0.10 -0.12** 
 (0.41) (0.41) (0.75) (-0.29) (0.45) (-0.66) (-0.79) (-0.64) (-1.55) (-2.05) (-2.53) 
FF α -0.02 -0.02 -0.00 -0.08 -0.02 -0.09 -0.07 -0.04 -0.09 -0.11 -0.09* 
 (-0.32) (-0.39) (-0.02) (-1.43) (-0.49) (-1.87) (-1.48) (-0.91) (-1.74) (-2.28) (-1.97) 
Carhart α -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.06 -0.02 -0.09 -0.08 -0.04 -0.09 -0.11 -0.10** 
 (-0.17) (-0.43) (-0.29) (-1.06) (-0.49) (-1.79) (-1.62) (-0.74) (-1.56) (-2.10) (-2.17) 
PS α -0.02 -0.03 -0.02 -0.07 -0.02 -0.08 -0.09 -0.03 -0.09 -0.10 -0.08* 
 (-0.28) (-0.53) (-0.38) (-1.21) (-0.47) (-1.7) (-1.62) (-0.48) (-1.47) (-1.93) (-1.84) 
Gross Return 
Average 0.76 0.77 0.79 0.71 0.77 0.70 0.70 0.71 0.67 0.66 -0.11** 
 (2.66) (2.61) (2.68) (2.45) (2.58) (2.36) (2.34) (2.39) (2.22) (2.21) (-2.2) 
CAPM α 0.13 0.13 0.15 0.08 0.13 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.02 0.01 -0.12** 
 (2.41) (1.97) (2.3) (1.2) (2.13) (1.03) (0.99) (1.36) (0.42) (0.27) (-2.52) 
FF α 0.10 0.08 0.10 0.02 0.08 0.01 0.03 0.06 0.02 0.01 -0.09* 
 (1.97) (1.57) (2.09) (0.38) (1.72) (0.28) (0.57) (1.21) (0.3) (0.11) (-1.96) 
Carhart α 0.10 0.08 0.09 0.04 0.08 0.01 0.02 0.06 0.01 0.00 -0.10** 
 (1.80) (1.37) (1.71) (0.63) (1.67) (0.27) (0.35) (1.27) (0.25) (0.05) (-2.16) 
PS α 0.09 0.07 0.08 0.03 0.08 0.02 0.01 0.08 0.02 0.01 -0.08* 
  (1.67) (1.24) (1.61) (0.43) (1.58) (0.39) (0.27) (1.47) (0.31) (0.2) (-1.82) 
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Table IA.XIV 
Fund Herding Following Institutional Buys and Sells 
This table presents the performance of decile portfolios formed on the basis of FH, the average tendency of mutual funds to follow past institutional trades. FH is constructed 
from the slope coefficient of cross-sectional regressions of mutual fund trades on past aggregate institutional buys (Panel A) and sells (Panel B) measured in the previous 
quarter, controlling for past stock returns, firm size, and the book-to-market ratio. Decile 10 is the portfolio of funds with the highest FH. We compute monthly equally 
weighted net and gross (net plus expense ratio) returns, as well as risk-adjusted returns based on the CAPM, the Fama and French (1993, FF) three-factor model, the 
Carhart (1997) four-factor model, and the Pastor and Stambaugh (2003, PS) five-factor model. Average returns and alphas are in monthly percentages. Newey-West (1987) 
t-statistics are shown in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively, for the return differentials between deciles 
10 and 1. 
Panel A: Fund Herding Following Institutional Buys 
FH rank 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 D10–D1 
Net Return 
Average  0.87 0.84 0.78 0.78 0.76 0.74 0.76 0.73 0.78 0.71 -0.16**  
(2.88) (2.87) (2.68) (2.65) (2.58) (2.53) (2.63) (2.45) (2.65) (2.43) (-2.36) 
CAPM α 0.09 0.07 0.01 0.00 -0.02 -0.03 -0.01 -0.06 0.00 -0.07 -0.15** 
(1.13) (0.92) (0.11) (0.01) (-0.29) (-0.53) (-0.21) (-1.08) 0.00  (-1.14) (-2.24) 
FF α 0.05 0.01 -0.06 -0.06 -0.07 -0.08 -0.05 -0.08 -0.02 -0.09 -0.14** 
(0.87) (0.12) (-1.11) (-1.33) (-1.35) (-1.57) (-1.09) (-1.57) (-0.46) (-1.57) (-2.44) 
Carhart α 0.01 -0.02 -0.06 -0.07 -0.09 -0.09 -0.05 -0.08 -0.03 -0.08 -0.09* 
(0.18) (-0.38) (-1.15) (-1.5) (-1.85) (-1.59) (-1.13) (-1.64) (-0.62) (-1.33) (-1.75) 
FS α 0.07 0.03 -0.03 -0.02 -0.04 -0.06 -0.03 -0.07 0.00 -0.10 -0.17** 
 (0.85) (0.42) (-0.52) (-0.37) (-0.63) (-0.89) (-0.48) (-1.26) (-0.06) (-1.79) (-2.22) 
Gross Return 
Average 0.98 0.94 0.88 0.87 0.86 0.84 0.86 0.82 0.88 0.81 -0.17** 
 (3.22) (3.22) (3.01) (2.97) (2.91) (2.85) (2.96) (2.77) (2.98) (2.77) (-2.42) 
CAPM α 0.19 0.17 0.10 0.09 0.08 0.06 0.08 0.04 0.10 0.03 -0.15** 
 (2.49) (2.24) (1.63) (1.54) (1.26) (0.94) (1.48) (0.69) (1.77) (0.55) (-2.29) 
FF α 0.15 0.11 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.05 0.02 0.07 0.01 -0.14** 
 (2.57) (1.89) (0.81) (0.72) (0.61) (0.20) (1.06) (0.40) (1.52) (0.18) (-2.51) 
Carhart α 0.11 0.08 0.04 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.07 0.02 -0.09* 
 (1.86) (1.33) (0.67) (0.44) (0.08) (0.09) (0.97) (0.29) (1.26) (0.31) (-1.82) 
PS α 0.17 0.13 0.06 0.07 0.06 0.04 0.07 0.03 0.09 0.00 -0.17** 
  (2.14) (1.70) (0.98) (1.15) (0.90) (0.53) (1.20) (0.53) (1.69) (-0.07) (-2.28) 
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Panel B: Fund Herding Following Institutional Sells 
FH rank 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 D10–D1 
Net Return 
Average 0.83 0.80 0.73 0.79 0.79 0.75 0.76 0.72 0.77 0.69 -0.14** 
 (2.84) (2.80) (2.57) (2.75) (2.75) (2.62) (2.61) (2.47) (2.58) (2.31) (-2.02) 
CAPM α 0.05 0.04 -0.03 0.02 0.02 -0.01 -0.02 -0.05 -0.01 -0.10 -0.15** 
 (0.83) (0.56) (-0.49) (0.33) (0.33) (-0.24) (-0.28) (-0.8) (-0.23) (-1.75) (-2.2) 
FF α 0.01 -0.02 -0.09 -0.05 -0.04 -0.08 -0.06 -0.12 -0.05 -0.10 -0.11* 
 (0.23) (-0.42) (-1.57) (-0.86) (-0.75) (-1.62) (-1.4) (-2.05) (-1.03) (-2.01) (-1.76) 
Carhart α 0.01 -0.02 -0.09 -0.05 -0.02 -0.08 -0.07 -0.11 -0.07 -0.09 -0.10* 
 (0.19) (-0.37) (-1.5) (-0.84) (-0.33) (-1.66) (-1.37) (-1.87) (-1.27) (-1.79) (-1.65) 
PS α 0.03 -0.01 -0.06 0.00 -0.02 -0.05 -0.03 -0.08 -0.03 -0.08 -0.11 
 (0.47) (-0.17) (-1.03) (-0.08) (-0.23) (-0.77) (-0.42) (-1.1) (-0.43) (-1.37) (-1.61) 
Gross Return 
Average 0.92 0.89 0.83 0.88 0.88 0.84 0.85 0.81 0.86 0.79 -0.13** 
 (3.18) (3.13) (2.88) (3.06) (3.07) (2.93) (2.92) (2.78) (2.90) (2.64) (-1.99) 
CAPM α 0.15 0.13 0.06 0.11 0.11 0.07 0.07 0.04 0.08 0.00 -0.15** 
 (2.30) (2.00) (0.94) (1.80) (1.66) (1.21) (1.26) (0.60) (1.27) (0.02) (-2.17) 
FF α 0.11 0.07 0.00 0.04 0.05 0.01 0.03 -0.02 0.04 0.00 -0.11* 
 (1.88) (1.18) (0.07) (0.83) (0.78) (0.20) (0.60) (-0.43) (0.78) (-0.05) (-1.74) 
Carhart α 0.11 0.07 0.00 0.04 0.07 0.01 0.03 -0.01 0.03 0.01 -0.10 
 (1.80) (1.19) (0.05) (0.73) (1.20) (0.11) (0.56) (-0.26) (0.55) (0.12) (-1.62) 
PS α 0.13 0.08 0.03 0.09 0.07 0.04 0.07 0.02 0.07 0.02 -0.11 
  (1.95) (1.27) (0.42) (1.45) (1.10) (0.74) (1.06) (0.24) (1.05) (0.32) (-1.58) 
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Table IA.XV 
Fund Herding Following Institutional Buys and Sells: Double Sorts 
This table presents the performance of mutual funds sorted on the basis of buy herding (FH/buys) and sell herding (FH/sells). We sort stocks based on the sign of the 
change in institutional ownership that they experience in the previous quarter, ΔIO; stocks with positive changes are classified as institutional buys and stocks with negative 
changes are classified as institutional sells. For these two groups of stocks, we separately estimate the slope coefficient of cross-sectional regressions of mutual fund trades 
on past institutional trades, controlling for past stock returns, firm size, and book-to-market. We use the estimated betas to create two measures of fund herding (FH) 
conditional on the sign of aggregate institutional trades: FH/buys and FH/sells. We double-sort funds independently into quartiles based on FH/buys and FH/sells and 
compute the average monthly performance of the 16 portfolios. The return series span January 1990 to December 2009. We report monthly equally weighted net returns, 
as well as risk-adjusted returns based on the Carhart (1997) four-factor model. Average returns and alphas are in monthly percentages. Newey-West (1987) t-statistics are 
shown in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively, for the return differentials between portfolios of high and 
low FH. 
 
   Net Return  Four-Factor Net α 
 Low FH/buys 2 3 High FH/buys High–Low/buys  Low FH/buys 2 3 High FH/buys High–Low/buys 
             
Low FH/sells  0.80 0.74 0.76 0.66 -0.13**  -0.03 -0.09 -0.06 -0.13 -0.10* 
  (2.76) (2.50) (2.59) (2.33) (-2.40)  (-0.47) (-1.42) (-0.93) (-1.85) (-1.82) 
2  0.82 0.80 0.77 0.76 -0.06  0.00 -0.03 -0.04 -0.02 -0.02 
  (2.85) (2.78) (2.67) (2.70) (-0.75)  (0.01) (-0.6) (-0.77) (-0.32) (-0.27) 
3  0.82 0.83 0.77 0.69 -0.12**  -0.01 -0.02 -0.04 -0.10 -0.10* 
  (2.83) (2.83) (2.63) (2.38) (-2.14)  (-0.1) (-0.31) (-0.85) (-1.79) (-1.78) 
High FH/sells  0.72 0.72 0.76 0.66 -0.06  -0.08 -0.11 -0.08 -0.10 -0.02 
  (2.52) (2.41) (2.48) (2.27) (-1.13)  (-1.3) (-1.85) (-1.34) (-1.41) (-0.41) 
High-Low/sells  -0.07 -0.02 0.00 0.00   -0.04 -0.02 -0.02 0.03 
   (-1.37) (-0.44) (-0.05) (0.06)   (-0.74) (-0.38) (-0.43) (0.62) 
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Table IA.XVI 
Price Pressure from Aggregate Institutional Trades  
This table presents estimates of the relation between aggregate institutional trades and future stock returns. For each month from January 1990 to December 2009, we 
regress monthly stock returns in excess of the one-month Treasury bill rate, measured in quarters t+1 to t+4, on aggregate institutional trades and stock characteristics 
measured in quarter t. Size is the natural log of stock market cap in millions of dollars. BM is the natural log of the book-to-market ratio. MOM3 is the stock return in 
quarter t. MOM12 is the stock return in the previous year. Turnover is trading volume in quarter t divided by the number of shares outstanding. Idiosyncratic volatility is 
the standard deviation of the residuals from a regression of daily stock returns on the Fama and French (1993) three factors, measured in quarter t. Share Issuance is the 
natural log of the ratio of the split-adjusted shares outstanding at the end of quarter t divided by the split-adjusted shares outstanding at the end of quarter t-4. Analyst 
earnings forecast revision is the quarterly change in consensus analyst earnings forecasts scaled by the stock price at the end of the previous period. The coefficients 
reported in the table are time-series averages of monthly regression coefficients, following Fama and MacBeth (1973). Newey-West (1987) t-statistics are shown in 
parentheses. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
 Dep variable: Excess returns (%) Quarter t+1  Quarter t+2  Quarter t+3  Quarter t+4 
  1 2  1 2  1 2  1 2 
ΔIO 0.006 -0.014  0.006 0.012  -0.027 -0.038  -0.002 0.010 
 (0.24) (-0.57)  (0.22) (0.51)  (-0.90) (-1.44)  (-0.09) (0.40) 
Size 0.027 -0.148**  0.032 -0.029  -0.008 -0.024  -0.010 0.018 
 (0.28) (-1.97)  (0.32) (-0.39)  (-0.08) (-0.31)  (-0.10) (0.23) 
BM 0.198* 0.082  0.211* 0.124  0.137 0.078  0.162 0.123 
 (1.78) (0.99)  (1.89) (1.60)  (1.23) (0.99)  (1.47) (1.56) 
MOM3 0.006 0.002  0.184* 0.190**  0.194** 0.189***  0.111 0.135** 
 (0.06) (0.03)  (1.84) (2.47)  (2.06) (2.66)  (1.30) (2.14) 
MOM12 0.290*** 0.318***  -0.003 0.033  -0.168** -0.117**  -0.134* -0.116* 
 (3.12) (3.90)  (-0.04) (0.49)  (-2.37) (-1.96)  (-1.71) (-1.77) 
Turnover  -0.003   -0.034   -0.014   -0.013 
  (-0.04)   (-0.43)   (-0.17)   (-0.16) 
Idiosyncratic Vol  -0.286***   -0.075   0.006   0.116 
  (-2.67)   (-0.64)   (0.05)   (1.02) 
Share Issuance  -0.169***   -0.178***   -0.181***   -0.158*** 
  (-5.48)   (-5.14)   (-5.00)   (-4.53) 
Forecast Revision  0.224***   -0.051   0.062*   0.029 
  (5.17)   (-1.61)   (1.90)   (0.80) 
Adj R2 0.043 0.066  0.038 0.057  0.034 0.053  0.031 0.048 
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Table IA.XVII 
Fund Herding and Future Performance: 
Excluding Top and Bottom Deciles of Fund Herding 
This table presents coefficient estimates from predictive panel regressions estimating the association between fund-level herding (FH) and future fund performance. FH is 
defined as the slope coefficient from cross-sectional regressions of mutual fund trades on past aggregate institutional trades measured in the past quarter, controlling for 
past stock returns, firm size, and the book-to-market ratio. Future mutual fund performance is measured using Carhart (1997) four-factor alpha (both net and gross in 
monthly percentages); factor loadings are estimated from rolling-window regressions over the previous three years. The panel regressions control for fund size, age, 
expense ratio (in percent), turnover, percentage flows in the past quarter, and alpha (in percent) in the past three years. The regressions include time fixed effects and the 
standard errors are clustered by fund. We exclude from the sample the top 10% herding funds and the bottom 10% antiherding funds. The t-statistics are presented in 
parentheses. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
 Four-Factor Net α  Four-Factor Gross α 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
FH -0.424*** -0.487***  -0.421*** -0.485*** 
  (-2.62) (-2.94)  (-2.60) (-2.92) 
Size  -0.009**   -0.010*** 
   (-2.31)   (-2.68) 
Age  0.018*   0.018** 
   (1.93)   (2.01) 
Expense  -0.090***   -0.019 
   (-5.12)   (-1.07) 
Turnover  -0.022***   -0.022*** 
   (-3.01)   (-2.91) 
Flow  0.033*   0.030* 
   (1.77)   (1.65) 
Alpha  0.005   0.002 
   (0.20)   (0.07) 
      
Adj R2 0.061 0.062  0.061 0.062 
N 134,460 128,308  134,460 128,308 
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Table IA.XVIII 
Value-Weighted Fund Portfolios 
This table presents the performance of decile portfolios formed on the basis of Fund Herding (FH), the average tendency of mutual funds to follow past institutional trades. 
FH is constructed from the slope coefficient of cross-sectional regressions of mutual fund trades on past aggregate institutional trades measured in the previous quarter, 
controlling for past stock returns, firm size, and the book-to-market ratio. The return series span January 1990 to December 2009. Decile 10 is the portfolio of funds with 
the highest fund herding measure. We compute monthly value-weighted net and gross (net plus expense ratio) returns on the portfolios, as well as risk-adjusted returns 
based on the CAPM, the Fama and French (1993, FF) three-factor model, the Carhart (1997) four-factor model, and the Pastor and Stambaugh (2003, PS) five-factor 
model. Average returns and alphas are in monthly percentages. Newey-West (1987) t-statistics are shown in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at 
the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively, for the return differentials between deciles 10 and 1. 
FH rank 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 D10-D1 
Net Return 
Average 0.78 0.76 0.77 0.76 0.74 0.71 0.64 0.64 0.66 0.55 -0.23*** 
 (2.77) (2.68) (2.72) (2.70) (2.70) (2.51) (2.27) (2.19) (2.26) (1.73) (-2.66) 
CAPM α 0.03 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 -0.05 -0.12 -0.13 -0.11 -0.26 -0.29*** 
 (0.45) (0.07) (0.25) (0.09) (-0.06) (-1.01) (-2.12) (-2.27) (-1.88) (-3.63) (-3.62) 
FF α 0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.04 -0.04 -0.06 -0.13 -0.13 -0.10 -0.22 -0.23*** 
 (0.16) (-0.17) (-0.12) (-0.8) (-0.92) (-1.36) (-2.34) (-2.29) (-1.82) (-3.52) (-3.16) 
Carhart α 0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.06 -0.06 -0.07 -0.10 -0.12 -0.10 -0.21 -0.24*** 
 (0.42) (-0.47) (-0.51) (-1.1) (-1.17) (-1.63) (-1.75) (-1.98) (-1.88) (-3.3) (-3.06) 
PS α 0.02 -0.06 -0.05 -0.09 -0.07 -0.07 -0.12 -0.13 -0.10 -0.21 -0.23*** 
 (0.24) (-0.96) (-0.88) (-1.67) (-1.45) (-1.64) (-2.15) (-1.99) (-1.77) (-3.27) (-2.85) 
Gross Return 
Average 0.87 0.84 0.85 0.84 0.82 0.79 0.71 0.72 0.75 0.65 -0.23*** 
 (3.10) (2.96) (3.00) (2.98) (2.98) (2.78) (2.54) (2.47) (2.54) (2.02) (-2.64) 
CAPM α 0.12 0.09 0.09 0.08 0.07 0.03 -0.04 -0.05 -0.03 -0.17 -0.29*** 
 (1.79) (1.32) (1.70) (1.43) (1.40) (0.60) (-0.75) (-0.87) (-0.45) (-2.32) (-3.6) 
FF α 0.10 0.07 0.07 0.04 0.03 0.02 -0.06 -0.05 -0.01 -0.12 -0.23*** 
 (1.49) (1.14) (1.30) (0.68) (0.68) (0.38) (-1) (-0.88) (-0.26) (-2) (-3.13) 
Carhart α 0.12 0.05 0.05 0.02 0.02 0.01 -0.03 -0.04 -0.02 -0.11 -0.23*** 
 (1.69) (0.76) (0.89) (0.33) (0.39) (0.12) (-0.44) (-0.66) (-0.32) (-1.8) (-3.04) 
PS α 0.11 0.02 0.03 -0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.05 -0.04 -0.02 -0.11 -0.22*** 
  (1.46) (0.27) (0.58) (-0.21) (0.07) (0.03) (-0.81) (-0.72) (-0.33) (-1.81) (-2.83) 
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Table IA.XIX 
Fund Herding and Stock Characteristics 
This table presents the average characteristics of stock holdings for decile portfolios of mutual funds formed on the basis of FH, the average tendency of mutual funds to 
follow past institutional trades. FH is constructed from the slope coefficient of cross-sectional regressions of mutual fund trades on past aggregate institutional trades 
measured in the previous quarter, controlling for past stock returns, firm size, and the book-to-market ratio. The sample period spans January 1990 to December 2009. 
Decile 10 is the portfolio of funds with the highest average herding measure. The stocks characteristics include size, book-to-market ratio, returns in the past quarter 
(Momentum), and the level of aggregate institutional ownership (IO). All characteristics are measured in decile ranks.  
 
FH rank 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
           
Size Rank 9.6 9.6 9.6 9.6 9.6 9.6 9.7 9.7 9.7 9.6 
BM Rank 3.9 3.9 3.9 4.0 3.8 3.8 3.7 3.6 3.5 3.4 
Momentum Rank 6.0 6.0 6.1 6.1 6.1 6.1 6.1 6.0 6.1 6.1 
IO Rank 8.4 8.4 8.4 8.4 8.4 8.4 8.4 8.4 8.4 8.5 
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Table IA.XX 
Fund Herding and Future Performance: Controlling for R2 from Trade Regressions  
This table presents coefficient estimates from predictive panel regressions estimating the association between fund herding 
(FH) and future fund performance. FH is constructed from the slope coefficient of cross-sectional regressions of mutual fund 
trades on past aggregate institutional trades measured in the previous quarter, controlling for past stock returns, firm size, and 
the book-to-market ratio. Future mutual fund performance is measured using Carhart (1997) four-factor alpha (both net and 
gross, in monthly percentages); factor loadings are estimated from rolling-window regressions over the previous three years. 
The panel regressions control for the R2 from the trade regressions used to estimate FH. We also control for fund size, age, 
expense ratio (in percent), turnover, percentage flows in the previous quarter, alpha (in percent) estimated over the previous 
three years, active share, and similarity with the investment decisions of successful funds. The regressions include time fixed 
effects and the standard errors are clustered by fund. t-statistics are presented in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
                       
   Four-Factor  Net α (t+1) Four-Factor Gross α (t+1) 
  (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
Fund Herding  -0.446*** -0.512*** -0.445*** -0.508*** 
   (-4.87) (-4.31) (-4.86) (-4.27) 
Size   -0.006* -0.008* -0.007** -0.009** 
   (-1.69) (-1.77) (-2.08) (-2.06) 
Age   0.014 -0.005 0.014* -0.004 
   (1.60) (-0.48) (1.67) (-0.43) 
Expense  -0.079*** -0.105*** -0.009 -0.034* 
   (-4.83) (-5.05) (-0.52) (-1.65) 
Turnover  -0.025*** -0.039*** -0.024*** -0.038*** 
   (-3.39) (-3.78) (-3.30) (-3.69) 
Flow   0.002*** 0.020 0.002*** 0.018 
   (2.63) (1.42) (2.79) (1.24) 
Past Alpha  0.014 0.025 0.010 0.022 
   (0.62) (1.00) (0.46) (0.88) 
R2    0.081 -0.079 0.083 -0.077 
   (1.41) (-1.06) (1.45) (-1.04) 
Active Share  0.215*** 0.220*** 
   (4.75) (4.86) 
Similarity   0.071* 0.072* 
   (1.81) (1.81) 
    
Adj R2   0.06 0.08 0.06 0.08 
N     159238 92540 159238 92540 
 
